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Does Highly Concentrated Market Inevitably Lead to Predatory Pricing? The 
Case of the Mexican Banking Industry 
 
Chu V. Nguyen Charles  Smith* Justo  Manrique 
 
Abstract 
Asymmetries in the Mexican lending-deposit rate spread were documented. Empirical results 
revealed that the lending-deposit rate spread adjusts to the threshold faster when the deposit rates 
fall relative to the lending rates than when the deposit rates move in the opposite direction This 
non-predatory rate setting behavior in the highly concentrated market may be attributable to the 
rise in foreign bank entry, which has fostered market contestability over the sample period. The 
empirical results also revealed the bidirectional Granger causality between the lending rate and 
the deposit rate, indicating that the lending rate and the deposit rate affect each other’s 
movement. 
 Key Words: Asymmetry; lending rate; deposit rate; lending-deposit rate spread; Mexican 
predatory pricing behavior. 
JEL classification codes: C22; E44; G21. 
 
Introduction  
The financial sector in general and 
commercial banks in particular play a 
significant role in promoting the 
industrialization and economic development 
of a country and are well documented in 
financial economics literature. This sector is 
expected to provide efficient intermediation to 
mobilize savings and channel them into 
productive investments and thus promote 
industrialization and development. 
Additionally, the banking sector is an integral 
part of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. These intermediaries would 
derive their interest income from the spread 
between the lending rate charged to borrowers 
and the deposit rate paid to savers. Economic 
theory has articulated that if the lending rates 
or spread is high, it would reflect inefficiency 
and/or lack of competition, and keep the 
financial sector from fulfilling its expected 
role in the economic development process. 
Furthermore, commercial banks’ behavior in 
setting their deposit and lending rates 
significantly influences the effectiveness of 
the monetary authority in its monetary 
policymaking.1 
 As suggested by Thompson (2006), banks 
may set their lending rates as some markup or 
premium over their deposit rates. If the 
premium is perceived to be too high or too 
low, the market forces will discipline banks to 
adjust back to some equilibrium spread. More 
importantly, part of any market determined 
lending rate, and hence lending-deposit rate 
spread, is risk premium. Therefore, despite 
conventional microeconomic theoretical 
articulation otherwise, operating in a highly 
concentrated market, charging high nominal 
lending rates or lending-deposit rate spread, 
and asymmetrically pricing financial products 
are necessary, but not sufficient, evidence of 
exhibiting oligopolistic/monopolistic market 
power by financial institutions in the context 
of predatory pricing. A highly concentrated 
market, high lending rate or lending-deposit 
rate spread, coupled with the predatory 
asymmetric rate-setting ability are stronger 
evidence of market power.   
The evidence of asymmetric rate-setting 
behavior in the banking industry supports the 
literature hypothesizing the asymmetric effects 
of monetary policy on output. There are three 
main theoretical explanations for commercial 
bank interest rate asymmetries: bank 
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concentration hypothesis, consumer 
characteristic hypothesis, and consumer 
reaction hypothesis.2 
The bank concentration hypothesis posits that 
banks in more concentrated markets are 
slower to adjust deposit rates upward and 
faster to adjust them downward while 
exhibiting the opposite behavior regarding 
lending rates (Neumark and Sharpe, 1992; 
Hannan and Berger, 1991). The consumer 
characteristic hypothesis asserts that the 
greater the proportion of unsophisticated 
consumers relative to sophisticated consumers 
in the market, together with the potential 
search and switching costs, the greater the 
banks’ ability to adjust interest rates to their 
advantage (Calem and Mester, 1995; 
Hutchison, 1995; Rosen, 2002). 
However, the asymmetric adjustment in 
lending rates may actually benefit the 
consumers.  As articulated by Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981), the presence of asymmetric 
information may create an adverse selection 
problem in lending markets such that higher 
interest rates will tend to attract riskier 
borrowers. Therefore, banks would be 
reluctant to raise lending rates, even if market 
rates rise. The expected cost to the banks of 
not raising the lending rates when their 
marginal cost of fund increases, will be offset 
by the benefits from not encouraging the 
higher-risk consumers to borrow. 
Additionally, the asymmetric rate-setting in 
the context of rates of return on financial 
market instruments in developed economies 
has been empirically documented in financial 
economics literature.  Arak et al. (1983), 
Goldberg (1984), Forbes and Mayne (1989), 
Levine and Loeb (1989), Mester and Saunders 
(1995), Dueker (2000), and Tkacz (2001) have 
reported asymmetries in the U.S. prime 
lending rate in the past.  Thompson (2006) 
found asymmetries in the U.S. prime lending-
deposit rate spread. Cook and Hahn (1989), 
Moazzami (1999), and Sarno and Thornton 
(2003) found asymmetries in U.S. Treasury 
securities in their studies.  Frost and Bowden 
(1999) and Scholnick (1999) reported 
asymmetries in mortgage rates in New 
Zealand, and Canada.  Heffernan (1997) and 
Hofmann and Mizen (2004) indicated 
asymmetric behavior of retail rates in the 
United Kingdom. Hannan and Berger (1991), 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992), and Diebold and 
Sharpe (1990) examine various deposit rates 
for the same behavior.  
The Mexican Financial Sector 
The Mexican economy has experienced some 
adverse financial phenomena in the recent 
history: the debt overhang in the 1980s, the 
Tequila attack in the early 1990s, and most 
recently the contagion of the U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis.  The banking system was 
nationalized and privatized to complete the 
circle to the current state of the system of an 
emerging economy.3 The central bank of 
Mexico (Banco de México) regulates the 
money supply and foreign exchange markets, 
sets reserve requirements for Mexican banks, 
and enforces credit controls. It serves as the 
fiscal agent of the federal government, the 
issuing bank for the peso, and as a discount 
house for private deposit banks. It supervises 
the private banking sector through the 
National Banking Commission. 
As pointed out in the IMF Country Report (no 
01/192, October 2001, p. 9), Mexico, up to the 
early 1990s,  had most of the financial 
institutions found in the financial systems of 
industrial countries, but the degree of 
development across sectors varied 
significantly. The banking sector dominated 
the financial system. Large conglomerates 
headed by banks normally provided private 
financial services. State-owned banks were 
involved in development-related lending, and 
housing finance. Nonbanking institutions 
included finance and factoring companies, 
specialized investment funds, pension funds, 
and insurance companies (IMF Country 
Report no 01/192, October 2001, p. 10). 
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In regard to the banking system, Blavy and 
Souto (2009, p. 7) characterized the Mexican 
banking system as having a low level of 
financial intermediation, with bank credit to 
the private sector substantially lower than in 
comparator countries. Moreover, the authors 
observed that an important share of banks’ 
assets was devoted to holdings of public sector 
debt instruments. However, the banking sector 
consumer- and mortgage-lending increased 
significantly, starting in early 2000. For 
example, from 2002 to 2007, consumer-
lending increasing on average increased by 
over 40 percent each year from 2002 to 2007 
(Blavy and Souto 2009, p. 7). More recently, 
consumer-lending has slowed greatly, while 
credit to firms picked up in the last two years.  
Following the currency crisis of late 1994, 
known as the Tequila attack, the government 
was forced to raise interest rates sharply in 
order to protect the peso’s value by retaining 
existing short-term foreign investment and 
attracting new capital inflows. High interest 
rates during 1995 sharply increased the 
payments owed by Mexican individual and 
business borrowers, many of whom could not 
shoulder the increased burden. As a result, the 
share of nonperforming to performing loans 
held by Mexican banks rose significantly, 
creating a major crisis for the financial sector. 
As pointed out by Zanforlin and Espinosa 
(2008, p. 5) the sharp interest rate spike in the 
aftermath of the Tequila crisis triggered a 
wave of bank mortgage defaults. The majority 
of mortgage lending in the early 1990s had 
adjustable interest rates. After the crisis, 
commercial banks relinquished almost entirely 
the origination of real estate mortgages to 
nonbank financial institutions and public 
sector entities. In 1994 nonbank financial 
intermediaries that specialized in real estate 
mortgages (Sofoles) were created, with their 
core market consisting of low-income 
households.  
Additionally, as pointed out in IMF Country 
Report (no 01/192, October 2001, p. 12), 
another consequence of the Tequila attack is a 
contractionary trend in the banking industry.  
After the crisis, banking system assets shrank 
from 55 percent of GDP at the end of 1994 to 
37 percent of GDP at the end of 2000. Even 
more spectacular was the contraction of bank 
credit to the private sector—it represented 76 
percent of bank assets (43 percent of GDP) at 
the end of 1994, and shrank to the equivalent 
of 22 percent of bank asset (10 percent of 
GDP)  at the end of 2000. 
In the face of the Tequila crisis and its 
attendant economic and financial difficulties, 
the Mexican economy underwent a significant 
transformation to comply with the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
implemented in January 1994 and one year 
later -- to the day – with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreement. Complying 
with the NAFTA and WTO is an important 
undertaking for developing nations. NAFTA 
and WTO memberships, without a doubt, 
change the characteristics and the complexity 
of the Mexican economy. Tariffs in all sectors 
are decreased substantially over time. Being a 
member of NAFTA and WTO also entails a 
wide array of commitments from Mexico to 
reduce trade-distorting subsidies, establish 
foreign companies’ trading rights, and comply 
with the full range of NAFTA and WTO rules 
and regulations. The distribution sector has to 
be opened up from the date of accession to 
foreign companies engaging in joint ventures 
with domestic partners that are allowed to 
operate in all but a few specific sectors or 
activities. 
In regard to engagement of foreign banks in 
Mexico, Blavy and Souto (2009, p. 7) reported 
that the banking sector is highly concentrated, 
and dominated by foreign-owned banks.  To 
substantiate their position, these authors cited 
that BBVA Bancomer, Banco Mercantil del 
Norte, Banco Nacional de México, Banco 
Santander, HSBC and Scotiabank Inverlat are 
the six largest banks in Mexico. Five of them 
are foreign owned.  More striking, (IMF 
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Country Report no 01/192, October 2001, p. 
13), has been the rise in foreign participation 
in the Mexican banking system, as the share in 
total assets of foreign-controlled banks rose 
from 24 percent in 1998 to nearly 50 percent 
at the end of 2000, and will reach over 70 
percent when the purchase of Banamex by 
Citigroup is completed.  
Thus, across this spectrum of events, it can be 
arguably posited that, over the NAFTA and 
WTO membership era, Mexican banks have 
been operating in fairly concentrated markets. 
The most important question is: does highly 
concentrated market inevitably lead to 
predatory pricing behavior as 
oligopolistic/monopolistic economic theory 
suggested? More specifically, do asymmetries 
exist in the Mexican lending-deposit rate 
spread, and if so, do such asymmetries reveal 
that the Mexican banks engage in 
oligopolistic/monopolistic or competitive rate-
setting behavior?  Second, if asymmetries are 
present, how do lending and deposit rates 
respond to such asymmetries? The remainder 
of this study is organized as follows: the next 
section describes the data used in this study 
and its descriptive statistics; the following 
section briefly describes the methodology used 
in the investigation; the section that follows 
reports the empirical results; and the final 
section provides concluding remarks. 
Data 
To study the market power of Mexican banks 
in the NAFTA and WTO membership era by 
investigating  the asymmetries in the Mexican 
lending-deposit rate spread, this analysis 
utilizes monthly data from International 
Financial Statistics, published by the IMF, 
over the period of 1995:02 to 2010:01. 
  
Figure 1 
Figure 1 displays the behavior of the 
respective lending and deposit rates over the 
sample period (correlation = 0.975). The mean 
lending rate during this period is 17.13 
percent, and ranges from 5.15 to 91.97. The 
mean deposit rate over the same period is 9.77 
percent, and ranges from 1.30 to 57.51   These 
descriptive statistics indicate that the lending 
rates are high relative to deposit rates and the 
resulting spreads were very high by 
international standards, raising questions as to 
whether the risk premium or the 
oligopolistic/monopolistic power led to this 
phenomenon in the NAFTA and WTO era in 
Mexico. 
Methodology  
As aforementioned, the Mexican economy and 
its financial sector have gone through many 
Mexican Lending Rates and Deposit Rates
February 1995 to January 2010
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
0
25
50
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changes and experienced many economic 
shocks; therefore, it is possible that the 
lending rates and the deposit rates might 
experience structural breaks over the sample 
period. To avoid possible misspecification of 
equation (1) due to failure to account for 
structural shifts and hence the entire model, 
following Perron (1997) procedure, this study 
specified and estimated an endogenous unit 
root test function with the intercept, slope, and 
the trend dummies to test the hypothesis that 
the Mexican lending rates and the deposit rates 
have experienced structural shifts over the 
sample period. The estimation results of these 
tests suggest that both the Mexican lending 
rates and the deposit rates might experience 
structural breaks in March 2001, possibly due 
to the impact of the recession in the US—its 
Northern neighbor and major trading partner. 
However, the test statistics rejected this 
suggested possibility at any conventional level 
of significance (see the Appendix).  
Given the result of the structural break tests 
and to investigate the aforementioned concern, 
the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model 
developed by Enders and Siklos (2001) is 
estimated to formally examine the behavior of 
the Mexican lending-deposit rate spread.  The 
threshold autoregressive model allows the 
degree of autoregressive decay to depend on 
the state of the lending-deposit rate spread, 
(i.e., “deepness” of cycles). The estimated 
TAR model empirically reveals whether the 
spread tends to revert to the long-run position 
faster when the spread is above or below the 
threshold. Therefore, the estimated TAR 
model indicates whether troughs or peaks 
persist more when shocks push the spread out 
of its long term path. For instance, if the 
autoregressive decay is fast when the spread is 
above the trend and slow when the spread is 
below the trend, troughs will be more 
persistent than peaks.   Likewise, if the 
autoregressive decay is slow when the spread 
is above trend and fast when the spread is 
below trend, peaks will be more persistent 
than troughs In this model’s specification, the 
null hypothesis that the lending-deposit rate 
spread contains a unit root can be expressed as
021 == ρρ , while the hypothesis that the 
spread is stationary with symmetric 
adjustments can be stated as 21 ρρ = .  
Enders and Siklos (2001) extended the popular 
two-step symmetric Engle-Granger (1987) 
methodology to test for long-run relationships 
between two time series allowing for 
asymmetry. As demonstrated by Enders-Siklos 
(2001), the first step in the procedure is to 
follow the Engel-Granger (1987) methodology 
to estimate the following long-run relationship 
between the Mexican lending rate and deposit 
rate using ordinary least squares.
                                   
ttttt TrendDummyDRLR εββββ ++++= 3210    (1) 
 
where tLR  and tDR are denoted as the lending 
rate and the deposit rate, respectively. tTrend
is a time trend and tDummy  is a dummy (with 
values of zero prior to March 2001 and values 
of one for March 2001 and thereafter). The 
saved residuals, tε  from the estimation of 
equation (1), denoted by tεˆ , are then used to 
estimate the following TAR model: 
tpt
p
i ittttt
uII ˆˆˆ)1(ˆˆ
11211
+∆+−+=∆
−
=
−− ∑ εαερερε     (2) 
 
where ),0.(..~ˆ 2σdiiu t , and the lagged values 
of tεˆ∆  are meant to yield uncorrelated 
residuals.  As defined by Enders and Granger 
(1998), the Heaviside indicator function for 
the model is given as:  
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The threshold value,τ , is endogenously 
determined using the Chan (1993) procedure, 
which obtains τ  by minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals after sorting the estimated 
residuals in ascending order, and eliminating 
15 percent of the largest and smallest values.  
The elimination of the largest and smallest 
values is to assure that the tεˆ
 
series crosses 
through the threshold in the sample period. 
Empirical Results 
The estimation results of the model are 
summarized in Table 1. An analysis of the 
overall empirical results indicates that the 
estimation results are devoid of serial 
correlation and have good predicting power, as 
evidenced by the Ljung-Box statistics and the 
overall F-statistics, respectively. With the 
calculated statistic µΦ  = 66.5866, the null 
hypothesis of a unit root ( 021 == ρρ ) is 
rejected at the 1 percent significance level 
(i.e., the spread is stationary).  As to the speed 
of adjustment, based on the partial test statistic 
F = 51.3378, the null hypothesis of symmetry,
21 ρρ = , is rejected at any conventional 
significance level. Thus, the empirical results 
indicate that adjustments around the threshold 
value of the Mexican lending-deposit rate 
spread are asymmetric.  In fact, the point 
estimates suggest that the spread tends to 
decay at the rate of 6292.01 =ρ  for 1ˆ −tε above 
the threshold, 7837.1=τ , and at the rate of 
0.11322 =ρ  for 1ˆ −tε  below the threshold. 
Both 1ρ  and 2ρ  are statistically significant at 
1 percent level. Furthermore, the estimates of 
1ρ  and 2ρ  satisfy the stationary (convergence) 
conditions.4 With regard to the stationarity of 
the basis, Ewing et al. (2006, p. 14) pointed 
out that this simple finding is consistent with 
the two underlying series that comprise the 
basis being co-integrated in the conventional, 
linear combination sense. 
Table 1: Unit Root and Tests of Asymmetry, Mexican Monthly Data, 1995:02 to 2010:01 
    1ρ     2ρ     τ  0: 210 == ρρH  210 : ρρ =H            aic 
-0.6292* -0.1132* 1.7837 µΦ = 66.5866
*
 
F =  51.3378* 0.0404 
      
             QLB (2)=4.0920[0.1292]             ln L = -267.9745      F(4,173)=41.1168*   
    
Notes: The null hypothesis of a unit root, 0: 210 == ρρH , uses the critical values from Enders and Siklos  
(2001, p. 170, Table 1, for four lagged changes and n = 100).”*” and”**” indicate 1 and 5 percent levels of 
significance. The null hypothesis of symmetry, 210 : ρρ =H , uses the standard F distribution.  τ  is the threshold 
value determined via the Chan (1993) method. QLB (2) denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic with 2 lags.   
 
With regard to the adjustment process, given
21 ρρ > , the Mexican lending-deposit rate 
spread adjusts to the threshold value faster 
when monetary policy action or economic 
shock causes the deposit rates to fall relative 
to the lending rates, widening the spread, than 
when the deposit rates move in the opposite 
direction, narrowing the spread. These 
findings contradict those reported by  
 
 
Thompson (2006) in the U.S. with respect to 
the prime rate and the secondary market one-
month CD rate, and seem to support the 
position articulated by the consumer-reaction 
hypothesis articulated by Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), that the presence of asymmetric 
information may create an adverse selection 
problem in lending markets such that higher 
interest rates will tend to attract riskier 
borrowers.  These empirical findings seem to 
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suggest strongly that the observed high 
lending rate and deposit-lending rate spread be 
attributable to the risk profile of the Mexican 
economy.  
More interestingly, these empirical findings 
parallel the standard econometric simulation 
results conducted by the IMF’s Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) mission 
that supports the hypothesis that “observed 
interest rates and loan quantities have been 
statistically equivalent to those a competitive 
system would have produced.” This suggests 
that the larger players have not exhibited 
predatory pricing behavior. The lack of 
evidence on predatory pricing behavior in 
spite of the increased concentration, over the 
NAFTA and WTO membership era, is likely 
explained by the rise in foreign bank entry, 
which has fostered market contestability (IMF 
Country Report no 01/192, October 2001, p. 
33). 
Results of the Asymmetric Error-
Correction Model 
The presence of asymmetric adjustments in 
the Mexican lending-deposit rate spread, as 
indicated by the above estimation results, 
necessitates the estimation of a TAR VEC 
model to further investigate the short-run and 
long-run dynamics with respect to the lending 
rate ( tLR )  and the deposit rate ( tDR ).    
          
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIILR 1121112110 )()(ˆ)1(ˆ +∆+∆+−++=∆ −−−− ερερα
     
(4)  
         
tititttttt uDRLALRLAIIDR 2222112110 )()(ˆ)1(~ˆ~~ +∆+∆+−++=∆ −−−− ερερα
  
  (5)  
where ),0.(..~ 22,1 σdiiu t  and tI  is set in 
accordance with equation (3).   
As pointed out by Thompson (2006, pp. 327-
328), the above specified TAR VEC model 
differs from the conventional error-correction 
models by allowing asymmetric adjustments 
toward the long-run equilibrium. Also, the 
asymmetric error correctional model replaces 
the single symmetric error correction term 
with two error correction terms. Thus, in 
addition to estimating the long-run equilibrium 
relationship and asymmetric adjustment, the 
model also allows for tests of short-run 
dynamic between changes in lending rate and 
deposit rate. This in turn reveals the nature of 
their Granger causality. 
The estimation results of the asymmetric error 
correction model are reported in Table 2. In 
the summary of the estimation results, Aij(L) 
represents the first-order polynomials in the 
lag operator L. The Fij represents the 
calculated partial F-statistics with the p-value 
in squared brackets testing the null hypothesis 
that all coefficients of Aij are equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are reported with “*” and “**” 
indicating the 1 and 5 percent significant 
levels, respectively. QLB (2) is the Ljung-Box 
statistics and its significance is in squared 
brackets, testing for the first six of the residual 
autocorrelations to be jointly equal to zero. ln 
L is the log likelihood. The overall F-statistic 
with “*” indicates the significance level of 1 
percent. 
An analysis of the overall empirical results 
indicates that the estimated equations (4) and 
(5) are devoid of serial correlation and have 
good predicting power as evidenced by the 
Ljung-Box statistics and the overall F-
statistics, respectively. As to the short-run 
dynamic adjustment, the calculated partial F-
statistics in equations (4) and (5) indicate 
bidirectional Granger-causality between 
Mexican lending and deposit rates. These 
results imply that the Mexican lending rate 
and deposit rate adjustments affected each 
other’s movements, which parallel those 
reported by Thompson with respect to the 
prime lending rate and the one-month CD rate 
in the U.S. banking industry, i.e., there is 
evidence of Granger bidirectional causality.
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Table 2: Asymmetric Error Correction Model, Mexican Monthly Data, 1995:02 to 2010:01 
tittitttttttt uDRLALRLAIILR 1222111 )()(ˆ)1(0286.0ˆ3324.00568.0 +∆+∆+−+−=∆ −−−− εε  
    0.3759       -3.8237*       0.3246                   F11=13.9307[0.000]   F21 =17.5226[0.000] 
 
 QLB (2) = 0.9000[0.6377]      ln L = -319.5516            F (6,160) =9.3290* 
 
 tittitttttttt uDRLALRLAIIDR 2222111 )()(ˆ)1(0634.0ˆ1214.01233.0 +∆+∆+−+−−=∆ −−−− εε
 
      -1.3153     -2.2679 **           1.2917         F21= 27.4639[0.000]   F22=32.5082[0.002] 
 
      QLB (2) = 5.4230[0.0665]            ln L = -248.6013              F (7,159) =19.5433* 
 
In addition to revealing the short -run dynamic 
Granger-causality, the asymmetric error 
correction model also allows the long-run 
adjustments of the lending rate, 21 ρρ >  in 
equation (4), indicating that the lending rate 
adjusts to the long-run equilibrium faster when 
the shock widens than when it narrows the 
lending-deposit rate spread. This empirical 
finding is consistent with the estimation 
results of the TAR model.  However, while 1ρ  
is statistically significant at 1 percent, 2ρ  is 
not significant at any conventional level. 
Economically, this result suggests that the 
Mexican lending rate does not respond to 
contractionary monetary policy in the long 
run.  With regard to the long-run adjustment of 
the deposit rate, the estimation results for 
equation (5) show that 21 ~~ ρρ > , and only 1~ρ
is statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
These findings suggest that the deposit rate 
only responds to the expansionary monetary 
policy, widening the lending-deposit rate 
spread, but does not respond to contractionary 
monetary policy that narrows the spread in the 
long run.  
Concluding Remarks  
This study utilized the threshold 
autoregressive (TAR) model developed by 
Enders and Siklos (2001) to examine the 
Mexican banks’ lending-deposit rates setting 
behavior. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
the empirical results suggest that Mexican 
banks do not engage in predatory pricing 
strategy that is expected in the concentrated 
markets.  In fact the Mexican lending rate-
deposit rate spread adjusts faster toward the 
threshold value when the spread is widening 
(i.e., decreasing the deposit rate) than when 
the spread is narrowing (i.e., increasing the 
deposit rate). These findings contradict those 
reported by Thompson (2006) regarding the 
responses of the U.S. prime lending rate and 
the one-month CD rate to their spread, but 
seem to support the consumer reaction 
hypothesis articulated by Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981). 
With regard to the short-run and long-run 
dynamics of the Mexican lending and deposit 
rates, the empirical estimations of the 
asymmetric error-correction model reveal that 
the lending rate and the deposit rate affect 
each other’s movement. These bidirectional 
Granger causality findings parallel those 
reported by Thompson (2006) with respect to 
the prime lending rate and the one-month CD 
rate. The estimation results further suggest that 
the lending rate adjusts to the long-run 
equilibrium faster when a shock widens than 
when it narrows the lending-deposit rate 
spread. However, the estimation results seem 
to indicate that the deposit rate only responds 
when the spread is widening, not when it is 
narrowing in the long-run. 
These empirical findings are important 
because they indicate that Mexican 
contractionary and expansionary monetary 
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policy actions affect the market rates 
differently. The banking system, operating in a 
fairly highly concentrated market where five 
out of the six largest banks are foreign owned, 
is quite wary of high-risk borrowers, and 
avoids the high-return and high-risk pricing 
strategy. Thus, the high lending rates and the 
high market rate spreads are attributable to the 
high-risk profile of the economy. The lack of 
evidence on predatory pricing behavior in 
spite of the increased market concentration is 
likely explained by the rise in foreign bank 
entry, which has fostered market 
contestability, 
Endnotes 
1 Sellon (2002) provides a nice overview of the 
impact of the changing U.S. financial system 
on the interest rate channel for monetary 
policy transmission. 
2
 Scholnick (1999) provides the survey on 
these three types of explanations for 
commercial banks’ interest rate asymmetries 
in the literature. 
3 Mexican commercial banks were 
nationalized in 1982 by presidential decree 
under the presidential administration of Jose 
Lopez Portillo (1976 -1982).  Under the 
presidential administration of Miguel de la 
Madrid Hurtado (1982-88), private sector 
institutions were allowed to perform the so-
called nonbank functions of the banks, and the 
radical liberalization and privatization process 
of the Mexican commercial banking system 
began in 1987.  This radical liberalization and 
privatization process was completed in 1991-
92, under the presidential administration of 
Carlos Salina de Gortari (1988-94). 
4
 As shown by Petrucelli and Woolford 
(1984), the necessary and sufficient condition 
for the basis to be stationary is: 1ρ <0, 2ρ  <0   
and (1+ 1ρ )(1+ 2ρ ) < 1. 
 
Appendix 
To endogenous search for the structural break possibility in the time series data tR , Perron 
(1997) procedure with the intercept, slope, and the trend dummy is specified as:  
         tit
k
i itbt
RSPTDDTtDUR υψβδγαθµ +∆++++++=
−
=
− ∑ 11)(                
where )(1 bTtDU >= is a post-break constant dummy variable; t is a linear time trend;
)(1 bTtDT >= is a post-break slope dummy variable; )1(1)( +== bb TtTD is the break dummy 
variable; and tυ  are white-noise error term.  The break date, bT , is selected based on the 
minimum t-statistic for testing 1=β  (see Perron, 1997, pp. 358-359).  Estimation results using 
the Mexican lending rate and deposit rate, tLR  and tDR , with  tl  and td denoting white noise 
error terms,  are summarized in Table 3: 
    Table 3: Perron’s Endogenous Unit Root Test, Mexican Monthly Data, 1995:2 -2010:1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:   Critical values for t-statistics in parentheses:  Critical values based n = 100 sample for the break date 
(Perron, 1997). “*” indicates significance at 1 percent level. 
 
     
  
ttbt lLRTDDTtDULR ++++−−= −18211.0)(7119.00481.00503.09161.40649.6
 
            (3.7312*)    (-3.3290*)     (2.6699*)    (2.5937*)       (0.4283)        (20.5026*)   
 
     No. of augmented lags: =k  12  Break Date: March 2001         4673.4)1( −==αt   
 
ttbt dDRTDDTtDUDR ++++−−= −18621.0)(4110.00323.00339.07573.23525.3  
          (3.2222*)    (-3.1133*)     (-2.7370*)    (2.7282*)       (0.6020)            (26.1545*)    
      No. of augmented lags: =k  12     Break Date: March  2001      1843.4)1( −==αt     
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Life Insurers’ Switch to Private Debt Holdings: The Duration Model 
 
Fan Liu, PhD 
 
Abstract 
Life insurers as major lenders in the private debt market must have relevant characteristics to 
match the special needs of private debt such as having the ability to evaluate the credit quality of 
borrowers and performing ongoing risk monitoring. The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
determinants of life insurers’ switch from no private debt holdings to private debt holdings. The 
results suggest that life insurers with fair or good financial strength rating scores, facing stringent 
regulation, having more percentage of foreign holdings and less cash holdings are more likely to 
switch from no private debt holdings to private debt holdings. 
 
Introduction 
In the United States, private placements 
(including debts and equities) are offerings of 
debts or equity securities that are not 
registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). They are generally fixed-
rate, intermediate-to-long-term securities, with 
individual issues being for moderately larger 
amounts and often including restrictive 
covenants and can be thought of as lying 
between bank loans and public bonds in their 
maturity, size and tightness of covenants.  In 
1990, the SEC further adopted Rule144A to 
develop a new market for privately placed 
debt which splits the private debt market into 
two segments: the traditional market and a 
new Rule144A market. 
Lenders in the private debt market engage in 
extensive credit evaluations of the potential 
borrowers and perform ongoing loan 
monitoring since borrowers in this market tend 
to be less well-know companies. They 
normally hold the debt to maturity because 
private debt is less liquid than public debt. The 
long-term character of private debt together 
with its relatively lower prepayment risk 
facilitates duration matching with life insurer 
fixed-rate liabilities. Life insurance companies 
are major lenders in the private debt market 
(both in the traditional market and Rule144A 
market). At year-end 2003, the value of U.S. 
issued private debt was $491.4 billion (see 
Table I) and life insurers held $437 billion of 
total privately placed debt  up to year 2003 
which also included private debt issued by 
other countries (National Association of 
Insurance Commissioner).  During the latest 5 
years (Year2003-Year2007), the trend for life 
insurers to invest more in private debt market 
is even more apparent (see Figure 1) and the 
relative percentage to the public debt holdings 
remains stable (see Figure 2). Moreover, both 
holdings class distribution and maturity 
distribution illustrate that life insurers keep 
their preferences to invest within high quality 
class (class1 and class2) and average maturity 
around 5-10 years (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). 
All these imply that there exist some reasons 
for life insurers to be attracted into this 
market. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
determinants of life insurers’ switch to private 
debt holdings. Drawing on the finance 
literature, we derive hypotheses regarding the 
relation between life insurers’ switch decision 
and firm-specific characteristics. We find that 
life insurers with good financial quality, 
licensed in New York State, having more than 
10% foreign holdings and less cash holdings 
are more likely to switch to private debt 
holdings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. In the next section we review prior 
studies on private debt market. Section III 
provides the details of the data. Section IV 
elaborates the framework for empirical tests 
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and the main hypotheses, and specifies the 
variables used to test the hypotheses. Section 
V describes the econometric methods and our 
model. Section VI presents our principal 
findings. The paper concludes with a summary 
and directions for future research. 
Literature Review 
Prior empirical studies on private debt 
financing focus only on the borrower side of 
the market. Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) 
examine the cost differences between public 
sales and private placements of debt for a 
sample of public utility issues and suggest that 
firms minimize the cost of issuing securities 
by selecting the market providing the lowest 
transaction costs. Houston and James (1996) 
examines the determinants of the mix of 
private and public debt using detailed 
information on the debt structure of publicly 
traded corporations. Krishnaswami, Spindt, 
and Subramaniam (1999) empirically examine 
the impact of flotation costs, agency conflicts, 
regulation, and information asymmetries on a 
firm’s mix between public and private debt. 
Denis and Mihov (2003) examine the choice 
among bank debt, non-bank private debt and 
public debt. However, all these studies neglect 
the important role of lenders in the private 
debt market. 
Three studies exceptionally focus on lender 
side of the market. Carey et al. (1998) present 
empirical evidence on the existence of 
specialization in private market corporate 
lending, adding a new dimension to the public 
versus private debt distinctions in the 
literature. Pottier (2007) extends the 
understanding of the private debt market by 
being the first to examine life insurer as the 
major lenders in the private debt market. 
However, without longitudinal data 
framework, it is hard to permits the sign of the 
relationship between the explanatory variables 
and the decision to hold private debt to differ 
from that linking these variables to the volume 
of holdings. Liu (2013) analyzes life insurers’ 
participation in the private debt market by 
using Cragg’s (1971) model. But the 
characteristics of life insurers which influence 
their decisions to switch from no-private debt 
holdings to private debt holdings are still 
unclear. 
Data 
The data used for our analysis are drawn from 
the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) Life-Health Annual 
Statement database and Best’s Key Rating 
Guide (A.M. Best) Life-Health Edition 
database beginning in the year 2003 through 
the year 2007. These data sets capture life 
insurer private debt holdings, financial 
strength rating and other firm-specific 
characteristics.  
For the purpose of our analysis, private debt 
holdings are defined as non-Rule 144A private 
debt consistent with the earlier discussion 
regarding the traditional private debt 
(Cummins, 1977). Firms must have non-
negative private debt holdings, positive total 
net admitted assets and total net premiums, 
and at least an ‘F’ letter rating from Best’s 
Key Rating. The sample consists of 
unaffiliated and affiliated insurers based on 
the individual level. For each year, the data 
may have different number of firms because of 
the exit or entry of new life insurers but for the 
same insurer, it cannot cycle on and off 
repeatedly. The final unbalanced panel 
includes 1014 observations for the 5 year 
window. 
A total of 297 life insurers which do not hold 
any private debt initially are included in the 
analysis that follows. Of all these life insurers, 
95 (or 11.20%) experienced switch to private 
debt holdings at least once (see Figure 5 and 
Table II). We focus on each life insurer’s first 
time switch to private debt holdings in the 
remaining analysis. 
Hypotheses 
This study examines the characteristics of life 
insurers that accelerate or delay the duration of 
their decisions to switch to private debt 
holdings.  A binary variable, 
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TRAD_PRIVATE, equals to one for life 
insurers that hold private debt, and zero 
otherwise. 
Several insurer-specific characteristics are 
included in the analysis of the determinants of 
switch to private debt holdings. The firm 
characteristics are considered related to 
financial quality, organization form, 
ownership, business growth, market 
geographic concentration, regulatory 
environment, liquidity, and foreign control. 
1. Financial Quality 
A variable, RATING_SCORE, measured from 
0 (with rating score ‘F’- In Liquidation) to 9 
(with rating score ‘A++’- Superior) from A.M. 
Best is used as a proxy for financial quality. 
The Best’s Financial Strength Rating is an 
independent opinion of an insurer’s financial 
strength and ability to meet its ongoing 
insurance policy and contract obligations. It is 
based on a comprehensive quantitative and 
qualitative evaluation of a company’s balance 
sheet strength, operating performance and 
business profile. High quality lenders convey 
more accurate information about the 
borrower’s risk and those firms seeking a 
credible signal of positive private information 
will use high quality lenders. Furthermore, a 
lender’s credit quality might also proxy for its 
incentive to monitor borrowers in order to 
protect their credit rating. As a result, life 
insurers with higher financial ratings are 
expected to accelerate their decisions to switch 
to private debt holdings.  
2. Organization Form 
A binary variable, MUTUAL, equals to one 
for mutual insurers and zero for non-mutual 
(stock) firms is used to measure organization 
form. Because more effective managerial 
control mechanisms exist in a stock firm, 
stock insurer should hold investments 
requiring more managerial discretion. On the 
other hand, the prior research (Garven and 
Pottier, 1995) suggests that the merger of the 
owner and policyholder functions in the 
mutual form mitigates the incentives for firm 
owners to increase asset risk at policyholders’ 
expense and the benefit of the mutual form is 
expected to be even greater in relation to stock 
firm where external monitoring is more 
limited. Thus the expected impact of 
organizational form on private debt holdings 
depends on whether agency costs associated 
with the owner-manager conflict or agency 
costs associated with the owner-policyholder 
conflict dominate. Latest research on private 
debt holdings (Pottier, 2007) argues that life 
insurers with mutual form have positive 
effects on private debt holdings. We expect 
that life insurers with mutual organization 
form are more likely to switch to private debt 
holdings. 
3. Ownership 
A binary variable, TRADED, which equals to 
one if the insurer is owned by a publicly-
traded insurer and zero otherwise, is used as 
an ownership measure. Public traded life 
insurers are expected to lessen the risk-shifting 
potential related to private debt and face lower 
costs of asymmetric information between the 
firm and the outside market. Thus, we expect 
to see being a publicly-traded insurer 
accelerates the switch to private debt holdings. 
4. Business Growth 
We define the business growth of life insurer 
as 
		

			
	
		
	 .  
The more rapidly the percentage of premium 
increases, the higher the life insurer growth 
rate is. While the life insurer will have more 
liquid to engage into the private debt market, 
growth also means big expansion on 
expenditure. If the net value of business 
growth for life insurers is to hold more liquid, 
we expect to see this has positive effect on 
private debt holdings. However, if the net 
value of business growth is to spend more on 
expenditure, a delay to have private debt 
holdings will be expected. 
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5. Market Geographic Concentration 
Market geographic concentration, 
GEO_MKT_SHARE, is a function of firm’s 
total share of the life business in different U.S. 
States/Possession. Mathematically, it is 
defined for each life insurer as  
∑
∑=
=
55
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2
55
1
)
__sin_
__sin_(
i
i
i
i
stateinessbulife
stateinessbulife
 
 
The value of market geographic concentration 
is between zero and one, and larger value 
implies more geographically concentrated for 
the life insurer. Geographic concentration for 
the life insurer in the previous literature is 
assumed not to have big influence on the 
investment decision comparing with 
geographic concentration for the nonlife 
insurer (Proper and Casualty). But since we 
define it here as the market geographic 
concentration for life business instead of 
annuity, it may bring different level of risks 
for different specific areas. We expect to see 
this variable to have some impacts on the life 
insurers’ switch decisions. 
6. Regulatory Environment 
A binary variable, NY_LIC that equals to one 
if the insurer is licensed in New York State, is 
used as a proxy measure for regulatory 
environment. Based on a review of state 
investment regulation, it doesn’t appear that 
insurance regulators impose any limitations 
specifically on private debt holdings. 
However, New York State insurance 
regulation is considered especially stringent 
and applies an extraterritorial basis (Pottier 
and Sommer, 1998). Thus, an insurer licensed 
in New York State must adhere to New York 
State regulations wherever the insurer 
operates.  Consequently, positive effect is 
expected to see. 
7. Liquidity 
The percentage of cash holdings, CASH, is 
used as a proxy for the liquidity level of the 
life insurer. It is defined as 
assetsinvested
investmenttermshortandcash
_
____
 
Higher rate of cash holdings may offset the 
reduction in liquidity associated with 
relatively more private debt holdings. Thus, 
we expect to find positive effect on the switch 
decisions. 
8. Foreign Control 
A binary variable, FOREIGN, equals to one if 
any foreign (non-United States) person or 
entity directly or indirectly control 10% or 
more of the life insurer is used as a measure 
for foreign control. The foreign control may 
have positive effect on the private debt 
holdings because of the preference to risk-
taking while it may also cause obstacles which 
delay the holding. Selected summary statistics 
for the samples of insurers with private debt 
holdings and those without private debt 
holdings are shown in Table III. The 
differences in means between life insurers 
with private debt holdings and life insurers 
without any private debt holdings are as 
expected. The exceptions are organization 
form (MUTUAL) and ownership (TRADED). 
However, this can be explained by the original 
unbalanced panel data. We define the initial 
status as life insurers without any private debt 
holdings and by fact, life insurers with mutual 
as organization form and traded publicly are 
investors who buy majority of private debt in 
the market. 
Methodology 
A variety of econometric methods are 
available for examining time-duration data. 
Among the most common are various forms of 
proportional hazards model that estimate the 
effects of various factors on the probability 
that a spell will end at some point in time, 
given that it has not previously ended. 
Denoting 	as the individual life insurer’s 
choice-switch spell length and 	as the current 
time, this probabilities is as follows: 
      ∆|   
where ∆	represents a small increment of time. 
The limit of       ∆|  /∆ as 
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∆	goes to zero is known as the hazard rate. It is 
typically assumed that  has a continuous 
probability distribution function, given 
by!, where the associated cumulative 
distribution function is 
" # $ !%&% #   .
(
)
 
The hazard rate )(tλ is the rate at which spells 
are completed immediately after		, given that 
they have lasted at least until , and is related 
to the survival function 
,)(
)(
)(
)()(lim)|(lim)(
00 tS
tf
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where + # 1 - " #    is the 
survival (or survivor) function. 
Empirically, hazard models express the hazard 
rate as a multiplicative function of some 
baseline hazard, )(0 tλ , and an exponential 
function of a set of covariates as 
),exp()()( 0 βλλ Xtt =  
where . represents the usual vector of 
coefficients. Estimation of this type of model 
involves making a decision about the 
functional form of the baseline hazard. 
A direct extension of the previous proportional 
hazard specification is the accelerated failure 
time (AFT) metric, which is used in this paper.  
Defining / as / # exp3. , and with some 
manipulation and rearranging, the log of the 
failure time  can then be conveniently 
expressed as a linear function of a set of 
relevant covariates 
ln # 3.  ln	/.  
The natural log of / represents something of 
an error term in the above equation. The 
distribution of it determines the particular 
model in much the same way as the choice of 
functional form for the baseline hazard in the 
proportional hazards metric. Specifically, we 
have parametric model as follows,
)ln(*_*
**__*
**_*)ln(
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The selection of an appropriate distribution for 
the baseline hazard (or / in the AFT metric) is 
typically based on an examination of the 
empirical hazard exhibited by the data in 
question. The relatively smooth empirical 
hazard exhibited by our data (see Figure 6 and 
Figure 7), which is characterized by high 
initial hazard rates followed by gradually 
declining rates, indicates that the log-normal 
or log-logistic is most appropriate. 
Empirical Results 
The results of the accelerated failure time 
model that analyze the determinants of switch 
to private debt holdings are presented in Table 
IV and Table V with using log-normal 
distribution and log-logistic distribution.  
Table IV captures the results by reporting 
coefficients and Table V by time ratios. 
The coefficient of the insurer financial quality 
variable (RATING_SCORE) is negative (as 
expected) and very significantly related to 
private debt holdings with 1% level, after 
controlling other characteristics. Transformed 
into time ratio, it indicates that the effect of 
one-unit increases in life insurer’s credit rating 
score speeds up the probability of switching to 
private debt holdings by 30% for log-normal 
distribution and 36% for log-logistic 
distribution. 
Contrary to the expectation, the coefficient of 
liquidity (CASH) is positive with 1% 
significance level (5% for log-logistics). As 
discussed earlier, we expect to see negative 
value here if higher rate of cash holdings may 
offset the reduction in liquidity associated 
with relatively more private debt holdings. 
Further, this contradicts with the static result 
shown by Pottier (2007). In his paper, he finds 
that life insurers with large percentage of cash 
holdings choose to hold private debt even 
though he also gets the same difference in 
means from summary statistics as we do. 
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However, results from our duration model 
show those life insurers who don’t hold 
private debt but with large cash holdings delay 
their switch to private debt holdings, which 
consists with the difference in means from our 
previous summary statistics. This can be 
explained by the investment preference of life 
insurers initially with no any private debt 
holdings instead of all life insurers in Pottier’s 
paper.  
The coefficients of regulatory environment 
(NY_LIC) and foreign control (FOREIGN) 
are both negative and significant with 10% 
level in log-normal distribution model, which 
means getting license in New York State or 
having more than 10% foreign control speeds 
up the probability of life insurers’ switch to 
private debt holdings by 27% and 33% 
respectively. 
The coefficients of ownership (TRADED), 
organization form (MUTUAL), Market 
Geographic Concentration 
(GEO_MKT_SHARE) and growth 
(GROWTH) are insignificant but most of 
them have the positive or negative effects as 
we expect with only exception for 
organization form which we have explained 
earlier. From results we can see that publicly 
traded life insurers with less geographic 
concentration for life business are more likely 
to switch to private debt holdings while the 
effect of growth rate is unpredictable.  
The potential problems of multicollinearity 
and heterogeneity are considered. From the 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient table (see 
Table VI), multicollinearity can hardly be 
considered as problem in our model. 
Moreover, we implement both gamma 
distribution and inverse-Gaussian distribution 
for controlling unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, considering our initial log-normal or 
log-logistic regression, it is not easy to get 
convergence when implementing unobserved 
heterogeneity. Besides, since AFT model with 
log-normal distribution and AFT model with 
log-logistic distribution are not nested models, 
we prefer to use AFT model with log-normal 
distribution if comparing the value of the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC).  
Conclusions 
This paper extends our understanding of the 
private debt market by examining the major 
lenders in the private debt market. We analyze 
the characteristics of life insurers that 
determine their switch decisions to private 
debt holdings in the private debt market.  
Our empirical results indicate that life insurers 
with fair or good financial strength rating 
scores, facing stringent regulation, having 
more percentage of foreign holding control 
and less cash holdings are more likely to 
switch from no private debt holdings to private 
debt holdings. 
Because this study provides some of the first 
findings that use longitudinal data, a number 
of questions remain unanswered. First, the 
investment decision performed remarkably 
importance for life insurers both from 
individual firm level and consolidated group 
level. Their decisions to switch to private debt 
holdings may be influenced differently. 
Second, our multivariate analysis has only 
considered life insurers’ first switch for 
investment decisions but not repeated switch. 
Finally, future research may consider to 
separate life insurers who don’t have access to 
private debt investment from life insurers who 
only invest in public debt but having access to 
private access to private debt investments.
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Table I Private Placements in the U.S., Year2003-Year2007 ($ billions) 
Year 
Value of U.S. private placements Number of U.S. private placements 
Debt Equity Total Debt Equity Total 
2003 491.4 28.9 520.3 2,635 534 3,169 
2004 570.4 32.1 602.5 2,729 560 3,289 
2005 554.7 57.7 612.4 2,887 516 3,403 
2006 523.7 73.5 597.2 2,705 596 3,301 
2007 555.2 72.0 627.2 1,933 512 2,445 
Source: Insurance Information Institute, Financial Service Fact Book 
 
Table II Overall First Switch Rates (Year2003-Year2007) 
Years Switch Cumulative Switch Rate 
2003-2004 46 5.42% 
2004-2005 29 8.84% 
2005-2006 8 9.79% 
2006-2007 12 11.20% 
 
 
Table III Selected Summary Statistics with and without Private Debt Holdings 
  TRAD_PRIVATE =1 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cash 201 0.075754 0.122327 0 0.717526 
foreign 201 0.19403 0.396439 0 1 
geo_mkt_share 201 0.373178 0.380442 0 1 
growth 201 0.152552 0.278656 0 1 
mutual 201 0.019901 0.140007 0 1 
ny_lic 201 0.323383 0.468936 0 1 
rating_score 201 7.99005 1.212395 2 9 
traded 201 0.079602 0.271352 0 1 
 
TRAD_PRIVATE =0 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cash 813 0.136717 0.179779 0 0.999928 
foreign 813 0.098401 0.298039 0 1 
geo_mkt_share 813 0.437633 0.38718 0 1 
growth 813 0.163368 0.275928 0 1 
mutual 813 0.02829 0.165903 0 1 
ny_lic 813 0.177122 0.382007 0 1 
rating_score 813 7.311193 1.077232 2 9 
traded 813 0.110701 0.313955 0 1 
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Table IV Coefficients for AFT Model with Log-normal Distribution and Log-logistics Distribution 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Log-normal (AFT) Log-logistic (AFT) 
 Coef. Coef. 
ny_lic -0.318* -0.260 
 (0.181) (0.183) 
foreign -0.413* -0.334 
 (0.221) (0.219) 
traded -0.0847 -0.0940 
 (0.250) (0.263) 
mutual 0.570 0.486 
 (0.620) (0.651) 
rating_score -0.359*** -0.461*** 
 (0.0770) (0.0963) 
geo_mkt_share 0.158 0.161 
 (0.202) (0.204) 
cash 1.644*** 1.613** 
 (0.577) (0.637) 
growth -0.000550 0.0310 
 (0.275) (0.289) 
Constant 4.251*** 5.001*** 
 (0.619) (0.768) 
Observations 848 848 
Log-likelihood -219.1134 -221.18333 
AIC 458.2268 462.3667 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table V Time Ratio for AFT Model with Log-normal Distribution and Log-logistics Distribution 
Variable 
Log-normal (AFT) 
Time-ratio 
Log-logistic (AFT) 
Time-ratio 
ny_lic 0.7275256 0.7709335 
foreign 0.6614687 0.715809 
traded 0.9187768 0.9103092 
mutual 1.767693 1.625496 
rating_score 0.6987021 0.6309281 
geo_mkt_share 1.17101 1.174673 
cash 5.178044 5.017924 
growth 0.9994501 1.031478 
 
Table VI Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient Across 297 Firms 
  cash foreign geo_mkt_share growth mutual ny_lic rating_score traded 
cash 1 
foreign 
-
0.0861 1 
geo_mkt_share 0.0977 -0.1456 1 
growth 0.1279 -0.1029 0.0368 1 
mutual 
-
0.0854 -0.0603 -0.0753 -0.024 1 
ny_lic 
-
0.0646 0.0415 0.0127 0.0395 0.0369 1 
rating_score 
-
0.1095 0.1776 -0.107 0.0739 -0.0907 0.2931 1 
traded -0.012 -0.0745 -0.1205 0.0883 -0.0565 0.0171 -0.0944 1 
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Figure 1 U.S. Life Insurer Private Debt Holdings (Year2003-Year2007) 
 
Source: Insurance Information Institute, Financial Service Fact Book 
 
Figure 2 U.S. Life Insurer Total Debt Holdings (Public and Private Debt Holdings) 
 
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioner (Year2003-Year2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
437.0
475.6 489.3
494.5
522.7
400.0
500.0
600.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
$ b
illi
o
n
s
Year
U.S. Life insurer private debt 
holdings
Value of U.S. Life insurer private debt 
holdings
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
2000
2250
2500
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
$ B
ill
io
n
s
Year
Life insurer total debt holdings
Value of U.S. Life insurer public debt holdings Value of U.S. Life insurer private debt holdings
International Research Journal of Applied Finance         ISSN 2229 – 6891   
Vol. V  Issue – 1  January, 2014 
22 
 
Figure 3 U.S. Life Insurer Private Debt Placed Class Distribution 
 
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioner (Year2003-Year2007) 
 
Figure 4 U.S. Life Insurer Private Debt Placed Maturity Distribution 
 
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioner (Year2003-Year2007) 
 
 
Figure 5 Cumulative First Switch Rates 
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Figure 6 Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates and Smoothed Hazard Estimates 
 
 
Figure 7 Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazard Estimates 
 
 
Reference 
Best, A. M. Best’s Key Rating Guide, Life 
Health Edition (Oldwick, NJ: A.M. Best 
Company, Inc.) 
Blackwell, David W., and David S. Kidwell. 
1988. An investigation of cost differences 
between public sales and private 
placements of debt. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 22 (2):253-278. 
Bruce, Barbour, and Thacker. 2004. Welfare 
Program Reentry among Postreform 
leavers. Southern Economic Journal, 70 
(4):816-836. 
Carey, Mark, Mitch Post, and Steven A. 
Sharpe. 1998. Does Corporate Lending by 
Banks and Finance Companies Differ? 
Evidence on Specialization in Private Debt 
Contracting. Journal of Finance, 53 
(3):845-878. 
Carey, Mark S., and Stephen D. Prowse. 1993. 
Recent developments in the market for 
privately placed debt. Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, 79 (2):77. 
Carey, Mark S., and Stephen D. Prowse. 1995. 
The changing Role of life insurance 
companies in the private placement market, 
in : Edward I Altman, eds. The financial 
dynamics of the insurance industry (New 
York, NY: Business One-Irwin). 
Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez. 2004. An 
Introduction to Survival Analysis Using 
Stata. 
Cragg, John G, 1971, Some Statistical Models 
for Limited Dependent Variables With 
Application to the Demand for Durable 
Goods, Econometrica, 39(5), 829-844. 
Cummins. 1977. Investment activities of life 
insurance companies. Published for the S. 
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
0 1 2 3 4
analysis time
Kaplan-Meier survival estimate
.
07
.
08
.
09
.
1
.
11
0 1 2 3 4
analysis time
Smoothed hazard estimate
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
0.
35
0.
40
1 2 3 4
analysis time
Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimate
International Research Journal of Applied Finance         ISSN 2229 – 6891   
Vol. V  Issue – 1  January, 2014 
24 
 
S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance 
Education, University of Pennsylvania. 
Denis, David J., and Vassil T. Mihov. 2003. 
The choice among bank debt, non-bank 
private debt, and public debt: evidence 
from new corporate borrowings. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 70 (1):3-28. 
Garven, James R., and Steven W. Pottier. 1995. 
Incentive Contracting and the Role of 
Participation Rights in Stock Insurers, 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 62(2):253-
270. 
Houston, Joel, and Christopher James. 1996. 
Bank Information Monopolies and The Mix 
of Private and Public Debt Claims, Journal 
of Finance, 51:1863-1890. 
Krishnaswami, Sudha, Paul A. Spindt, and 
Venkat Subramaniam. 1999. Information 
Asymmetry, Monitoring, and the Placement 
Structure of Corporate Debt, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 51:407-434. 
Liu, Fan. 2013. Participation And Volume 
Decisions of Private Debt Holdings: A 
Longitudinal Investigation In the Life 
Insurance Industry, International Journal of 
Applied Finance, 4 (2):186 – 205. 
Meier, Keneth J. 1988. The political economy 
of regulation: the case of insurance (State 
University of New York Press) 
Pottier, Steven W. 2007.  The determinants of 
private debt holdings: evidence from the 
life insurance industry, Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 74 (3):591-612. 
Author 
Fan Liu, PhD, Associate Professor of 
Finance, Department of Finance and Supply 
Chain Management, John L. Grove College of 
Business, Shippensburg University, 
Shippensburg, Pennsylvania, fliu@ship.edu
 
 
International Research Journal of Applied Finance         ISSN 2229 – 6891   
Vol. V  Issue – 1  January, 2014 
25 
 
A Framework for Explaining Accounting Students’ Formal Communication 
GAP 
 
Charles Harter Robert Marley 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper introduces a framework that explains how innovations in communication technology 
have affected students’ communication skills. Our framework suggests that new communication 
mediums have reduced students’ exposure to contexts requiring formal communication and 
increased students’ exposure to contexts utilizing informal communication.  As a result, today’s 
accounting students have less formal communication experience, thus less developed formal 
communication skills than their predecessors. To mitigate this communication gap, we discuss 
adapting the accounting classroom to familiarize, hone, and instill formal communication skills.   
 
Keywords: communication skills, communications gap, informal communication, 
 flipping the classroom  
 
Introduction 
Accounting students inappropriately informal 
communication style has been decried by both 
college educators and industry professionals 
(Mulling, 2013).  Though faculty may no 
longer consider informal communication 
unusual, it was relatively unknown only one 
generation ago and it remains inappropriate for 
many professional workplace settings (Vance 
and Stephens, 2010; Bauer, 1996).  The 
following anecdote illustrates the 
inappropriately informal communication style 
exhibited by some contemporary accounting 
students: 
 A partner in a CPA firm recently 
received a resume and cover letter from 
an accounting student who possessed a 
good GPA, was active in beta alpha psi, 
and seemingly had prepared herself for a 
professional career in public accounting.  
However, upon reading the student’s 
cover letter, the partner rejected the 
application because the student had 
inappropriately used the letter “u” in 
place of the word “you” and “thnx” as a 
replacement for “thank you.”  When 
faculty followed up with the student, she 
said she was unaware that the 
communication style she used in 
applying for the job was inappropriately 
informal.  
Many similar informal communication 
anecdotes are shared on College Misery 
(2013), a popular blog where faculty members 
share their collegiate experiences.  Both 
anecdotes and accounting research 
(Christensen and Rees, 2002) suggest today’s 
accounting students may not sufficiently 
develop the formal communication skills 
required to be successful in the accounting 
profession during their college education. 
There are serious consequences associated 
with accounting students’ failure to develop 
formal communication skills during their 
college years.  In the example above, the 
student’s inappropriately informal 
communication style prevented her from 
obtaining the job she wanted.  More 
frequently, an accounting student obtains a job 
without possessing the requisite formal 
communication etiquette, leading to frustration 
and embarrassment for those who interact with 
the student in a professional setting.  Thus, 
failing to obtain and hone formal 
communication skills leads to a 
“communication gap” between students’ 
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informal communication style and the more 
formal communication style expected of 
professionals.  The communication gap is of 
particular concern to the accounting profession 
as there is some empirical evidence that 
suggests accountants are already perceived to 
lack communication skills (Friedman and 
Lyne, 2001). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
employers, managers, and professors have all 
expressed concern regarding the quality of 
current accounting students’ soft skills (Cohn, 
2013; Christensen and Rees, 2002).   
This paper contributes to the literature by 
introducing a framework that proposes 
innovations in communication technology have 
reduced students’ exposure to contexts 
requiring formal communication. Accordingly, 
we suggest it is not surprising that today’s 
students may lack the formal communication 
skills held by their predecessors because 
today’s students have less formal 
communication practice.1 While we recognize 
that the primary focus of the classroom should 
be student learning, we suggest it is important 
that students understand how to formally 
communicate.  As a result, we contribute to 
accounting pedagogy by identifying means by 
which educators can help mitigate the 
communications gap.  We suggest adapting the 
accounting classroom to familiarize, hone, and 
instill formal communication skills.     
The rest of our paper is organized as follows:  
in the next section we identify how 
technological innovations have changed 
                                                 
1
 We define formal communication as the 
communication etiquette that is appropriate for a student 
to use when they are communicating with an individual 
in a non-peer relationship.  Examples of non-peer 
relationships are numerous, such as a student-professor 
relationship, a student-employer relationship, and 
student-parent relationship. We recognize that our 
definition of “formal communication” connotes the 
existence of hierarchical relationships, which is 
admittedly somewhat unpopular with regards to recent 
societal trends which take a more egalitarian tone, 
suggesting that everybody is a peer and nobody should 
be thought to hold positions of “superiority.” 
 
communication norms. Then, we explain how 
changing communication norms have impeded 
the development of formal communication 
skills.  Finally, we identify ways the classroom 
can be adapted to instill formal communication 
skills.  We conclude by summarizing our key 
contributions and by identifying limitations 
and opportunities for future research. 
Technological Innovations and 
Communication Norms 
The current generation of accounting students 
grew up in an era categorized by tremendous 
advancements in communication technology. 
In the span of one generation, entirely new 
mediums of communication, such as e-mail, 
text messaging, and social media, have not 
only been introduced but have become 
ubiquitous.2  Generally, using these new 
communication mediums (“new mediums”) 
requires some form of electronic device, but 
more significantly the new mediums enable 
individuals to remain in  communication with 
each other asynchronously and without regard 
to physical proximity (IJsselsteijn, van Baren, 
and van Lanen, 2003).3  However, since new 
mediums do not require physical proximity or 
temporal synchronization, many of the verbal 
and non-verbal cues associated with traditional 
mediums are no longer present, leading 
communicators to apply different 
communication norms (i.e., “etiquette”).   
Research finds that when verbal and non-
verbal cues are removed, social presence cues 
are lost (Short, Williams, and Christie, 1976; 
Rice, 1993) and communication becomes more 
depersonalized.  The literature suggests 
depersonalization encourages self-centeredness 
and anti-social behavior (Sproull and Kiesler, 
                                                 
2
 We define communication mediums as those 
permitting individuals to share information with each 
other. 
 
3
 The principal constraint of these new technological 
innovations is connection to an internet or 
telecommunications signal.  However, given the 
communication infrastructure of the United States circa 
2013, such a connection is widely available. 
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1986; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, and 
McGuire, 1986), leading individuals to 
communicate with each other more as objects 
than as people (Williams, 1977).  As the 
communication medium becomes more 
indirect, that is less rich in social cues, the 
manner in which the message is communicated 
becomes increasingly informal because 
communicators cannot use social cues, like 
body language and facial expressions, as 
feedback to detect when an individual’s 
behavior is perceived as inappropriate or rude 
by the other party.  Further, as communication 
becomes more indirect, the immediacy of 
social cues becomes diminished, causing 
individuals to feel increasingly comfortable 
saying what comes to mind.  This explains 
why the content of messages communicated 
via new mediums has become less formal.  
Additionally, the etiquette associated with new 
mediums is not as well established as 
traditional forms of communication.  Thus, it is 
not altogether surprising that faculty and 
practitioners are concerned about receiving 
messages which were previously considered 
unheard of since the norms of communication 
behavior are less defined for new 
communication mediums.  While accounting 
professionals may expect etiquette surrounding 
new communication mediums to be no 
different than traditional communication 
mediums, assuming the norms of traditional 
communication mediums to automatically 
apply to new communication mediums seems a 
bit presumptuous. For example, when 
considering the following student messages 
were sent via email, the level of informality 
contained is not altogether unexpected in light 
of the indirectness of the communication 
medium itself:  
“Hello Professor Bauer, I will not be in 
class today, because it is just too 
beautiful a day out to be inside. I hope 
you’re not too dissapointed [sic]. Here is 
…. Thanks again!!”  (Bauer, 1997) 
“I have just returned from a trip 
I took with my father. It was 
very exciting that I got to go … 
to Denmark, Germany and … 
Finland.… I need to make up 
the quizzes I have missed, and 
am willing to do so, whenever it 
is convenient for you. If it is 
possible, could you please let 
me know basicly [sic] what the 
quizzes covered? You can 
contact me at the above E-Mail 
address. Thank you for your 
time.” (Bauer, 1997) 
In the past, individuals communicating the 
above messages would have been required to 
do so in a face-to-face setting containing more 
established norms of behavior and richer social 
cues.  Therefore, such messages may have 
been relatively rare because the social cues 
inherent in face-to-face communication would 
have alerted the communicator he was being 
inappropriately informal, prompting him to 
maintain a sense of decorum for fear of 
provoking an immediate and negative response 
from the person receiving the message.  
However, as a communication mode moves to 
environments less rich in social cues, such as a 
student sending their professor an email from 
the safety and comfort of their home, 
individuals will become increasingly 
comfortable stating whatever springs to mind 
because there is no risk of a direct, immediate 
response.  Because new communication 
mediums are less direct, thus less rich in social 
cues, such mediums have likely affected 
communication norms. 
Since young individuals integrate technology 
into their lives faster than the general 
population (Gonsalves, 2006), the 
communication norms associated with new 
mediums have disproportionally affected 
younger generations.  Unlike previous 
generations who entered the workforce before 
new mediums were ubiquitous, today’s 
accounting students have never known a time 
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when these mediums did not exist.  As a result, 
younger generations have no frame of 
reference to draw upon in determining the 
appropriateness of using a specific 
communication medium to convey a message.  
For example, younger employees see little 
wrong with informing their boss via text 
message that they will be absent from work 
due to illness (Mirror, 2011), whereas older 
employees may feel it appropriate to 
communicate the message via the telephone.  
As new mediums are popular forms of 
communication among students, it should 
come as no surprise that these new mediums 
have affected students’ communication style.   
Finally, since new mediums permit individuals 
to communicate at almost any time from 
almost anywhere, individuals likely perceive 
new mediums to be the most convenient way 
to communicate a message in many situations. 
As a result, new mediums have eliminated the 
need for individuals to engage in face-to-face 
or telephone communication in many 
circumstances.  Accordingly, new mediums 
have likely reduced the use of traditional 
communication mediums in favor of newer, 
less direct mediums.  Thus, while new 
mediums have made it more convenient for 
individuals to communicate with each other, 
the loss of social cues has likely increased the 
informality of the messages exchanged. 
As a result, because today’s students have less 
practice communicating formally vis-à-vis 
prior generations, it should come as no surprise 
that they possess weaker formal 
communication skills.  Students’ lack of 
experience with formal communication may 
help to explain why they seemingly lack 
formal communication skills.   
To be successful in the accounting profession, 
it is important that students acquire formal 
communication skills. As faculty members are 
responsible for preparing students to enter the 
profession, we suggest faculty should play an 
active role in helping accounting students 
develop their formal communication skills. In 
the next section, we identify ways the 
classroom can be used to develop students’ 
formal communication skills. 
Developing Students Communication Skills 
As faculty charged with preparing the next 
generation of accounting leaders, we believe 
faculty have an obligation to educate students 
in the norms associated with professional 
communication so students are not caught off 
guard when they enter the business world.  
Though we understand there may be 
considerable resistance from faculty, who may 
feel their primary obligation is to provide 
students with knowledge of accounting 
principles, this definition of a professor’s role 
is too narrow.  We subscribe to the argument 
that a good professor is one who prepares his 
or her students to be successful in their field of 
study.  Thus, educating students in the norms 
associated with professional communication 
etiquette does not fall outside of the 
professor’s charge. 
In this section, we provide suggestions on how 
new mediums can be redirected to facilitate 
student learning in a classroom environment.  
We select this approach because it gives 
students the opportunity to see elements of 
formal and informal communication and to 
learn when each is appropriate.  Our 
suggestions are in line with the evolution of 
technology into the modern classroom and to 
teaching innovations like flipping the 
classroom.  Our goal is to begin the 
development of a roadmap that will provide a 
new perspective in accounting education by 
providing examples of teaching approaches 
that are conducive to using technology that 
students may find appealing.  Though we 
recognize that flipping the classroom and 
virtual discussions are not new ideas, as both 
have been suggested by other academics as 
ways to improve student learning, we believe 
these two approaches are especially suited to 
the current generation of students because they 
encourage communication while utilizing 
technology students are familiar with. 
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Flipping the Classroom  
Today’s technology savvy-students do not 
necessarily thrive in a lecture style class.  For 
decades, educational researchers have 
questioned the effectiveness of the lecture 
approach, concluding that the traditional 
lecture is not an effective method for 
facilitating student leaning.  At best, lectures 
disseminate knowledge that might or might not 
be retained (Van Eynde and Spencer, 1988).  
Some studies suggest that students in lecture-
based classrooms fail to retain as much 
material as students in active learning 
classrooms (Van Eynde and Spencer, 1988).  
Active or collaborative learning methods like 
flipping the classroom focus on learning rather 
than teaching.   When students become active 
participants in the classroom they utilize higher 
order thinking skills such as analysis, 
synthesis, and evaluation.  The result is that 
students learn how to apply concepts, resulting 
in greater learning.   
Flipping the classroom can be implemented 
using the technology that today’s students are 
comfortable with.  Prior to receiving an in-
class assignment, on-line lectures or other 
media can be used to provide students with 
basic concepts.  While flipped classrooms may 
be live or on-line, if the class is live, class time 
can be devoted to interactive discussions where 
students solve complex problems using the 
concepts provided to them prior to class.  Thus, 
the class functions more as an interactive lab 
then a sterile lecture hall.  If a live classroom is 
not used, students can interact using various 
electronic media.  In a flipped classroom, 
student learning predominantly takes place as 
the students interact with each other to solve 
case or problem assignments.  The professor’s 
role shifts to observing progress and offering 
assistance on an as-needed basis by circulating 
among students in the classroom or by 
monitoring on-line communication. 
Students respond to a flipped classroom 
because it incorporates inter-personal 
communication, encourages use of technology 
for research, and focuses on interactive 
problem solving.  By permitting students to 
work together using whatever communication 
medium they prefer, students learn to manage 
their time efficiently because they have 
periodic reporting assignments.  The assigned 
tasks should be complex enough to require 
critical thinking and may culminate in a final 
product that is presented to the class.  This 
presentation can model the type of 
presentations students will need to be 
comfortable giving in their future accounting 
careers.  Grading is most effective when based 
upon the quality of the solution, the degree of 
team involvement, and the quality of the 
presentation.  We suggest fostering an informal 
communication style until the class 
presentation, where students can be required to 
present their results using formal 
communication norms.  Flipping the classroom 
allows students to learn using the informal 
communication style they are accustomed to, 
but instills the importance of formal 
communication by requiring students to 
change their communication style when 
presenting their results.  We suggest this 
approach both exposes students to formal 
communication styles and demonstrates that 
informal communication is not always 
appropriate for every task context.  
Virtual Discussion 
Learning management tools like Desire-to-
learn or Blackboard are already widely used in 
higher education.  Students like these 
electronic tools because they provide timely 
information.  Outlines, handouts, and grades 
can be updated quickly by the professor and 
accessed in real-time by students.  Tools 
available in most learning management 
applications such as chat, email, and 
gradebook are readily accepted by students.  
Further, this technology is effective as an 
information disseminator in a live classroom or 
can be used to facilitate a totally online class.   
A useful, but sometimes overlooked tool 
provided with most learning management 
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systems is the discussion function.  This tool 
can be used to engage students in discussions 
that can be more effective online than in a 
face-to-face classroom setting.  For example, 
in an online discussion, even the shyest student 
will often participate in the discussion.  
Students who are uncomfortable participating 
in a live classroom may be willing to post their 
ideas online because they are accustomed to 
using informal communication technology like 
social media to make their opinions known.  
Unlike the traditional classroom discussion 
where one student speaks at a time, online 
discussions permit students to post their ideas 
simultaneously so that all are actively engaged.  
Further, to encourage students to formulate 
their own ideas, the learning management 
system can be set so that students must make a 
post before they are allowed to see posts made 
by other students.  This type of virtual 
discussion can generate a more in-depth 
discussion than is possible in a live classroom.  
We suggest assessing learning by using a 
record of the discussion, which is archived by 
the system.  To promote the development of 
formal communication skills, we suggest the 
professor establish some communication 
etiquette “ground rules” at the beginning of the 
class.  During the semester, we suggest the 
professor at least occasionally praise students 
applying appropriate communication etiquette, 
while identifying how students communicating 
in an inappropriately informal manner can 
improve their communication style.  By tying 
some portion of the discussion grade to 
communication style, the professor can take 
advantage of peer pressure and achievement 
pressure to motivate students to learn and 
apply formal communication etiquette.  Thus, 
virtual discussion can be an interactive, 
collaborative learning environment from which 
to impart formal communication skills to 
students. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we proposed a framework to 
identify how innovations in communication 
technology (i.e., new communication 
mediums) have caused communication norms 
to become more informal.  Our framework also 
identifies how these new mediums have 
reduced students’ exposure to formal 
communication contexts, impeding their 
development of formal communication skills.   
While our framework identifies how 
technology has shifted the norms of 
interpersonal communication towards 
informality, we emphasize the need for 
embracing and re-directing these new 
mediums. Banning the use of new mediums in 
the classroom is misguided and only results in 
the classroom becoming increasingly removed 
from the outside world.  We advance flipping 
the classroom and virtual discussion as two 
means by which professors can use the new 
mediums to facilitate learning and impart 
formal communication skills, thereby adapting 
to the times instead of becoming overcome by 
them.   
While we developed our framework by 
drawing upon the findings of prior research, 
we acknowledge our framework is built upon 
logical argument but not tested or supported by 
empirical evidence. Thus, future research may 
find it advantageous to empirically test our 
framework to contribute to the academic 
conversation regarding the efficacy of the two 
learning means suggested in this article. 
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The Information Asymmetry of A and B Shares in China: Which One 
Dominates the Market? 
 
Anthony H. Tu 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the possible information asymmetry between A-share (domestic 
investors) and B-share (foreign investors) markets in China. We use and modify the 
information share model, proposed by Hasbrouck (1995), to analyze the contribution of each 
market to the price discovery. The modified information share model allows us to distinguish 
two sources of information asymmetries between markets: volume-related (private) 
information shocks and volume-unrelated (public) information shocks. The empirical 
evidence indicates that, as the two markets are completely segmented, the price discovery 
contribution of B-shares is slightly higher (lower) than that of A-shares in private (public) 
information shocks. This implies that domestic individual investors in A-shares market have 
better public information, whereas foreign institutional investors in B-shares market have 
better private information. After the B-share market is opened to domestic investors, the 
information advantage of B-shares no longer exists. A-shares have the information advantage 
over B-shares in both private and public information shocks. 
 
Keywords: Segmented markets; Chinese stock markets; Information shares; Information 
asymmetry; error correction model 
JEL Classifications: G14; G15 
 
Introduction 
In China, the same firm can issue A shares 
and B shares. Domestic investors can only 
buy A shares and foreign investors can only 
buy B sharesa. The shares are identical in 
terms of voting power and dividend claims. 
Due to the existing regulations, the amount 
of outstanding B shares is always smaller, 
so foreign investors are forced to be 
minority shareholders. The outcome is that 
the equity of the same firm is traded at the 
same time, at the same exchange, but by two 
different investor groups and at quite 
different prices. Typically, A shares trade at 
a premium over B shares (Fung et al. 
(2000), Chen et al. (2001), Karolyi and Li 
(2003), Mei et al. (2005)). 
This study proposes to examine whether 
foreign investors (B-shares) are at an 
information advantage (or disadvantage)  
                                                 
a
 On February 19, 2001, the authority implemented a 
new policy by opening the B-share market to 
domestic individual investors with foreign currency 
holdings. As a result, the A- and B-share markets are 
now no longer completely segmented. 
 
relative to domestic investors (A-shares)b. 
Understanding this may lead to improved 
predictions that can benefit both policy-
makers and market-participants. Calvo and 
Mendoza (2000) argue that the information 
disadvantage of foreign investors will cause 
contagions across international markets. 
Several factors can cause information 
asymmetry between domestic and foreign 
investors in China. Foreign investors in 
China are mainly big financial institutions. 
Compared with the domestic investors, 
foreign institutional investors can, in 
general, be assumed to be more 
experienced, have better means of obtaining 
information, and have access to more 
advanced technology to analyze data. Thus, 
the presence of foreign investors can be a 
                                                 
b
 In this paper, we define “A-share (B-share) 
dominates the market” if A-share (B-share) has the 
information advantage over the B-share (A-share), 
because the better informed investors always 
dominate the price discovery process in an 
asymmetric-information market. 
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“buy signal” for the relatively uninformed 
domestic investors. In this situation, the 
price of B shares would lead those of A 
shares indicating domestic investors get 
information from foreign investors. The 
above argument refers to the “institutional 
dominance hypothesis.” Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2000) support this hypothesis 
using Finnish data as do Froot and 
Ramadorai (2001) using a cross section of 
data from 25 countries. Pan et al. (2001) 
also find that foreign investors are better 
informed than domestic investors in six East 
Asian emerging markets. 
Yet, domestic investors might have the 
information advantage. They can better 
acquire relevant news from local sources 
and the information does not have to travel 
over physical, linguistic, or cultural 
distances. This refers to the “local 
familiarity hypothesis.” Choe et al. (2001) 
provides convincing evidence using Korean 
data, Hau (2001) using German data, and 
Dvorak (2005) using Indonesian data. In this 
scenario the price of A shares would lead 
the prices of B shares because foreign 
investors learn from domestic investors. 
This paper proposes to study the 
informational advantage (or disadvantage) 
of domestic investors relative to foreign 
investors in China’s stock market by 
inferring information shares, proposed by 
Hasbrouck (1991b, 1995), for the two 
classes of marketsc. The empirical 
methodology has been widely adopted in 
                                                 
c
 The present paper is most closely related to the 
previous work on price discovery in multiple-trading 
environments. Garbade and Silber (1979) conclude 
that regional exchanges contribute to price discovery. 
Harris et al. (1995) use an error correction model to 
examine the discovery in IBM price on the New 
York, Midwest, and Pacific Stock Exchanges. Harris 
McInish, and Wood (2002) apply the common long-
memory procedure of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) to 
estimate the relative contribution of the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) for price discovery. Ding et 
al. (1999) uses the same methodology for comparing 
the contribution to price discovery of a Malaysian 
firm and Sime Darby Berhad uses the methodology 
on the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore Stock 
Exchanges. 
investigating the informational roles of 
information-linked markets (Martens 
(1998), Huang (2002), Grammig et al. 
(2005), Pascual, et al. (2006)). China’s stock 
market is an ideal market for investigation 
since the A-share market and B-share 
market were completely segmented before 
February 19, 2001, which means the 
information advantages of A- and B-share 
markets can be examined under different 
trading mechanisms. In addition, the 
Chinese equity markets offer an excellent 
laboratory for the purpose of this study. 
Chinese equity markets have one of the 
largest individual investor populations in the 
worldd. Individual investor accounts make 
up 99.5 percent of the total number of 
investor accounts in the markets, whereas 
institutional accounts form merely 0.5 
percent of investor accounts.  
This study is, of course, not the first to 
examine information asymmetry between 
the markets for domestic and foreign 
investors in China. Chakravarty et al. (1998) 
and Chui and Kwok (1998) investigated 
information transmission between A-shares 
and B-shares markets. While Chakravarty, 
et al. (1998) finds that A-share returns lead 
B-share returns more than vice versa, Chui 
and Kwok (1998) find the opposite result. 
According to Chakravarty, et al. (1998), 
foreign investors are less informed than 
domestic investors because of the language 
barrier and different accounting standards. 
However, Chui and Kwok (1998) argue that 
foreign investors are institutional investors 
who are more experienced and have better 
means of obtaining information and more 
access to advanced technology to analyze 
data than individual domestic investors. By 
contrast, individual domestic investors rely 
solely on rumor and perception and are 
more likely to trade based on “noise” rather 
than on information. Using the forecast error 
variance decomposition, Yang (2003) also 
find that foreign investors in the Shanghai 
                                                 
d
 By the end of 2002, the number of individual 
investor accounts opened at the Chinese stock 
exchanges reached 68.5 million. 
International Research Journal of Applied Finance         ISSN 2229 – 6891   
Vol. V  Issue – 1  January, 2014 
34 
 
B-shares market are better informed than 
Chinese domestic investors in both A-shares 
markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen). 
Recently, a similar study by Chan et al. 
(2007) indicates that the A-shares market 
led the B-share market in price discovery 
during the period of complete market 
segmentation. After the B-shares market 
opened to domestic investors, the A-share 
market continues to dominate the price 
discovery process. Evidence further 
indicates that the intraday 5-minute signed 
volume and quote revision in the B-shares 
market contain information for predicting 
subsequent quote revision in the A-shares 
market. However, the analysis is based on 
76 firms with sample period from Jan 10, 
2000 to Nov 8, 2001. 
The finding of Chan et al. (2008) also 
supports the information advantage of A-
share market. They use the same data to 
examine whether the information 
disadvantage of foreign investors (who trade 
B-shares), relative to domestic investors 
(who trade A-shares), can explains the so-
called “foreign share discount puzzle” 
(Fernald and Rogers (2002), Eun et al. 
(2001)). They construct measures of 
information asymmetry based on market 
microstructure models, and show that the 
cross-sectional variation in foreign share 
discounts can be explained by these 
measures, even after controlling for other 
factors. They further investigate the effect of 
the B-share market being opened to 
domestic investors in March 2001. The 
results indicate that, by allowing domestic 
investors to trade in the B-shares market, 
there is less of the information disadvantage 
in this market, and thus the B-share 
discounts become smaller. 
Notwithstanding the different results in 
these earlier studies, a common shortcoming 
is that these studies base their analyses on 
price series data only. This paper uses and 
modifies the information shares model by 
including the influence of trading activities 
(trading volumes). The modified 
information share model allows us to 
distinguish two sources of information 
asymmetries between markets: volume-
related (private) information shocks and 
volume-unrelated (public) information 
shocks. The theoretical motivation is 
provided by some recent theoretical models 
and empirical findings. Blume et al. (1994) 
and Bernardo and Judd (1999) argue that 
volume conveys information to the market 
that cannot be deduced from price alone. 
They also develop models in which traders 
use previous periods’ trading volume to 
make inferences about the quality of 
informed traders’ signals which is important 
for estimating the payoff for the security. In 
Suominen’s (2001) model, traders estimate 
the availability of private information using 
past periods’ trading volumes and use this 
information to adjust their strategies. 
Further, this study applies the model 
empirically to a longer period (more than 8 
years) and to individual-firm stocks listed 
both on A and B shares, rather than the 
aggregated index only. As indicated by 
Llorente et al. (2002), the individual-firm 
stocks allow to efficient examination of the 
information role of volume. The empirical 
results in this paper indicate that when the 
two markets are completely segmented, the 
price discovery contribution of B-shares is 
slightly higher (lower) than that of A-shares 
in private (public) information shocks. This 
implies that domestic individual investors in 
A-shares market have better public 
information, whereas foreign institutional 
investors in B-shares market have better 
private information. 
Finally, how the relationship changes after 
domestic investors are allowed to trade on 
the B-share market is also investigated. This 
happens after February 19, 2001 when the 
Chinese government introduced a new 
policy that allowed domestic investors with 
foreign currency holdings to trade B-shares. 
Consequently, the A- and B-share markets 
are now no longer completely segmented. 
Chiu et al. (2005) investigate the impact of 
the China stock market allowing domestic 
residents to invest in B-shares. Their results 
show that this policy improves the B-share 
price discount and strengthens market 
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integration between A- and B-shares. 
Moreover, the volatility transmission 
between A- and B-shares accelerates. The 
results in this paper verify the finding of 
Chiu et al. (2005) in a more robust sense. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
followed. The next section presents and 
discusses the empirical model. Section 3 
proposes a modified model of information 
shares measures, and Section 4 describes the 
data set and reports the empirical results. 
The final section summarizes the paper.
 
Information revelation by prices and trading volumes and the empirical model 
The most common efficient parameterization of a vector of co-integrated variables is a vector 
error correction (VEC) model from Granger’s Representation Theorem in Engle and Granger 
(1987). The standard error-correction representation of the market prices for a cross-listed 
stock is  
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where },{,lnln 11 BAiPPppp ititititit =−=−=∆ −− . itP  is market i ’s daily closing price at 
time t . The terms (L)ikφ , for k and },{ BAi = , are stationary autoregressive polynomials in 
the lag operator L . The component )( 11 BtAt pp −− − β  is the normalized error correction term. 
Presumably, β  is equal to one. The iα  term is the response of the market i  to a divergence 
from other markets’ prices. If both Aα  and Bα  were statistically significant, the model 
would be facing a two-way price discovery process. 
 
In matrix form, the equation (1) can be rewritten as 
   
tttt pLpp εβα +∆Φ+′=∆ −− 11 )(                                        (1a) 
where ),( ′= BtAtt ppp . 
 
The information role of (trading) volume in stock markets has long been a subject of 
empirical researcha. In a theoretical model of Blume et al. (1994), volume provides 
information in a way distinct from that provided by price. As is true in most rational 
expectations models, that price impounds information about the average level of trader’s 
private information, their model emphasizes that volume captures the important information 
contained in the quality or precision of traders’ information signals. In Suominen’s (2001) 
model, trading volume plays an important role in traders’ learning. Traders estimate the 
availability of private information using past periods’ trading volume and use this 
information to adjust their strategies. This accord with the empirical observation that the 
information contained in trading volume is important for traders’ learning and affects their 
behavior. Finally, Suominen shows that price changes are not sufficient to characterize the 
evolution of conditional variance; information on trading volume is also needed. 
Following the above discussion, we thus modify the traditional VEC model by including the 
interacting effects of price and volume. Similar to Pascual et al. (2006), we extend (1) by 
allowing the VEC model to be  
                                                 
a
 Karpoff (1987) documented that stock return volatility and contemporaneous trading volume are positively 
correlated, and Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) found that trading volume in stock markets contains relevant 
information for predicting future volatility. 
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where },{, BAix it =∆  is market i ’s trading activity (trading volume) in t . 
 
The generating process of },{, BAix it =∆  is given by  
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with )(
,
Li khΠ , for },{ pxh =  and },{ BAk = . All lag polynomials are stationary. By 
substituting recursively (3) into (2), it is straightforward to obtain (1) as  
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Similar to the framework by Frijns (2006) and Pascual et al. (2006), the shocks Atη , Btη  in (1) 
include both volume-related and volume-unrelated shocks. Thus, the vector of ),( BtAtt εεε =  
represents volume-unrelated shocks. We expect 0),( ≠BtAtE εε  due to the existence of 
common factors. The formulation of volume-related or volume-unrelated shocks is consistent 
with the treatment in Hasbrouck (1991b) and Dufour and Engle (2000)b. 
 
The above equation (4) captures usual features that itp  may, due to market frictions, not 
instantaneously reproduce all the information trades released in t . As described in the 
theoretical investigation in Frijns (2006) and Pascual et al. (2006), one might be tempted to 
equate all “private information shocks” with volume-related shocks ),( BtAt ee  and all “public 
information shocks” with volume-unrelated shocks ),( BtAt εε . 
In equation (3), the trading volumes do not depend on the contemporaneous change in market 
prices. This is because trading volumes and prices are not determined simultaneously; the 
                                                 
b
 Hasbrouck (1991b) and Dufour and Engle (2000) suggest the following vector autoregression (VAR),  
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to study the effects of trade-related information on prices. In the above equation, 
tq∆  is conventionally defined 
as the quote change subsequent to the t th trade. Furthermore, the informational component of price variation 
can be related to two different sources of information, public and private. These informational shocks are 
commonly represented with two white noise processes tv ,1  and tv ,2 . Specifically, tv ,1  is the update to the 
public information set and tv ,2  is the update from the private information which is gleaned from unexpected 
trades. Dufour and Engle (2000) consider the simplest version of this model where 
tx  is a univariate limited 
dependent variable, the trade sign. Hasbrouck (1991b) proposes generalizations with 
tx  as a vector of trade-
related variables (e.g., trade sign, the interaction between trade sign and volume, the interaction between trade 
sign and spread). 
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price revisions always follow the trading activities. The model allows causality running from 
lagged price revisions to trading volumes but not contemporaneouslyc. 
Following the above discussion, we use a similar framework of the extended VEC model by 
Arranz and Escribano (2000) with 4 equations, and with 3≤r  co-integrating vectors, 
 
t1-t1-tt zG(L)zzF ξβα +∆+′=∆                                        (5) 
 
where )x,x,p ,p(z BtAtBtAtt ′∆∆∆∆=∆  is a 4 x 1 vector. 
)( BtAtBtAtt eeεεξ =′ , 
  α is a 4 x r matrix of coefficients representing the speed of adjustment to equilibrium, 
  β is a 4 x r matrix of long-run coefficients, 
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c
 The causality structure is common among theoretical models, such as Huang and Stoll (1997). 
The empirical model (5) contains the main 
features of the structural relationship as 
described previously. It includes the 
contemporaneous causality running from 
trading volumes to prices; lagged causality 
from prices to trading volumes; uncorrelated 
(by definition) volume-related and volume-
unrelated shocks; multiple co-integration 
relationships involving trading volumes and 
prices, and all the relevant information 
being inferred from the past trading volumes 
and prices.a 
The Model of Information Shares 
Hasbrouck (1991a, 1995) proposes a 
measure of a market’s contribution to price 
discovery based on the permanent impact of 
new information on observed prices. This 
study extends it to calculate “information 
                                                 
a
 A salient feature of the VEC model (equation (5)) is 
the extra lags in the error correction term. This type 
of specification is called an extended vector error 
correction (EVEC) model. 
shares” as relative contributions of variance 
of a security in the variance of innovations 
of both trading volumes and prices. The 
modified information share (MIS) model 
can effectively distinguish the information 
asymmetry resulting from private 
information or public information. Every 
VEC model has an associated common 
trend model representation implied by the 
co-integration relationshipsb. The vector 
moving average (VMA) representation of 
(5) is 
tt Lz ξ)(Ψ=∆        (6)                                            
                                                 
b
 Hasbrouck (2002) confronts the information share 
approach in Hasbrouck (1995) with the permanent-
transitory approach in Harris et al. (2002). He shows 
that in the case of a two-market model with private 
and public information, similar to the one presented 
in this paper, the information share approach is more 
reliable. The bound generated by the information 
share approach contains (up to the estimation error) 
the true value. This cannot be said for the permanent-
transitory approach.  
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where )(LΨ  is a lag polynomial. Consider 
the first two equations in (6),  
tt Lp ξψ )(=∆  
where )( BtAtt ppp ∆∆=′∆  and )(Lψ  
represents the first two rows in )(LΨ . By 
recursive substitution and using 
)()1()1()( * LLL ψψψ −+= with 
1* )1))(1()(()( −−−= LLL ψψψ , 
∑
=
+=
t
tt Lp
1
* )()1(
τ
τ ξψξψ       (7)                                             
The first term on the right side of (7) is the 
common long-run (permanent) component. 
The second term is a zero-mean weakly 
stationary (transitory) component. Co-
integration entails 0)1( =Ψ′δ , where δ  is a 
co-integration vector. Under the theoretical 
assumption that the difference between the 
prices is stationary, (1 100)δ ′ = −  we have 
that 1 2 (1 4)(1) (1)ψ ψ ×= , with )1(kψ  
representing the k th row in )1(Ψ . 
Intuitively, the common long-run 
component implies that the long-run impact 
of a new shock on either A or B share 
should have the same permanent impact on 
all prices. It follows that tψξ  measures the 
impact of a shock on the information 
efficient price. 
Let )44()( ×Ω=tVar ξ . Then the long-run 
variance would be given by ψψ ′Ω . The aim 
is to identify the part of this long-run 
variance that is explained by each market’s 
information. Under the assumption of no 
correlation between ),( BtAt ee  and ),( BtAt εε , 
the δ ’s corresponding modified 
information share (MIS) would be 
 
ψψ
σψ δδδ
′Ω
=
22
MIS           { }BtAtBtAt ee ,,,εεδ =         
(8)                          
 
where 22 δδ σψ  and δψ is the δ ’s 
corresponding component of the row vector 
ψ . Further, it requires that 
 
1=∑
δ
δMIS              (9)                                                       
If the innovations in )( BtAtBtAtt eeεεξ =′  
are correlated, the covariance terms in Ω  
could be attributed to any shock. This paper 
follows Hasbrouck’s suggestion of 
constructing upper and lower bounds for the 
information shares. We orthogonalize the 
residual variance-covariance matrix using 
the Cholesky factorization and rotate the 
ordering of the variables to maximize and 
minimize the explanatory power of each 
particular shock. The Hasbrouck modeling 
framework is problematic wherever the 
contemporaneous correlation of shocks 
across markets is substantive. In that case, 
Huang (2002) and Booth et al. (2002) show 
wide gaps between the upper and lower 
bounds on the information shares. Although 
Hasbrouck (1995) indicates the higher the 
correlation between market innovations, the 
greater (smaller) the upper (lower) bound, 
Baillie et al. (2002) shows that the mean 
value of the lower and upper bounds is a 
reasonable estimate of a market’s 
contribution to price discovery.  
Empirical results 
 Data 
There are two stock exchanges in China, the 
Shanghai stock exchange and the Shenzhen 
stock exchange, both inaugurated in the 
early 1990s. The Shenzhen exchange is a 
relatively smaller and less liquid market. 
The market for 13 shares opened in 1992, 
more than a year after A shares were first 
listed on the Shanghai exchange. Table 1 
presents basic statistics for the two 
exchanges and Figure 1 plots the daily 
trading volumes and share indices of A and 
B shares in the two exchanges. 
The sample in this study includes times 
series of daily closing prices for sixty-four 
firms issuing both A and B shares from 
10/6/1997 to 10/31/2005 on either the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange. 
Among the firms, thirty-four are from the 
Shanghai exchange and thirty are from the 
Shenzhen exchange. We divide the full 
sample into two sub-periods: before 
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(10/6/1997 – 2/18/2001) and after 
(2/20/2001 – 10/31/2005) when China 
opened B shares to domestic investors. 
Since the information-driven component in 
the information share model is assumed to 
follow a random walk, which is a unit root 
process. Thus, we examine whether prices 
from cross-listing (both A-shares and B-
shares) contain unit roots and exclude the 
samples that do not follow a random walk. 
In the final sample, there are a total of eight 
firms in Shanghai and twelve firms in 
Shenzhen left before China opened B shares 
to domestic investors and twenty-six firms 
in Shanghai and twenty-two firms left in 
Shenzhen after the opening of B shares (see 
Appendix for the list of company names). 
 Cointegration between A- and B-
shares 
In segmented markets, prices are primarily 
determined by supply and demand 
conditions within each trading venue. By 
contrast, proper price discovery requires that 
prices from various traders not only be 
informative but that they also reflect 
common information on the underlying 
asset. This means prices for the same asset 
must be cointegrated. 
To test the cointegration relationship of 
prices between A- and B-shares, we adopt 
the Johansen (1988) maximum likelihood 
methodology. Johansen (1988) observes that 
the rank of the matrix βα ′  in (1a) 
determines whether or not the prices from 
various markets are cointegrated, and rank 
also determines the number of cointegrating 
vectors. Specifically, he provides two test 
statistics: 
∑
+=
−−=
n
rt
ttrace Tr
1
)ˆ1ln()( λλ         (10)                                            
  and 
)ˆ1ln()1,( 1max +−−=+ rTrr λλ      (11)                                         
where the n characteristic roots are ordered 
such that nλλλ >>> ...21  and T  is the 
number of observations. The statistic traceλ  
tests the null hypothesis that the number of 
cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to 
r  against the alternative that it is greater 
than r . The statistic maxλ  tests the null 
hypothesis that the number of cointegrating 
vectors equals r  against the alternative that 
it is equal to 1+r . 
The test results for all stocks in the final 
sample in each of the two exchanges are 
consistent with at least one cointegrating 
vector. Tables 2(a) and 2(b) report the 
cointegration results for the sample period 
before and after the opening of B-shares. 
The results for the two exchanges are 
similar. 
 The Information Shares of 
Hasbrouck (1995) 
The estimation methodology exploits the 
duality between the VAR representation (5) 
and the VMA formulation (7) to estimate 
the information share, using the covariance 
matrix of innovations diagonalized by the 
Cholesky factorization procedure. Varying 
the participant order produces the maximum 
and minimum bounds on the information 
shares of the participants. Since an estimate 
of the information share’s standard error is 
difficult to obtain, the analysis follows 
Hasbrouck (1995) in using the cross-
sectional variation in the information share 
to determine the statistical significance of 
the estimates. 
Tables 3(a) and 3(b) report the information 
shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges 
respectively. The two exchanges have 
similar results. Before the opening of B-
shares to domestic investors, B-shares 
dominate the market (with an average of 
61.88 percent (55.72 percent) in B-shares as 
compared to 38.12 percent (44.28 percent in 
A-shares in Shanghai (Shenzhen)). 
However, A-shares dominate the market 
after the opening of B-shares to domestic 
investors (with an average of 58.01 percent 
(54.52 percent) in A-shares compared to 
41.99 percent (45.48 percent) in Shanghai 
(Shenzhen)). 
The result before the opening of B-shares is 
consistent with the “institutional dominance 
hypothesis,” in which large foreign 
institutional investors generally are  more 
experienced, have better means of obtaining 
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information, and have access to more 
advanced technology to analyze the data. In 
the earlier period when A- and B-shares 
were completely segmented, the B-share 
market was traded by foreign institutional 
investors only. The A-share market, 
composed of domestic individual investors, 
learned information from the B-share 
market. However, after the opening of B-
shares to domestic investors, traders in the 
B-share market are composed of both 
foreign institutional investors and domestic 
investors. The information advantage of B-
shares thus no longer exists. 
Despite using different empirical models, 
our finding is consistent with those of Chui 
and Kwok (1998) and Sjöö and Zhang 
(2000). They all indicate there exists crucial 
information barriers to domestic investors in 
China, mainly because of the low 
creditability of the domestic media. The cost 
of obtaining correct information about the 
stock market is generally high for domestic 
investors. Thus, a cost-effective way for 
getting information is to observe the price 
movements in the foreign B shares. 
The information asymmetry is obvious in 
Shanghai relative to that in Shenzhen. The 
explanation could be that the Shenzhen 
exchange is relatively smaller in terms of 
total market capitalization and the number 
of listed firms (as shown in Table 1)c. The 
finding is also at odds with the argument 
that the Shenzhen market informationally 
leads the Shanghai market, as reported in 
Fung et al. (2000) and Poon and Fung 
(2000). The observed prices and trading 
activities in the Shanghai exchange seem to 
play a more important role as a “buy signal” 
for relatively uninformed domestic 
investorsd. 
                                                 
c
 Another possible explanation is that more “foreign” 
investors (mainly Hong Kong investors, who are 
allowed to open A-share accounts in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai) traded A-share in Shenzhen than that in 
Shanghai before February 2001. 
d
 Another possible explanation is information quality 
and institutional investor choices. Chan (1993) 
argues large firm has better quality information than 
small firms. Thus, institutional investors usually 
 The Modified Information Shares 
Table 4(a) (Table 4(b)) represents the lower, 
upper and mean modified information 
shares bounds between A and B shares on 
the Shanghai (Shenzhen) exchange. Table 
4(c) summarizes the average mean values of 
modified information shares between A and 
B shares. As shown in Table 4(c), the 
private (volume-related) information shocks 
(in Ae  and Be ) always dominate the public 
(volume-unrelated) information shocks (in 
Aε  and Bε ) on both exchanges. Before the 
opening of B-shares to domestic investors, 
B-shares’ contribution is slightly higher than 
A-shares’ in private information shocks. As 
for public information shocks, B-shares’ 
price discovery contribution is slightly 
lower than A-shares’. The two exchanges 
have similar findings. 
When the market is completely segmented, 
the results in this section support the 
institutional dominance hypothesis. Even 
though the B-share market has relatively 
low trading volumes (as shown in Figure 2), 
foreign institution investors, who have been 
regarded as informed traderse, have better 
private information than local investors 
because of their experience and expertise. 
By contrast, local individual investors’ 
information advantage on public 
information is due to their understanding of 
the local language and culture. Another 
potential source of information advantage 
for local investors is a better knowledge of 
important government data releases or 
policy actions (Covrig and Melvin (2002)). 
After the opening of B-shares to domestic 
investors, A-shares have an information 
advantage over B-shares in both private and 
public information shocks (except for the 
                                                                         
focus on large firms. Individual investors adjust the 
prices of small stocks after observing previous price 
changes of large stocks. Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) 
found that foreign investors prefer to invest in large 
domestic firms where the financial disclosure and 
information availability are better. 
e
 Many prior studies, such as Szewczyk et al. (1992), 
Alangar et al. (1999), Chakravarty (2001) and Anand 
et al. (2005), found evidence of institutions being 
better informed (relative to individuals). 
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public information in the Shenzhen 
exchange). The result, which supports the 
local familiarity hypothesis, is consistent 
with the finding by Chiu et al. (2005). They 
indicated that the removal of the B-share 
restriction accelerates the market integration 
between A- and B-shares. 
Conclusion 
Are foreign investors at an information 
advantage (or disadvantage) relative to 
domestic investors? This has been one of the 
frequently researched topics in the 
international capital market literature. This 
paper examines the possible information 
asymmetry between A-share (domestic 
investors) and B-share (foreign investors) 
markets in China. China’s stock market is 
an ideal market for investigation since the 
A-share and B-share markets were 
completely segmented before February 19, 
2001, which means that we can examine 
information advantages of A- and B-share 
markets under different trading mechanisms. 
Foreign investors in the B-share market are 
almost all institutional investors who are 
more experienced and have better means of 
obtaining information. By contrast, 
domestic investors in the A-share market are 
almost all individual investors who rely 
solely on rumor and perception and are 
more likely to trade based on “noise” rather 
than on information. 
We use and modify the Hasbrouck’s 
information share model to analyze the 
contribution of each market to price 
discovery. The modified information share 
model allows us to distinguish two sources 
of information asymmetries between 
markets: volume-related (private) 
information shocks and volume-unrelated 
(public) information shocks. 
The empirical results indicate that when the 
two markets are completely segmented, the 
price discovery contribution of B-shares is 
slightly higher (lower) than that of A-shares 
in private (public) information shocks. This 
implies that domestic individual investors 
have better public information, while 
foreign institutional investors have better 
private information. After the B-share 
market was opened to domestic investors, 
the information advantage of B-shares no 
longer exists. Due to the improvement of 
market integration between A- and B-
shares, the A-share market has the 
information advantage over the B-share 
market in both private and public 
information shocks.
 
Table 1  Descriptive statisticsa 
 Shanghai 
stock exchange 
Shenzhen 
stock exchange 
Number of A shares listed 824 54 
Number of B shares listed 534 55 
A-share market capitalization (billion RMB)b 490.592 199.562 
B-share market capitalization (billion RMB) 10.445 12.639 
 
                                                 
a
 This table contains basic statistics of China’s stock markets during the sample period in the study. 
b
 Updated to October, 2005. 
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Table 2(a)  Cointegration Tests Before the Opening of B-shares 
The table presents the results of Johansen cointegration tests for daily closing prices between A- and B-shares 
on twenty cross-listed stocks (eight in Shanghai and twelve in Shenzhen) before the opening of B-shares to 
domestic investors. Two test statistics are traceλ  and maxλ  and the critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum 
(1992). The statistic traceλ  tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal 
1=r  against the alternative that it is greater than r . The statistic maxλ  tests the null hypothesis that the 
number of cointegrating vectors equals r  against the alternative that it is equal to 1+r . 
 
Shanghai (8 firms) Shenzhen (12 firms) 
Code no. 
of stock trace
λ  maxλ  critical 
values 
Code no. 
of stock traceλ  maxλ  
critical 
values 
600614 25.677 23.295 2.382 000002 18.399 16.544 1.854 
600639 25.779 24.375 1.405 000011 21.533 19.155 2.378 
600663 24.403 19.152 5.251 000016 25.428 22.259 3.169 
600680 21.083 19.202 1.881 000018 24.867 20.218 4.649 
600776 22.263 19.808 2.456 000026 15.361 15.361 0.000 
600801 19.480 18.401 1.079 000056 18.073 15.839 2.234 
600822 19.132 16.930 2.202 000058 12.047 11.814 0.233 
600841 22.661 20.933 1.728 000418 40.264 32.373 7.892 
    000530 30.009 23.325 6.685 
    000539 17.101 15.980 1.122 
    000541 34.597 29.882 4.716 
    000553 11.971 11.971 0.000 
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Table 2(b)  Cointegration Tests After the Opening of B-shares 
The table presents the results of Johansen cointegration tests for daily closing prices between A- and B-shares 
on forty-eught cross-listed stocks (twenty-six in Shanghai and twenty-two in Shenzhen) after the opening of B-
shares to domestic investors. Two test statistics are traceλ  and maxλ  and the critical values are from Osterwald-
Lenum (1992). The statistic traceλ  tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than 
or equal 1=r  against the alternative that it is greater than r . The statistic maxλ  tests the null hypothesis that 
the number of cointegrating vectors equals r  against the alternative that it is equal to 1=r . 
 
Shanghai (26 firms) Shenzhen (22 firms) 
Code no. 
of stock traceλ  maxλ  
critical 
values 
Code no. 
of stock traceλ  maxλ  
critical 
values 
600054 38.143 35.917 2.226 000002 22.716 19.667 3.049 
600094 35.802 32.029 3.772 000011 54.066 51.516 0.002 
600190 57.229 54.247 2.982 000012 15.373 13.416 1.957 
600221 63.093 59.837 3.256 000016 12.942 10.089 2.854 
600604 43.016 41.089 1.927 000018 24.929 22.889 2.040 
600610 26.311 24.911 1.400 000019 27.492 25.800 1.692 
600611 32.623 30.881 1.742 000022 28.826 24.665 4.160 
600612 51.528 49.702 1.827 000024 15.464 15.423 0.041 
600613 35.180 33.525 1.655 000028 38.512 33.902 4.610 
600614 47.547 44.591 2.955 000055 25.057 23.910 1.146 
600619 38.755 36.755 2.000 000058 21.505 19.620 1.885 
600639 22.864 21.033 1.830 000413 17.665 15.706 1.958 
600648 35.650 33.441 2.209 000429 39.671 34.675 4.995 
600650 39.536 36.562 2.975 000513 30.750 29.341 1.409 
600663 12.856 10.952 1.904 000521 56.549 53.627 2.922 
600680 41.954 39.891 2.062 000530 14.699 12.915 1.785 
600689 49.246 46.739 2.507 000550 28.806 28.347 0.460 
600726 35.807 32.481 3.326 000553 19.782 18.068 1.714 
600754 38.218 35.339 2.879 000570 65.307 61.546 3.762 
600776 41.231 34.642 6.589 000581 17.019 16.479 0.540 
600801 35.437 33.231 2.206 000625 15.145 14.426 0.719 
600822 23.671 22.339 1.331 000761 36.650 33.033 3.618 
600827 26.619 25.059 1.560     
600835 19.732 17.828 1.904     
600843 26.881 25.041 1.840     
600845 30.780 28.937 1.842     
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Table 3(a)  Hasbrouck’s Information Shares in Shanghai Exchange 
This table reports estimates (by percentage) of the Hasbrouck’s (1995) information shares (as described in 
Section 3) for A- and B-shares in Shanghai before and after the opening of B-shares to domestic investors. It 
includes upper bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of information shares. The averages of the above upper 
bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of all A-share and B-share stocks (eight firms before and twenty-six 
firms after the opening of B-shares) are listed on the bottom line. 
 
Unit: % 
Code no. 
of stocks 
Before the opening (8 firms) After the opening (26 firms) 
A-shares B-shares A-shares B-shares 
upper lower mean upper lower mean upper lower mean upper lower mean 
600054       93.86 14.28 54.07 85.72 6.14 45.93 
600094       97.29 17.68 57.48 82.32 2.71 42.52 
600190       96.92 26.81 61.86 73.19 3.08 38.14 
600221         99.85 26.09 62.97 73.91 0.15 37.03 
600602             
600604       98.80 15.09 56.94 84.91 1.20 43.06 
600610       98.21 16.71 57.46 83.29 1.79 42.54 
600611       96.75 24.87 60.81 75.13 3.25 39.19 
600612       97.53 19.32 58.42 80.68 2.47 41.58 
600613       95.50 8.67 52.09 91.33 4.50 47.91 
600614 64.75 26.24 45.50 73.36 35.25 54.50 93.64 26.74 60.19 73.26 6.36 39.81 
600618             
600619       93.26 11.37 52.32 88.63 6.74 47.68 
600623             
600639 47.76 5.51 26.64 94.49 52.24 73.36 97.94 14.95 56.45 85.05 2.06 43.55 
600648       96.95 15.33 56.14 84.67 3.05 43.86 
600650       99.53 23.28 61.41 76.72 0.47 38.59 
600663 35.68 3.26 19.47 64.32 96.74 80.53 98.64 19.13 58.88 80.87 1.36 41.12 
600679             
600680 80.02 29.50 54.76 70.5- 19.98 45.24 97.27 14.71 55.99 85.29 2.73 44.01 
600689       95.09 10.20 52.65 89.80 4.91 47.35 
600726       99.10 24.77 61.93 75.23 0.90 38.07 
600754       96.84 17.34 57.09 82.66 3.16 42.91 
600776 29.61 1.04 15.32 98.96 70.39 84.68 99.43 16.05 57.74 83.95 0.57 42.26 
600801 66.99 20.18 43.58 79.82 33.01 56.42 98.38 29.90 64.14 70.10 1.62 35.86 
600818             
600822 80.51 39.01 59.76 60.99 19.49 40.24 95.58 15.18 55.38 84.82 4.42 44.62 
600827                      99.93 46.05 72.99 53.95 0.07 27.01 
600835       99.67 28.93 64.30 71.07 0.33 35.70 
600841 63.95 15.93 39.94 84.07 36.05 60.06       
600843       94.24 9.48 51.86 90.52 5.76 48.14 
600845       87.27 6.23 46.75 93.77 12.73 53.25 
Average   38.12   61.88   58.01   41.99 
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Table 3(b)  Hasbrouck’s Information Shares in Shenzhen Exchange 
This table reports estimates (by percentage) of the Hasbrouck’s (1995) information shares (as described in 
Section 3) for A- and B-shares in Shenzhen before and after the opening of B-shares to domestic investors. It 
includes upper bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of information shares. The averages of the above upper 
bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of all A-share and B-share stocks (twelve firms before and twenty-two 
firms after the opening of B-shares) are listed on the bottom line. 
 
Unit: % 
Code 
no. of 
stocks 
Before the opening (12 firms) After the opening (22 firms) 
A-shares B-shares A-shares B-shares 
upper lower mean upper lower mean upper lower mean upper lower mean 
000002 61.57 7.14 34.36 92.86 38.43 65.64 82.08 2.59 42.33 97.41 17.92 57.67 
000011 89.68 23.32 56.50 76.68 10.32 43.50 98.56 7.25 52.91 1.44 92.75 47.09 
000012       99.19 27.57 63.38 72.43 0.81 36.62 
000016 70.42 29.23 49.83 70.77 29.58 50.17 89.13 31.56 60.35 68.44 10.87 39.65 
000018 99.49 81.81 90.65 18.19 0.51 9.35 97.02 10.52 53.77 89.48 2.98 46.23 
000019       98.13 10.48 54.30 89.52 1.87 45.70 
000022       88.64 7.33 47.99 92.67 11.36 52.01 
000024       96.83 16.35 56.59 83.65 3.17 43.41 
000026 59.76 11.92 35.84 80.08 40.24 64.16       
000028       99.77 18.19 58.98 81.81 0.23 41.02 
000029             
000037             
000039             
000045             
000055       87.76 0.17 43.97 99.83 12.24 56.03 
000056 73.35 23.62 48.49 76.38 26.65 51.51       
000058 85.80 33.64 59.72 66.36 14.20 40.28 97.21 10.25 53.73 89.75 2.79 46.27 
000413       90.97 3.24 47.11 96.76 9.03 52.89 
000418                    30.52 4.99 17.76 95.01 69.48 82.24       
000429       96.13 13.38 54.76 86.62 3.87 45.24 
000513          99.33 18.18 58.76 81.82 0.67 41.24 
000521       99.99 17.41 58.70 82.59 0.01 41.30 
000530 35.15 0.16 17.66 99.84 64.85 82.34 99.83 20.60 60.21 79.40 0.17 39.79 
000539 74.54 14.79 44.66 85.21 25.46 55.34       
000541 24.23 0.31 12.27 99.69 75.77 87.73       
000550       98.14 25.74 61.94 74.26 1.86 38.06 
000553  91.57 35.77 63.67 64.23 8.43 36.33 88.77 3.67 46.22 96.33 11.23 53.78 
000570       99.71 14.34 57.03 85.66 0.29 42.97 
000581       99.68 29.28 64.46 70.77 0.32 35.54 
000625       64.54 27.95 46.24 72.05 35.46 53.76 
000761       97.02 14.40 55.71 2.98 85.60 44.29 
Average   44.28   55.72   54.52   45.48 
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Table 4(a) Modified Information Shares between A-shares and B-shares on the Shanghai Exchange 
This table reports estimates (by percentage) of the modified information shares (as described by equation (8)) 
for A- and B-shares in Shanghai before (panel A) and after (panel B) the opening of B-shares to domestic 
investors. It includes upper bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of modified information shares for public 
information in A-shares ( Aε ), B-sharea ( Bε ) and private information in A-shares ( Ae ), B-shares ( Be ). 
 
Panel A: the first subperiod (before the opening)                                 Unit: % 
Code no. of stocks upper lower mean Code no. of stocks upper lower mean 
600614 
Aε  
Bε  
Ae  
Be  
27.03 
11.53 
95.78 
86.63 
0.12 
0.01 
9.07 
2.38 
9.74 
3.22 
56.75 
30.29 
600776 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
20.38 
7.82 
79.90 
63.63 
0.00 
0.00 
20.71 
9.70 
20.71 
4.27 
44.28 
43.46 
600639 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
20.68 
4.55 
75.85 
85.42 
0.01 
0.01 
8.98 
22.01 
8.43 
1.65 
36.95 
52.98 
600801 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
37.98 
25.13 
96.01 
80.48 
0.30 
0.00 
7.04 
2.21 
13.97 
5.79 
50.07 
30.17 
600663 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
25.33 
22.00 
87.48 
86.76 
0.04 
0.00 
0.53 
7.30 
7.00 
6.86 
31.46 
54.68 
600822 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
3.07 
6.12 
92.70 
97.37 
0.07 
0.00 
1.60 
5.96 
1.36 
1.71 
46.37 
50.56 
600680 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
16.11 
11.17 
85.91 
92.47 
0.19 
0.00 
2.99 
12.55 
6.35 
3.40 
39.25 
51.01 
600841 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
16.69 
8.33 
76.53 
86.75 
0.10 
0.01 
7.41 
21.43 
7.08 
2.75 
39.09 
51.08 
 
 
Panel B: the second subperiod (after the opening)  
Code no. of stocks upper lower mean Code no. of stocks upper lower mean 
600654 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
9.97 
42.32 
90.70 
94.40 
0.11 
0.00 
3.43 
1.78 
3.36 
6.32 
54.41 
35.92 
600650 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
5.51 
15.23 
97.08 
97.83 
0.05 
0.00 
0.21 
1.04 
1.57 
3.17 
63.21 
32.05 
600694 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
8.71 
10.27 
80.62 
95.68 
0.02 
0.01 
1.02 
17.55 
2.32 
2.78 
34.39 
60.50 
600663 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
98.16 
78.98 
15.55 
3.78 
19.44 
0.92 
0.00 
0.12 
60.82 
33.79 
4.55 
0.84 
600190 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
42.94 
40.96 
98.19 
98.57 
0.21 
0.00 
0.03 
0.24 
12.53 
7.84 
45.47 
34.16 
600680 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
3.73 
21.93 
92.48 
95.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
4.52 
1.43 
2.39 
62.62 
33.56 
600221 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
95.60 
67.61 
98.62 
98.01 
0.34 
0.00 
0.02 
0.01 
29.30 
13.14 
34.72 
22.83 
600689 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
25.01 
13.86 
89.71 
97.36 
0.00 
0.00 
0.97 
8.68 
7.25 
3.70 
41.40 
47.65 
600604 
Aε  
Bε  
8.46 
18.24 
96.44 
0.01 
0.01 
0.62 
2.28 
3.28 
42.05 
600726 
Aε  
Bε  
21.77 
13.71 
92.88 
0.15 
0.00 
0.45 
7.34 
3.18 
39.74 
Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
International Research Journal of Applied Finance         ISSN 2229 – 6891   
Vol. V  Issue – 1  January, 2014 
47 
 
 
Be  
97.51 1.97 52.39 
 
Be  
98.52 6.21 49.74 
600610 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
96.14 
70.33 
18.98 
6.80 
27.21 
0.01 
0.00 
0.72 
69.49 
21.15 
7.04 
2.32 
600754 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
28.83 
24.85 
98.00 
98.26 
0.24 
0.00 
0.23 
1.05 
8.69 
5.93 
49.39 
35.99 
600611 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
16.43 
14.13 
95.10 
98.59 
0.25 
0.00 
0.12 
3.88 
5.21 
3.19 
37.24 
54.36 
600776 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
54.15 
46.84 
95.42 
96.30 
0.29 
0.00 
0.15 
1.89 
15.70 
9.15 
36.64 
38.50 
600612 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
10.06 
4.87 
93.17 
77.15 
0.00 
0.00 
20.68 
2.76 
3.10 
1.92 
58.05 
36.93 
600801 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
12.54 
17.89 
83.29 
98.78 
0.33 
0.00 
0.02 
14.30 
3.63 
4.61 
36.94 
54.82 
600613 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
86.30 
85.00 
81.24 
90.97 
0.32 
0.00 
0.95 
0.04 
10.71 
8.94 
34.27 
46.08 
600822 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
13.65 
23.89 
98.58 
98.32 
0.41 
0.00 
0.24 
0.07 
2.95 
4.52 
63.20 
29.33 
600614 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
9.30 
11.38 
95.10 
91.83 
0.32 
0.00 
5.66 
0.90 
2.95 
2.69 
60.09 
34.27 
600827 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
60.19 
24.02 
98.86 
90.54 
0.61 
0.00 
0.20 
0.18 
21.64 
4.65 
40.38 
33.33 
600619 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
36.35 
27.48 
85.51 
91.19 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
9.70 
9.24 
8.60 
32.38 
49.77 
600835 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
9.93 
20.80 
99.07 
82.61 
0.10 
0.00 
7.40 
0.15 
2.09 
2.49 
76.72 
18.70 
600639 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
5.20 
16.50 
90.68 
98.05 
0.09 
0.00 
0.41 
7.38 
1.36 
1.73 
57.08 
39.83 
600843 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
5.79 
16.58 
98.75 
86.32 
0.03 
0.01 
9.19 
1.14 
1.63 
2.08 
71.49 
24.80 
600648 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
3.85 
15.89 
87.30 
98.23 
0.01 
0.00 
0.20 
10.25 
1.36 
1.78 
56.53 
40.33 
600845 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
2.26 
15.70 
97.91 
98.25 
0.01 
0.00 
0.06 
0.94 
0.79 
2.02 
65.37 
31.82 
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
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Table 4(b)  Modified Information Shares between A-shares and B-shares in the Shenzhen Exchange 
This table reports estimates (by percentage) of the modified information shares (as described by equation (8)) 
for A- and B-shares in Shenzhen before (panel A) and after (panel B) the opening of B-shares to domestic 
investors. It includes upper bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of modified information shares for public 
information in A-shares ( Aε ), B-shares ( Bε ) and private information in A-shares ( Ae ), B-shares ( Be ). 
 
Panel A: the first subperiod (before the opening)                                 Unit: % 
Code no. of stocks upper lower mean Code no. of stocks upper lower mean 
000002 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
27.17 
6.00 
86.86 
88.68 
0.02 
0.03 
7.09 
11.96 
9.54 
1.65 
40.51 
48.30 
000058 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
13.78 
5.30 
87.54 
97.80 
0.29 
0.00 
0.67 
11.16 
5.59 
1.49 
52.31 
40.60 
000011 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
11.25 
5.69 
56.23 
99.46 
0.17 
0.00 
0.27 
42.02 
4.20 
1.57 
21.56 
72.67 
000418 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
56.21 
17.52 
98.30 
95.21 
0.61 
0.00 
0.13 
35.37 
22.16 
3.12 
39.35 
0.83 
000016 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
23.47 
8.32 
97.61 
66.53 
0.23 
0.04 
24.68 
1.09 
9.73 
2.16 
68.76 
19.35 
000530 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
13.74 
11.17 
63.63 
91.48 
0.00 
0.01 
5.79 
32.50 
4.32 
4.13 
31.39 
60.16 
000018 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
32.77 
16.81 
88.17 
93.26 
1.56 
0.00 
0.12 
8.87 
10.90 
3.71 
34.56 
50.84 
000539 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
14.45 
6.86 
76.31 
86.14 
0.08 
0.02 
9.64 
22.44 
5.86 
2.14 
41.18 
50.81 
000026 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
20.23 
17.36 
79.45 
97.97 
0.13 
0.00 
0.04 
16.95 
6.62 
5.22 
28.21 
59.96 
000541 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
82.33 
12.41 
80.11 
47.01 
0.59 
0.00 
0.00 
0.21 
32.1 
7.21 
43.70 
16.90 
000056 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
40.43 
9.95 
97.56 
98.45 
0.15 
0.00 
0.05 
1.89 
15.36 
2.13 
52.55 
29.97 
000553 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
20.90 
10.27 
91.64 
97.22 
0.47 
0.00 
0.13 
7.43 
8.22 
2.28 
34.77 
54.74 
 
 
Panel B: the second subperiod (after the opening)  
Code no. of stocks upper lower mean Code no. of stocks upper lower mean 
000002 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
2.73 
21.28 
98.78 
90.86 
0.17 
0.03 
7.46 
0.03 
0.92 
7.92 
62.36 
28.81 
000413 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
11.11 
26.24 
88.58 
90.08 
0.00 
0.01 
4.63 
8.32 
2.62 
3.92 
45.06 
48.40 
000011 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
36.60 
45.82 
93.79 
98.26 
0.32 
0.00 
0.15 
1.46 
10.05 
11.74 
33.09 
45.12 
000429 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
25.45 
20.02 
89.28 
99.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
8.85 
6.85 
5.74 
34.98 
52.43 
000012 
Aε  
Bε  
72.92 
63.30 
95.85 
0.61 
0.00 
0.37 
21.48 
12.92 
31.79 
000513 
Aε  
Bε  
6.77 
30.68 
96.92 
0.16 
0.01 
48.61 
1.62 
8.74 
77.15 
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
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Be  
95.84 1.31 33.81 
 
Be  
46.75 2.10 12.49 
000016 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
31.93 
13.56 
98.39 
96.41 
0.96 
0.00 
0.22 
0.00 
12.12 
4.02 
52.52 
31.34 
000521 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
23.30 
35.08 
75.36 
97.17 
0.12 
0.00 
0.52 
16.51 
6.51 
7.82 
31.07 
54.61 
000018 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
5.80 
8.99 
72.90 
94.25 
0.65 
0.00 
0.00 
23.35 
2.80 
2.15 
39.39 
55.66 
000530 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
20.45 
27.09 
95.71 
94.06 
0.26 
0.00 
0.96 
3.58 
5.24 
5.89 
34.37 
54.50 
000019 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
3.93 
50.93 
80.12 
97.60 
0.04 
0.00 
0.03 
18.67 
1.69 
16.69 
22.28 
59.34 
000550 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
18.39 
27.98 
4.12 
96.25 
0.16 
0.00 
0.25 
21.17 
5.85 
6.91 
30.91 
56.34 
000022 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
19.87 
27.22 
48.34 
92.37 
0.28 
0.00 
0.05 
28.53 
9.01 
8.93 
27.22 
54.84 
000553 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
25.25 
36.08 
97.38 
97.71 
0.28 
0.00 
0.10 
0.34 
7.07 
8.99 
42.08 
41.86 
000024 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
12.24 
29.23 
97.17 
81.30 
0.12 
0.01 
13.49 
0.39 
3.47 
8.22 
70.53 
17.78 
000570 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
11.90 
48.71 
99.85 
86.99 
0.07 
0.03 
10.97 
0.05 
3.79 
12.89 
61.11 
22.21 
000028 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
3.19 
14.60 
88.21 
97.74 
0.03 
0.00 
0.71 
9.01 
1.48 
3.34 
53.28 
41.90 
000581 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
8.37 
9.15 
79.28 
98.61 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
18.01 
3.40 
2.40 
41.21 
52.99 
000055 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
54.60 
48.83 
97.25 
92.84 
0.32 
0.00 
1.91 
0.44 
15.21 
10.71 
45.49 
28.58 
00625 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
35.05 
32.31 
98.35 
93.97 
0.34 
0.00 
2.03 
0.00 
11.05 
6.52 
53.80 
28.62 
000058 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
67.96 
56.73 
98.49 
97.09 
0.27 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
19.67 
10.90 
41.85 
27.55 
000761 
Aε  
Bε  
 
Be  
4.57 
52.04 
96.75 
97.01 
0.10 
0.00 
0.05 
0.92 
1.86 
4.94 
59.52 
33.68 
 
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
Ae Ae
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Table 4(c)  Summary of the Average Mean Values of Modified Information Shares between A-shares 
and B-shares 
This table summarizes the average mean values of the modified information shares in Table 4(a) and (b). It 
includes the average mean values of the modified information shares for public information in A-shares ( Aε ), 
B-shares ( Bε ) and private information in A-shares ( Ae ), B-shares ( Be ). All estimates are percentages. 
 
Unit: % 
  before the opening after the opening 
Shanghai Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen 
public 
information 
Aε  7.74 11.23 11.11 6.99 
Bε  3.71 3.07 6.35 7.83 
private 
information 
Ae  43.03 40.74 46.36 45.05 
Be  45.53 44.97 36.19 40.13 
Figure 1(a): Stock index in Shanghai 
 
 
Figure 1(b): Stock index in Shenzhen 
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Figure 2(a): Trading volumes in Shanghai 
 
 
Figure 2(b): Trading volumes in Shenzhen 
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Appendix: List of company names in sample 
A. Shanghai Exchange 
Code No.  Full name of company 
600054 Huangshan Tourism Development Co., Ltd.                 
600094 Shanghai Worldbest Co., Ltd.                            
600190 Jinzhou Port Co., Ltd.                                  
600221 Hainan Airlines Co., Ltd.                               
600602 Sva Electron Co., Ltd.                                  
600604 Shanghai Erfangji Co., Ltd.                             
600610 China Textile Machinery Co., Ltd.                       
600611 Dazhong Transportion (Group) Co., Ltd.                  
600612 China First Pencil Co., Ltd.                            
600613 Shanghai Wingsung Data Technology Co., Ltd.              
600614 Shanghai Sanjiu Technology Development(Group) Co., Ltd.  
600618 Shanghai Chlor-Alkali Chemical Co., Ltd.                
600619 Shanghai Highly (Group) Co., Ltd.                       
600623 Shanghai Tyre & Rubber (Group) Co., Ltd.                
600639 Shanghai Jinqiao Export Processing Zone Dev. Co., Ltd.  
600648 Shanghai Wai Gaoqiao Free Trade Zone Development Co.    
600650 Shanghai Jin Jiang International Ind. Inv. Co., Ltd.    
600663 Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone Dev. Co., Ltd.   
600679 Phoenix Co., Ltd.                                       
600680 Shanghai Posts & Telecommunications Equipment Co., Ltd.  
600689 Shanghai Sanmao Enterprise (Group) Co., Ltd.            
600726 Huadian Energy Co., Ltd.                                
600754 Shanghai Jinjiang International Hotels Dev. Co., Ltd.   
600776 Eastern Communications Co., Ltd.                        
600801 Huaxin Cement Co., Ltd.                                 
600822 Shanghai Material Trading Co., Ltd.                     
600827 Shanghai Friendship Group Incorporated Company          
600835 Shanghai Mechanical & Electrical Industry Co., Ltd.     
600841 Shanghai Diesel Engine Co., Ltd.                        
600843 SGSB Group Co., Ltd.                                    
600845 Shanghai Baosight Software Co.,Ltd.                     
 
B. Shenzhen Exchange 
Code No.  Full name of company 
000002 China Vanke Co., Ltd.                                    
000011 Shenzhen Properties & Resources Dev. (Group) Ltd.        
000012 CSG Holding Co., Ltd.                                    
000016 Konka Group Co., Ltd.                                    
000018 Shenzhen Victor Onward Textile Ind. Co., Ltd.            
000019 Shenzhen Shenbao Industrial Co., Ltd.                    
000022 Shenzhen Chiwan Wharf Holdings Ltd.                      
000024 China Merchants Property Development Co., Ltd.           
000026 Shenzhen Fiyta Holdings Limited                          
000028 Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical CO., Ltd.                 
000029 SZ S.E.Z. Real Estate & Properties (Group) Co., Ltd.     
000037 Shenzhen Nanshan Power Station Company Limited           
000039 China International Marine Containers (Group) Co., Ltd   
000045 Shenzhen Textile (Holdings) Co., Ltd.                    
000055 China Fangda Group Company Limited                       
000056 Shenzhen International Enterprise Co., Ltd.              
000058 Shenzhen SEG Co., Ltd.                                   
000413 Shijiazhuang Baoshi Electronic Glass Company Limited     
000418 Wuxi Little Swan Company Limited                         
000429 Guangdong Provincial Expressway Development Co., Ltd.    
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Code No.  Full name of company 
000513 Livzon Pharmaceutical Group Inc.                         
000521 Hefei Meiling Co., Ltd.                                  
000530 Dalian Refrigeration Co., Ltd.                           
000539 Guangdong Electric Power Development Co., Ltd.           
000541 Foshan Electrical & Lighting Co., Ltd.                   
000550 Jiangling Motors Corporation Ltd.                        
000553 Hubei Sanonda Co., Ltd.                                  
000570 Changchai Co., Ltd.                                      
000581 Weifu High-Technology Co., Ltd.                          
000625 Chongqing Changan Automobile Co., Ltd.                   
000761 Bengang Steel Plates Co., Ltd                            
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The Asymmetric Information of Alpha on Portfolio Management within the 
S&P 500 
 
Darrol J. Stanley  Michael D. Kinsman 
 
Abstract 
Alpha, Beta and the Sharpe Ratio have become the obsessive Holy Trinity of portfolio 
management.  Portfolio managers are held hostage to these statistics and their benchmark error. 
This paper recognizes this reality. It is an attempt to help S&P 500 large-capitalization portfolio 
managers perform better. The hypothesis is that by concentrating only on high alpha stocks, 
performance characteristics could be enhanced for such managers. The paper makes a 
compelling case for such conduct.  
 
Introduction 
There are many paradigms in finance. One is 
the contention that the stock market is 
efficient. Eugene F. Fama espoused this 
paradigm, The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH), while a doctoral student at Chicago. 
The core concept is simple. Stock prices 
change from one period to the next due to the 
appearance of new and unanticipated 
information.  Since this information was 
revealed randomly, stock prices at all times 
were correctly set, which is the finance 
definition of “efficient.” This concept of an 
efficient market is still paramount in 
investment theory although strict 
interpretation of it has been challenged as time 
has passed.  Fama (1970) noted that in an 
efficient market any new information would 
be immediately and fully reflected in equity 
prices.  
A financial market therefore quickly, if not 
instantaneously, discounts all available 
information. In an efficient market, investors 
should expect an asset price to reflect its true 
fundamental value at all times. Bruno Solnik 
(1996) noted that since fundamental value is 
unknown, the only way to test for market 
efficiency is to detect whether some specific 
news is not yet incorporated in the asset price 
and could therefore be used to make some 
abnormal profit. 
Those who challenge EMH suggest that there 
exists public information already available that 
can be more effectively incorporated in the 
asset price and could therefore be used to 
make some abnormal profit. This group 
includes most of the world’s investment 
managers. 
Market Efficiency 
It is essential to understand the environment in 
which securities are priced. The signal 
question is how effectively investor’s 
expectations are incorporated into security 
pricing. Are investor’s expectations for a 
particular security quickly and accurately 
reflected in the price of the security? This is 
the concept of market efficiency. 
In an efficient market, the current prices of 
securities represent unbiased estimates of the 
“fair,” “intrinsic,” “real,” “fair market,” 
“sound,” and “true” value of the securities. If 
all securities are correctly valued (by whatever 
term), investors will earn a return on their 
investment appropriate for the level of risk 
assumed by the investor according to Capital 
Market Theory. This is called the “normal 
return”. This “normal return” will occur 
regardless of which securities are purchased. 
Thus, in a perfectly efficient market in 
equilibrium all securities are correctly priced, 
and there are no under or over valued 
securities. The existing price for each security 
is its correct price.  
The degree to which a market is efficient has a 
profound implication for investors. If a market 
is efficient, the time, money, effort, required 
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knowledge, and anxiety required to engage in 
security analysis becomes meaningless. 
The central theorem of the EMH is that the 
security market participants are competent and 
well-informed. It is the competition therefore 
between these very astute market participants 
which results in security prices being fairly 
and correctly priced. These market 
participants immediately “compete away” any 
chance to earn an abnormal profit. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The framework for a discussion of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)  is 
generally centered around Eugene Fama’s 
May 1970 Journal of Finance paper “Efficient 
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work.” . 
Fama defined efficient markets in terms of a 
“fair game” where security prices “fully 
reflect” all the information available. 
Consequently, if the markets are efficient, 
individuals can-not consistently receive 
abnormal risk-adjusted returns. Utilizing the 
framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
this implies that the expected value of ex-ante 
alpha must be zero. This implies that the 
complete measurement of risk can be noted in 
the beta of the security. 
Fama suggested that the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) can be divided into three 
categories. These categories are as follows: 
1. Weak-Form EMH. In the weak-form 
EMH, the type of information being 
considered is restricted exclusively to 
historical price data. If the weak-form 
EMH is correct, investors should not be 
able to consistently earn abnormal 
profits by simply observing the 
historical prices of securities. Weak-
Form efficiency is, in fact, a special case 
of Semi-Strong form efficiency.  
2. Semi-Strong Form EMH. The semi-
strong form EMH asserts that security 
prices rapidly and correctly adjust to the 
release of publicly available 
information. Thus, under the semi-strong 
form, current prices fully reflect not only 
all past price data but all other data as 
well. Hence, any and all information that 
is available to the public should be 
quickly if not instantaneously reflected 
in security prices so that investors can 
not consistently earn abnormal returns 
by action on such public information. 
3. Strong-Form EMH. The strong-form 
EMH represents the most extreme case 
of market efficiency. Under the strong-
form it is argued that security prices 
fully reflect all information whether 
public or private. Fama himself thought 
that this form was an extreme one that, if 
ever adequately tested, would prove 
false. 
There are a huge number of empirical studies 
of the EMH.  It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to conduct even a causal review of those 
studies. Suffice it to say, researchers have 
tested the EMH due to its signal importance in 
financial literature and their combined results 
indicate that the EMH as postulated by Fama 
is overwhelmingly supported especially in 
dealing with the weak and semi-strong 
versions of the hypothesis. The difficulty of 
obtaining data on undisclosed sources of 
information makes it difficult to research the 
strong-form hypothesis.  
However, even in face of this consensus, there 
are a growing number of researchers that 
question the EMH. Robert Haugen is one. He 
argues in multiple books that the EMH is a 
paradigm that is at the extreme end of the 
spectrum. He has made a serious case for 
recognizing that the market overreacts to past 
records of success and failure with resulting 
incorrect or imprecise security prices. (Haugen 
(1999) New Finance p. ix) 
Other researchers are even more radical, 
holding the opinion that the market is in chaos   
(which also implies you can not beat the index 
as well). 
Finally, there is a small but growing group that 
believes the American stock market is now 
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(perhaps again) manipulated. Further, the 
EMH can also be seriously questioned in view 
of the international financial turmoil following 
the sub-prime crisis in the USA. 
Alpha 
This paper is focused on one aspect of the 
CAPM spectrum: the Alpha. The alpha herein 
discussed is the intercept of the regressed 
returns of a stock and its index–its 
characteristic line. It represents the 
unexplained return (positive or negative) given 
the slope (beta) of the regression against an 
index such as a capitalization-weighted S&P 
500 which is used in this study. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the 
advantage, if any, of utilizing alpha as a 
predictive factor in portfolio management.  
CAPM states that beta has predictive powers 
due to its “memory.” Does alpha have 
memory power as well? 
In portfolio management alpha has assumed a 
paramount position in measuring portfolio 
performance. To a great degree, the success of 
portfolio managers is measured by their risk-
adjusted excess returns versus the market. An 
alpha is then a measurement of the ability to 
select winning (losing) stocks. 
This is part due to the fact that for beta to be 
valid measurement of risk a diversified 
portfolio of stocks should have an ex-ante 
alpha of zero. The only measurement of risk 
therefore is beta. In a world without CAPM, a 
beta adjusted return would not exist. 
Portfolio managers have found it most 
difficult to outperform the S&P 500 market on 
a risk-adjusted basis.  Stated another way, they 
have not been able to capture normally 
positively desired “excess alpha” in their stock 
selection process.  
Perhaps focusing only on stocks that have 
historically demonstrated “excess returns” 
might be a possible way to achieve superior 
performance within the S&P 500. This is the 
core of the research hypotheses proposed in 
this paper. 
 
Research Hypotheses 
The research hypotheses of this paper are that 
by sectoring the S&P 500 into Alpha terciles 
the Top Alpha tercile will outperform both the 
S&P 500 (Equally-Weighted) as well as the 
Bottom Alpha tercile on a risk-adjusted basis 
after transaction costs based on the portfolio’s 
Coefficient of Variation (CV).  
The terciles are rebalanced on a monthly basis. 
Thus, the study is a Weak-Form Efficient 
Market Hypothesis test. The research period is 
December 31, 2002 through December 31, 
2011. 
The selection of terciling the S&P 500 was 
done for one predominate reason: the 
necessity for efficient diversification.  Each of 
the three portfolios has been selected on the 
basis of alpha alone. Industry and/or sector 
groups should be accounted for in normal 
portfolio construction. This is at best 
pragmatically difficult. Consequently, three 
large portfolios mitigate this problem. This 
study was done on a stock selection basis of 
167 stocks in the top tercile; 166 stocks in the 
mid-tercile, and 167 stocks in the bottom 
tercile. 
The Alpha (ALP) employed in this research 
comes from the same five-year monthly 
regression used to calculate the beta of a stock 
against the S&P 500. It is the excess return 
(positive or negative) not explained by the 
beta. Excess positive (negative) Alpha is 
sought by investment managers indicating 
their superior ability to selecting winning 
(losing) securities. All investment managers 
“seek alpha.”   
Data and Methods 
This paper will explore the total return 
behavior on a risk-adjusted basis, through the 
above noted hypothesis. Only one data source, 
Ford Equity Research of San Diego, was used 
in this study. Ford Equity Research is a data 
vendor with proprietary models for investment 
managers globally and is affiliated with 
Mergent through stock ownership. See 
www.fordequity.com for more information 
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A review of the data and methods used by 
Ford Equity Research is constructed such that 
the three most common biases in investment 
data were eliminated. There is no look-ahead 
bias, no restatement bias, nor any survivorship 
bias to the data. 
Ford Equity Research, likewise, provided all 
variables utilized in this study. Total return 
includes both price changes and dividends. 
Dividends are included in the appropriate 
period based on their ex-dividend date. All 
returns were computed on a geometric basis, 
as were the standard deviations in conformity 
with accepted professional investment 
standards.   
All returns were calculated on a monthly basis 
including the index. Hence, re-balancing 
occurs on a monthly basis for the entire study 
period. All returns were computed equally-
weighted. All stocks were selected from the 
noted benchmark S&P 500 Index.  
A number of output variables were selected. 
One key output variable was an estimation of 
turnover. This allows for the estimation of 
transaction costs for testing the efficiency of 
the strategy for both market efficiency and 
pragmatic investment management. The final 
portfolios were subjected to a .5% transaction 
cost utilized by hedge funds in back-testing 
models.  
All three terciles previously noted were 
constructed utilizing the highest positive 
Alpha to the lowest negative Alpha. The 
bottom tercile is therefore also constructed as 
the “short” portfolio since the research 
hypothesis states that it will underperform the 
top tercile portfolio as well as the S&P 500 
(Equally-Weighted).  
The selection for the sample size is of concern 
for all researchers. The selection of portfolios 
of 167-166-167 stocks reduces the impact of 
industry concentration especially in short time 
frame studies. Ideally, the number of stocks 
from one specific industry should be in line 
with the benchmark index. Even more ideally, 
the selected portfolio should be of the same 
industry weightings as the benchmark index. 
Unfortunately, there is no computer program 
in the United States that allows for this type of 
back-testing without signal manual analysis. 
Data Results 
The results of the investigation can be found 
in the following two tables. Table 1 presents 
the results on a risk adjusted basis before 
transaction costs. Table 2 presents the results 
on a risk-adjusted basis after transaction costs. 
The performance, again, was computed on a 
monthly rebalancing basis. 
Data Analysis 
The results of the study had a number of 
significant implications. First, the hypotheses 
were confirmed. The Top Alpha portfolio 
outperformed the S&P 500 (Equally-
Weighted) on both a non-transaction cost and 
after-transaction cost basis risk-adjusted 
utilizing the CV. Further, the Top Alpha 
portfolio outperformed the Bottom Alpha 
portfolio on both a non-transaction cost and 
after-transaction cost basis risk-adjusted 
utilizing the CV.  
There are a number of pragmatic investment 
management conclusions. The first is that 
portfolio managers can have a higher 
probability of achieving the same results as 
the S&P 500 by selecting only stocks in the 
Top Alpha tercile category.  Thus, the amount 
of analytical work is reduced by two-thirds. It 
must be acknowledged, however, that the 
portfolio manager could select 
underperforming stocks within this tercile. The 
reduction in analytical work must be 
contrasted to the fact that the betas of both the 
top and bottom terciles are different than the 
equally-weighted beta value of the S&P 500.  
Table 3 addresses this situation. It shows, 
based on year end data for the last five years, a 
problem does exist but it is not material in 
nature. 
The second pragmatic investment 
management consideration is the ability to run 
a risk-free portfolio with returns that 
outperform US T Bills. This statement must be 
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carefully noted under two key assumptions. 
First, the beta of the two portfolios (Top and 
Bottom) Alphas have the same beta 
throughout time. This calculation was not 
done in the study. However, the year-end betas 
were noted for the past five years of the study. 
While the averages are close (Top at 1.21 and 
the Bottom at 1.23), the results were indicative 
of the economic environment.  
It would appear that the Top Alpha portfolio 
will have a bias towards a higher beta than the 
bottom over long periods of time of economic 
advancement.  Second, the study was done 
without inter-period analysis. Consequently, 
there could be periods in which this positive 
differential (Long Top Alpha – Short Bottom 
Alpha) did not hold with resulting drawdowns. 
Additionally, short selling, even with S&P 500 
stocks, can be quite difficult. This difficulty 
could result in some of the excess profit being 
lost. Table 3 again discusses this situation over 
the past five years of the study utilizing year 
end data only. 
Conclusion 
This study examined the weak-form of the 
EMH utilizing the technical tool of Alpha 
developed from the characteristic line. The 
tercile Alpha portfolios of the S&P 500 
showed that on an after-transaction basis that 
the Top Alpha portfolio outperformed ever-so-
marginally the equally-weighted S&P 500 
utilizing the Coefficient of Variation.  This 
Top Alpha portfolio clearly outperformed the 
Bottom Alpha portfolio. This could allow for a 
risk-free arbitrage opportunity. 
      However, the key implication of this study is 
that large-capitalization S&P 500 portfolio 
managers should concentrate most of their 
stock selection efforts on stocks within the 
Top Alpha portfolio. It could well be the way 
to really truly achieve “Excess Alpha” returns. 
 
Table 1: Alpha Tercile Performance Monthly Rebalancing Without Transaction Costs 
(December 31, 2002-December 31, 2011) 
Equally-Weighted 
Top Tercile           Bottom Tercile              S&P 500 
Annual Returns                             11.0%                      8.0%                             9.6% 
Standard Deviation                       19.3%                     22.2%                           18.9% 
CV                                                   1.75                        2.78                              1.97 
 
Table 2: Alpha Tercile Performance Monthly Rebalancing After Transaction Costs 
(December 31, 2002-December 31, 2011) 
Equally-Weighted 
Top Tercile          Bottom Tercile          S&P 500 
 
Annual Returns                               9.8%                      6.8%                       9.6% 
Standard Deviation                        19.2%                     22.2%                    18.9% 
CV                                                    1.96                        3.26                        1.97 
 
Table 3:  S&P 500 Alpha Terciles for Mean Alpha and Beta data for December year end only 
Top Alpha                Bottom Alpha          Equally-Weighted 
Year End             Portfolio                     Portfolio                     S&P 500 
Alpha     Beta         Alpha       Beta              Alpha       Beta 
 
2011               1.64        1.24          -0.36        1.14               0.61          1.16 
2010               1.64        1.26          -0.32        1.10               0.63          1.16 
2009               1.72        1.36          -0.37        1.22               0.64          1.19 
2008               1.74        1.21          -0.93        1.32               0.43          1.18 
2007               1.84        1.00          -0.87        1.37               0.46          1.11 
       Five Year 
Average         1.72         1.21         -0.57         1.23               0.55         1.16 
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Evaluation of Hospital Financial Performance in Taiwan Following 
Implementation of National Health Insurance 
 
Jiunn Chiou Chiang   Tsai Yi Wang   Feng Jui Hsu 
 
Abstract 
The financial performance of hospitals in Taiwan is evaluated following the implementation 
of the National Health Insurance scheme. Results showed that, overall, public hospitals in 
Taiwan had better liquidity status than private hospitals, but showed poor results for 
collection delays. Aside from a few foundation hospitals, analysis of capital structure showed 
almost no long-term debt, suggesting a need to explore capital financing to improve 
profitability. The majority of private and foundation hospitals showed profitability, but most 
public hospitals operated at a loss. 
Keywords: Hospital financial performance, national health insurance in Taiwan 
 
Introduction 
In 1995, the government of Taiwan 
implemented the National Health Insurance 
(NHI) scheme, stimulating competition in 
the health care market. Hospitals in Taiwan 
are classified by type (medical center, 
teaching hospital, regional hospital, and 
district hospital) and region (north, middle, 
south and east). Since the implementation of 
the National Health Insurance (NHI) in 1995, 
out-patient attendance at large hospitals has 
decreased significantly and small hospitals 
are finding it increasingly difficult to 
compete with the large hospitals. Hospital 
financial and operating performance has a 
key impact on the role-effectiveness of the 
various types of hospitals in providing 
effective and efficient health care in Taiwan. 
As of 1995, Taiwan had a total of 715 
hospitals, including 12 medical centers, 42 
regional hospitals, 86 district teaching 
hospitals, 475 district hospitals, 3 speciality 
teaching hospitals, 9 psychiatric teaching 
hospitals, 18 psychiatric hospitals, and 92 
miscellaneous type hospitals (Hospitals 
Accreditation Report, FY’s 1993~1995, 
Department of Health, Government of 
Taiwan, ROC; Accreditation of Psychiatric 
Hospitals Report, FY 1994, DOH). Prior to 
the implementation of NHI, Taiwan provided 
public insurance schemes for agricultural 
workers, laborers, and government 
employees, but five million people (25% of 
the total population) were not covered by 
these plans. NHI was implemented to 
provide universal coverage, with special 
emphasis on children, the elderly and the 
poor. To finance the scheme, premiums were 
doubled on those who had coverage under 
the three pre-existing schemes before 1995. 
The medical environment in Taiwan differs 
from that in many Western countries, along 
with the primary issues in hospital financial 
management. The following discussion 
reviews the key characteristics of Taiwan’s 
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medical system, including payment systems, 
fees and insurance. 
Taiwan’s NHI system features three types of 
doctor's wage and salary systems. The first, 
typical of large private hospitals, is a fee-for-
service system established 30 years ago to 
raise doctor incomes, improve service 
quality, and reduce the incidence of bribery. 
This system has been modified to the current 
physician fee (PF) system, wherein doctors 
receive 1% of the hospital’s fees for 
examination, handling and surgery as their 
bonus (Huang, Jiajing, 1996). Since doctor 
incomes are determined by patient volume 
and price of service items, this system 
encourages doctors to treat more patients and 
provide higher-priced services. According to 
Lin (1994), prior to the implementation of 
NHI, 57.5% of regional hospitals used the 
physician fee system. The second physician 
compensation system is the salary plus bonus 
system used in public hospitals, where 
doctors are paid a bonus are based on 
hospital profitability. This system 
encourages the doctors to help the hospital 
control costs, fixes fee standards and controls 
factors which impact the market for medical 
services. The third system is the individual 
profit system in the small private clinics 
where doctor incomes are determined by the 
profits made by hospital profits, encouraging 
doctors to help increase hospital income and 
reduce costs.  
In terms of fees and insurance payments, 
80% of hospital income comes from the 
Bureau of National Health Insurance through 
patient claims (known as “written 
declarations”). The remaining 20% comes 
from registration fees, copayments, and 
minority difference burdens – government 
subsidies for people below poverty line and 
poor indigenous populations to cover the 
20% copayment. The Healthcare Bureau 
strictly regulates the list of declarable items 
and conducts critical audits of medical 
services and expenses to prevent waste and 
reduce increases to the overall cost of 
medicine. The declaration is also involved in 
the management of hospital accounts 
receivable. Increased attention should focus 
on increasing declared expenses, raising the 
ratio of pre-paid fees, accelerating payments, 
and reducing the number of rejected 
declarations.  
Financial efficiency is traditionally a key 
performance factor for most businesses. 
However, financial efficiency and its 
attendant concepts and practices are relative 
novelties in the hospital sector. A hospital’s 
financial condition and focus has a critical 
impact on its sustainability. (Cleverley, 
1987, 1988; Williams D. et al, 1992). 
Accordingly, interest in this topic has grown 
among policy makers, hospital management 
and researchers (Narine et al, 1996). 
Despite the research devoted to financial 
efficiency, basic evaluation standards for 
hospitals are still lacking. This report 
concentrates on evaluating four financial 
efficiency criteria (liquidity, operating 
ability, capital structure and profitability) 
along with other factors. 
In evaluating a hospital’s financial efficiency 
liquidity and operating ability are assessed in 
terms of its liquidity ratio, leverage ratio, 
profitability ratio, and turnover. Research has 
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shown that, of these four measures, liquidity 
ratio has a much lower correction rate than 
the other three (Lynn & Wertheim, 1993). 
In terms of capital structure, Taiwan’s 
healthcare system can be usefully compared 
to that of the United States, where Medicare 
and other third party insurance companies 
use the prospective payment system, in 
which risk is transferred from the payers to 
healthcare providers. In this system, the 
amounts that hospitals charge patients for 
identical services often vary widely. In 
addition, hospital profitability is limited by 
increased operating risk, unpaid medical 
bills, competition from other Medicare 
providers, and implementation of managed 
care programs (McCue & Ozcan, 1992), thus 
increasing the difficulty of debt financing. 
Under these conditions, hospital 
management must stay aware of critical 
factors that impact the hospital’s capital 
structure strategy (e.g., short-term or long-
term debt financing). This report will focus 
on factors affecting capital structure at the 
financial, organizational and operational 
level.  
Given an understanding of the critical factors 
affecting profitability, hospital management 
can act to minimize risk and maximize profit. 
Policy makers can also benefit from an 
appreciation of the impact of new policies on 
hospital operations (Gapenski et al, 1993). 
Fottler (1987) separated hospital 
characteristics into two parts: structural 
factors with a direct impact on hospital 
financial conditions and profitability, such as 
size, systemic association and profit; and 
process factors which have positive impact 
on profitability, such as operational strategy 
and contract management. Clement (1998) 
found no relationship between process 
factors and hospital profitability. This report 
categorizes these structural and process 
factors into four components: liquidity, 
operating ability, capital structure, and 
profitability. 
Method 
Data was obtained from the National Health 
Insurance Bureau covering 13 months from 
1995 to 1996, following the implementation 
of NHI. Our sample covered 144 hospitals in 
Taiwan, including 67 public hospitals, 49 
private hospitals, and 28 foundation 
hospitals. The sampled hospitals are located 
in all four regions and represent 23.8% of all 
hospitals in Taiwan, and 48.2% of total bed 
capacity. Definition and measurement of 
financial variables were based on the work of 
Mccue and Lynch (1987), which defined 
specific indicators for financial status and 
performance, and developed specific 
quantitative norms indicative of favourable 
status/performance based on industry 
averages. Standard definitions used in the 
health management literature were adopted 
for performance indicators specific to the 
hospital industry. Hospitals provide data to 
the National Health Department in various 
formats, but these are then standardized in an 
SAS-compatible format. Statistical methods 
appropriate to the study objectives and 
hypotheses were selected, and applied to 
balance sheets and income statements for 
144 hospitals for the fiscal year running from 
January 1 to December 31. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics 
As shown in Table 1, the sample for this 
study included 144 hospitals including 67 
public hospitals, 49 private hospitals, and 28 
foundation hospitals, respectively 
representing 79%, 10.6% and 47.5% of all 
hospitals in each category. In terms of 
hospital type, the study included 10 medical 
centers, 22 regional hospitals and 112 district 
hospitals, respectively representing 71.4%, 
48.9% and 20.5% of all hospitals of each 
type. In terms of regional distribution, the 
sample included 66 hospitals in south 
Taiwan, 50 in north Taiwan, 21 in central 
Taiwan, and 7 in east Taiwan, respectively 
representing 24.4%, 23.2%, 20% and 50% of 
all hospitals in each region. 
In terms of bed capacity, the sample included 
50 hospitals with fewer than 100 beds, 35 
with 100-299 beds, 22 with 300-499 beds, 20 
with 500-99 beds, and 7 with more than 1000 
beds, respectively representing 14.4%, 35%, 
53.7%, 55.6%, and 63.6% of the total 
number of hospitals in each size 
classification. 
Refer Table I 
Descriptive statistics of hospital income 
In our sample, approximately equal numbers 
of hospitals reported profits or losses from 
medical services. When sorted by hospital 
ownership type, 22.4% of 67 public hospitals 
showed positive earnings from medical 
services (i.e., a positive operating margin), as 
opposed to 70% of the 29 foundation 
hospitals, and 73% of the 49 private 
hospitals. When sorted by level, 48% of the 
22 regional hospitals reported positive 
earnings, as opposed to 50% of the 10 
medical centers, and 51% of the 112 district 
hospitals. 
When the level of hospitals was collapsed 
within each ownership type, the loss ratio 
among public hospitals is highest in medical 
centers, followed by district hospitals and 
regional hospitals. Among foundation 
hospitals, earnings were higher for medical 
centers, followed by district hospitals and 
regional hospitals.  
Refer Table II 
Reinvestment capacity 
About half of public medical centers had 
good reinvestment ability, as opposed to 
26.9% of public hospitals. Sorted by level, 
medical centers had better performance, with 
about half exhibiting good reinvestment 
ability. 
Refer Table III 
Descriptive statistics of hospital liquidity 
and capital structure 
In terms of liquidity measures, the current 
ratio status is satisfactory among the sample 
hospitals, indicating satisfactory liquidity 
status. Private hospitals show relatively 
poorer liquidity and short-term liability 
status with low current ratios. However, 
public hospitals need to reduce the current 
delay in clearing accounts receivable. When 
reviewed by in terms of hospital level, 
increased level correlates positively with 
improved liquidity status. 
In terms of capital structure, the sample 
hospitals seldom used financial leverage or 
used short-term debt to fund capital 
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requirements. Private and the regional 
hospitals tended to resort to debt financing 
while foundation hospitals and medical 
centers funded operations and expansions 
through capital. Higher hospital level 
correlates positively with capital structure. 
Refer Table IV 
Descriptive statistics of hospital liquidity 
and capital structure 
Effective operations require managers to 
carefully evaluate the turnover of each type 
of asset. This could be due either to use or 
reduction of assets. Overall, in private and 
regional hospitals, increased turnover was 
found to be associated with a decrease in 
assets, but this is beyond the scope of this 
research. 
When sorted by hospital type, public 
hospitals fared the worst in terms of 
profitability indicators. Sorting by level 
failed to produce a uniform pattern, and 
when sorted by level, the ranking proceeded 
from medical center to district hospital to 
regional hospital. Caution must be exercised 
when evaluating return on equity as a 
measure of profitability. 
Refer Table V 
Overall, our evaluation of hospital financial 
effectiveness indicates the following salient 
features of the sample hospitals: 
(a) High current ratio and short-term 
debt. 
(b) Relatively low use of financial 
leverage, and reliance on short-debt for 
capital requirements, with the exception 
of some foundation hospitals. 
(c) Very low or negative profitability of 
public hospitals as compared with 
private hospitals. 
(d) Higher level hospitals are in 
relatively better financial shape. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Findings are discussed in comparison with 
comparable indicators of hospital financial 
performance in the United States.  
Liquidity analysis 
Hospitals in Taiwan had lower current and 
quick ratios than their American 
counterparts, but a higher acid-test ratio. This 
indicates that the total value of accounts 
receivable at Taiwan hospitals is lower than 
in the US, and that collection period is 10 
days lower. The day’s cash on hand is 
considerably greater than in the US, (39.8 
days for Taiwan as opposed to 13.1 days for 
the US). The average payment period in 
Taiwan is 20 days longer than in the US 
(74.1 days vs. 53.3 days), suggesting 
relatively lower payment ability and credit 
availability in Taiwan. This also explains the 
lower long-term debt-to-equity ratio of 
Taiwan hospitals and their reliance on short-
term debt for their capital needs. Most 
liquidity indicators were more favourable for 
Taiwan hospitals than for their US 
counterparts. 
Overall, Taiwan hospitals have few short-
term debt problems. Sorted by hospital type, 
private hospitals tended to have the poorest 
short-term debt conditions, with low current 
ratios and fewer days cash on hand, though 
they had a shorter payment collection period 
than other hospital types. This is possibly 
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due to the small scale of most private 
hospitals with little current capital and 
relatively fewer accounts receivable. Public 
and foundation hospitals were better off, but 
long collection periods need to be reduced. 
Higher level hospitals had relatively better 
liquidity positions, possibly because such 
hospitals have higher profits from medical 
services, resulting in increased accounts 
receivable and cash levels adequate to meet 
short-term debt needs. Another explanation 
is that most Taiwan hospitals are non-profit, 
and thus require less investment and 
therefore have more cash on hand.   
Capital structure analysis 
The most outstanding difference in capital 
structure between Taiwanese and American 
hospitals is the relatively low use of financial 
leverage in Taiwan where, due to traditional 
conservatism in the industry, most capital 
resources are raised using short-term debt. 
With the exception of a few hospitals 
carrying long-term debt, most support 
operations and expansion with ownership 
capital. For public hospitals that have only 
recently installed professional accounting 
systems, government subsides make up most 
uncovered expenditures, thus precluding the 
need for debt financing, and reducing long-
term debt to nearly zero. Foundation 
hospitals adopt a conservative approach to 
financing partly because of tax structures: 
Operating margin exceeding 20% are subject 
to tax, thus these hospitals prefer to refinance 
using profits to the extent that operating 
margins are kept below 20%. In addition, 
subsidies for medical foundations are not 
taxed, which also contributes to long-term 
liability. Private hospitals have a greater 
tendency to take on debt, probably because 
small and medium sized hospitals have 
limited capital and need to raise loans to 
fund operations and expansion. Foundation-
run hospitals and medical centers tend to 
have plenty of capital which contributes to 
increased income, and tend to have more 
cash on hand and other liquid assets, thus 
mooting the need for loans.   
Operating ability analysis 
Turnover indicators show that hospitals in 
Taiwan have a total asset turnover rate of 
85.5%, and a current assets turnover rate 
253.6%, both lower than their US 
counterparts (96% and 388%, respectively), 
but had a higher fixed assets rate (320%) vs. 
175%). This indicates that Taiwan hospitals 
are relatively more efficient in terms of asset 
use. 
Sorted by hospital type, private hospitals had 
the highest rates of total asset turnover and 
current asset turnover. Sorted by hospital 
level, higher level hospitals were associated 
with lower total assets turnover, which could 
be due to two possible explanations. First, 
private hospitals (including most district 
hospitals) showed high rates of asset usage 
effectiveness, resulting in an apparent 
correlation between hospital level and asset 
usage effectiveness. Second, smaller total 
asset holdings are typically associated with 
high turnover, particularly in the private 
sector, which could be a factor given that 
most district hospitals are privately-run. 
Public hospitals show the highest turnover of 
fixed assets, followed by private and 
International Research Journal of Applied Finance         ISSN 2229 – 6891   
Vol. V  Issue – 1  January, 2014 
68 
 
foundation hospitals, possibly because public 
hospital capital accounts do not reflect actual 
land costs, resulting in their fixed assets 
being significantly undervalued as compared 
to other types of hospitals, thus leading to 
inflated turnover statistics. Based on this 
study, there appears to be a case for 
recommending the government review 
investment measurements before buying 
fixed assets. 
Profitability analysis 
Every profitability index shows that Taiwan 
hospitals are less profitable than those in the 
US. This could be due American hospitals 
placing a greater emphasis on profitability. 
Also, non-operating revenue is relatively 
lower in Taiwan, indicating that the major 
revenue source for Taiwan hospitals was 
derived from performing medical services. 
Public hospitals had the lowest overall 
profitability levels, and higher losses, a 
pattern which also prevailed in terms of 
turnover. The explanation for this is probably 
the same as that for asset turnover.  
On the whole, Taiwan hospitals had less 
short term liability than US hospitals. The 
most outstanding difference seen in liability 
structure lies in the fact that Taiwan hospitals 
have almost no long-term debt and relatively 
higher amounts of short-term debt, while US 
hospitals are more prone to using financial 
leverage. Among Taiwan hospitals, 
foundation hospitals exhibited the highest 
degree of financial effectiveness while public 
hospitals were the least effective. It is 
possible this results from differences in 
management, where foundation hospital 
executives are more entrepreneurial and 
better attuned to issues including operational 
effectiveness, cost control and revenue 
maximization. Public hospitals are also 
limited by their systems for human resource 
management, accounting and purchasing 
high personnel and purchasing costs eroding 
their competitiveness. Differences in 
accounting methods also apparently 
contributed to the relative financial 
effectiveness of public hospitals.
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Table I: Characteristics of sample hospitals 
 
Total Hosp. Sample # Percent Statistic value 
Type of Hosp. 
    
Public 84 67 79.80% 
 
Private 462 49 10.60% X2=101.44* 
Foundation 59 28 47.50% 
 
     
Level of Hosp. 
    
Medical Center 14 10 71.40% 
 
Regional Hosp. 45 22 48.90% X2=17.83* 
District Hosp. 546 112 20.50% 
 
     
Region 
    
North 216 50 23.20% 
X2=3.29 
Central 105 21 20% 
South 270 66 24.40% 
East 14 7 50% 
     
Bed capacity 
    
<100 Beds 417 60 14.40% 
X2=41.75* 
00-299 Beds 100 35 35% 
300-499 Beds 41 22 53.70% 
500-999 Beds 36 20 55.60% 
>1000 Beds 11 7 63.60% 
     
Mean Bed capacity 154.5 312.6 
 
t = 0.55 
Total Hospital 605 144 23.80% 
 
Total Beds 93742 45014 48.20% 
 
Note: 1.*denotes Z-value significance at 5%. 2. Significance level = 0.05. 3. Sample 
# denotes number of hospitals. 
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Table II: Income by level and type 
  
Medical Income Total Income 
 
Hosp no. Loss Gain Loss Gain 
Medical Center Public 6 5 (83.3%) 1 (16.7%) 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 
Foundation 4 0 (0%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 4 (100%) 
Total 10 5 (50%) 5 (50%) 3 (30%) 7 (70%) 
      
Regional Hosp. Public 14 10 (71.4%) 4 (28.6%) 10 (28.6%) 4 (28.6%) 
Foundation 8 3 (37.5%) 5 (62.5%) 2 (75.0%) 6 (75%) 
Total 22 13 (59.1%) 9 (40.9%) 12 (45.5%) 10 (45.5%) 
      
District Hosp.  Public 47 37 (78.7%) 10 (21.3%) 35 (74.5%) 12 (25.5%) 
Private 48 13 (27.1%) 35 (72.9%) 15 (31.3%) 33 (68.7%) 
Foundation 17 5 (29.4%) 12 (70.6%) 9 (52.9%) 8 (47.1%) 
Total 112 55 (49.1%) 57 (50.9%) 59 (52.7%) 53 (47.3%) 
      
Total Public 67 52 (77.6%) 15 (22.4%) 48 (71.6%) 19 (28.4%) 
Private 48 13 (26.5%) 35 (73.5%) 15 (30.6%) 33 (69.4%) 
Foundation 29 8 (28.6%) 21 (71.4%) 11 (39.3%) 18 (60.7%) 
Total 144 73 (50.7%) 71 (49.3%) 74 (51.4%) 70 (48.6%) 
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Table III:  Reinvestment ability by level and type 
 
Reinvestment  Ability 
 
Poor (%) Good (%) 
Medical Center Public 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 
Foundation 0 (0%) 4 (100%) 
Total 3(30%) 7 (70%) 
   
Regional Hosp. Public 10 (71.4%) 4 (28.6%) 
Private 2 (25%) 6 (75%) 
Total 12 (54.5%) 10 ( 45.5%) 
   
District Hosp. Public 36 (76.6%) 11 (23.4%) 
Private 15 (31.3%) 33 (68.7%) 
Foundation 9 (52.9%) 8 (47.1%) 
Total 60 (53.6%) 52 (46.4%) 
   
Total Public 49 (73.1%) 18 (26.9%) 
Private 15 (30.6%) 34 (69.4%) 
Foundation 11 (39.3%) 17 (60.7%) 
Total 75 (52.1%) 69 (47.9%) 
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Table IV:  Liquidity and capital structure 
Panel A Type of hospital 
 
Total Public Private Foundation 
Liability 
    
Current Ratio 1.68 1.95 0.71 2.1 
Quick Ratio 1.43 1.62 0.51 1.7 
Acid-Test Ratio 0.46 0.57 0.16 0.89 
Day in Accounts 53.6 83.04 0 41.7 
Receivable 
    
Average Payment Period 74.08 74.86 70.96 77.11 
Days cash on hand 39.8 52.71 14.84 71.72 
Capital Structure 
    
Equity Financing Ratio 0.48 0.54 0.18 0.6 
Cash Flow to Total Debt 0.06 –0.396 0.21 0.16 
Debt Service Coverage 0.08 –0.396 0.29 0.18 
Long-term Debt to Equity 0 0 0 0.03 
Total Debt to Equity 0.9 0.94 1.02 0.6 
Long-tem Debt to 
    
Net Fixed Assets 0 0 0 0.03 
Panel B Level of hospital 
 
Total Medical Center Regional Hosp. District Hosp. 
Liability 
    
Current Ratio 5.04 1.52 1.61 1.84 
Quick Ratio 4.75 1.44 1.34 1.56 
Acid-Test Ratio 3.19 0.48 0.45 0.24 
Day in Accounts 62.27 54.37 52.19 63.58 
Receivable 
    
Average Payment 55.27 69.82 77.22 53.25 
Period 
    
Days cash on hand 176.13 47.82 31.12 13.12 
Capital Structure 
    
Equity Financing Ratio 0.88 0.49 0.45 0.49 
Debt Service Coverage 0.68 0.09 0.07 – 
Long-term Debt to Equity 0 0 0 0.67 
Total Debt to Equity 0.14 1.03 0.91 – 
Long-term Debt to Net Fixed Assets 0 0 0 0.59 
(Indicator selection based on: McCue, M.J., and Lynch, J.R., 1987) 
Table V: Operating ability and profitability 
 
Type of hospital 
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Total Publics Private Person 
Operating Ability 
    
Total Assets Turnover 85.46 84.71 167.78 71.77 
Fixed Assets Turnover 320.13 570.38 394.09 126.2 
Current Asset Turnover 253.6 185 692.04 231.47 
Profitability 
    
Markup 1.01 0.81 1.06 1.04 
Operating Margin -0.01 –0.247 0.04 0.02 
Total Margin 0 –0.197 0.04 0.01 
Non-operating Rev. 0.01 0.01 0 0.03 
Return on Total Assets (%) -0.28 –12.40 7.31 0.97 
Return on Fixed Assets (%) -0.34 –33.70 13.88 1.69 
Profit/(FA-Land) (%) -0.79 –67.54 11.78 2.05 
Return on Equity (%) -1.92 -21.5 11.68 1.8 
 
Level of hospital 
 
Total Medical Center Regional Hosp. District Hosp. 
Operating ability 
    
Total Assets Turnover 55.91 82.75 98.57 96 
Fixed Assets Turnover 119.22 499.99 323.14 175 
Current Assets Turnover 137.47 310.42 255.49 388 
     
Profitability 
    
Markup 1.04 0.98 1.01 1.24 
Operating Margin 0 –0.060 0.01 0.03 
Total Margin 0.02 –0.036 –0.009 – 
Non-operating Rev. 0.07 0.02 0 0.31 
Return on total Assets (%) 2.56 –5.30 –0.49 5 
Return on Fixed Assets (%) 7.75 –7.70 –0.62 – 
Profit/(FA-Land) (%) 9.48 –22.17 –0.79 – 
Return on Equity (%) 3.73 –8.84 –2.20 9 
(Selection of indicators was based on: McCue, M.J., and Lynch, J.R., 1987) 
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The Effects of M&A on the Change of Productivities – Evidence From The 
Japanese Shinkin Banks 
Dai jianzhong 
 
Abstracts 
In this paper we examine the effects of merger and acquisition（ ）M&A incidents occurred in 
the period of financial year (FY) 2001-FY 2004 on the productivity changes of the Japanese 
shinkin banks during the period of FY 2005-FY 2008. We use a two-stage approach to 
analyze the effects of M&A on the productivity change. To deal with measure error and 
endogenous problems inherent in the second stage regressions, this paper uses a semi-
parametric bootstrapping approach to get more robust estimates of the coefficients in the 
model. The paper finds that M&A incidents and some other related variables have significant 
effects on the productivity change and its components. 
Keyword: DEA; Malmquist index; semi-parametric bootstrapping; banking 
JEL code: C14 D24 G21 O47 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the effects of merger 
and acquisition（ ）M&A incidents occurred 
during the fiscal year (FY) 2001 to FY 2004 
on the productivity changes of the Japanese 
shinkin banks in FY 2005 to FY 2008. 
Shinkin bank is a kind of regional financial 
institutions in Japan. They are non-profit 
mutual financial institutions aimed at 
servicing small and middle enterprises 
(SMEs) and local inhabitants.  
From the beginning of 21st century, the 
supervision environment for financial 
institutions in Japan experienced great 
changes. With the progress of deregulation 
and financial liberalization, the permitted 
business scope of financial institutions was 
widened and the boundary between different 
kinds of financial institutions became 
obscured. These changes triggered a wave of 
M&A among shinkin banks at the beginning 
of 2000s (see graph 1). As the result, the 
number of shinkin banks deceased from 371 
at the end of FY 2000 to 279 by the end of 
FY 2008. It is interesting to analyze the 
effects of this peak of M&A activities on the  
 
productivity changes in the shinkin banks.  
Refer Figure I 
The influence of M&A is a major concern of 
many papers about the determination of 
efficiency and productivity changes in 
financial institutions. Interests in this area are 
not purely due to academic curiosity. They 
also come from policy considerations. 
Encouraging M&A among financial 
institutions is an important component of 
bank restructuring policy packages in many 
countries. Therefore understanding the 
impacts of M&A on the efficiency and 
productivity changes in financial institutions 
has significant policy implications.  
Unfortunately there is no consensus among 
researchers about the effects of M&A on the 
efficiency and productivity changes in firms. 
Many researchers argued that M&A will 
improve the efficiency of the involved firms 
through: (1) technology transfers between 
the participant firms, (2) economy of scale 
and economy of scope improvement due to 
M&A, (3) reduction of overcapacity and 
redundant labors often carried out after 
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M&A. On the other hand, M&A may 
increase the market power of the involved 
firms. This may increase the efficiency 
measured in value terms. But it may also 
reduce their motive for innovation. Thus it 
may decrease their efficiency measured in 
technical terms and also be disadvantageous 
to the interests of consumers.  
There are by now many empirical researches 
in this field. For example, Berger and 
Humphrey (1992)studied 57 M&A case 
among large US banks during the period 
1981 to 1989. Hahn (2007) analyzed the 
effects of M&A on the efficiency of Austrian 
banks during the period of 1995-2002. Al-
Sharkas et al. (2008) analyzed the impact of 
M&A on the efficiency of the US banks for 
the period from 1985 to 2002. Rezitis (2008) 
analyzed the effects of bank mergers on the 
efficiency and of productivity changes for 
ten Greek banks from 1993 to 2004.  
Several researchers focus on the M&A 
among credit unions and other small 
financial institutions. For example, Grifell-
Tatjé and Lovell (1996) analyzed the effects 
of M&A on the productivity changes of the 
Spanish saving banks from 1986-1991. 
Vennet (1996) analyzed the effects of M&A 
on the cost efficiency and other financial 
profit indicators of the credit union in Europe 
over the period of 1988-1993. Fried et al. 
(1999) analyzed the effects of mergers on the 
efficiency of credit union of the United 
States from 1989-1995. Garden et al. (1999) 
analyzed the effects of mergers on the 
efficiency changes of the credit union in 
Australia during the period of 1992-1997. 
Haynes and Thomson (1999) analyzed the 
effects of M&A on the productivities of the 
building society in U.K. Devaney and Weber 
(2000) analyzed the effects of market 
structure on the productivity changes in the 
rural banking sector of the United States 
during the years from 1990-1993.  
Corresponding to the inconsistence in the 
theoretical explanation, the conclusions of 
the empirical literature about the effects of 
M&A on the efficiency are mixed. Some 
have found no evidence (Grifell-Tatjé and 
Lovell 1996, Garden et al. 1999, Devaney 
and Weber 2000, etc.) that M&A had 
significant effects on the efficiency of the 
banks. Some (Fried et al 1999, etc.) found 
mixed evidences about the effects of M&A. 
some (Rezitis 2008, etc.) even reported 
negative effects of M&A on efficiencies. On 
the other hand, others (Vennet 1996, Haynes 
and Thomson 1999, Al-Sharkas et al 2008, 
etc.) have found positive relationship 
between M&A and efficiency.  
There are also several papers which concerns 
the small and middle financial institutions in 
Japan. These papers either directly analyzed 
the effects of M&A activities or used M&A 
as an important control variable. For 
example，Hoshino (1992) analyzed the 
effects of M&A on some simple financial 
ratios of the small and medium financial 
institutions in Japan. Fukuyama (1996) 
analyzed the return of scale of credit unions 
in FY 1992. Harimaya (2004) analyzed the 
correlation between the efficiency and 
dividend policy of the shinkin banks by 
using the data of FY 2002. Horie (2010) 
analyzed the relationship between the 
operation areas and the productivity changes 
in the Japanese shinkin banks during the 
period of FY 2005-FY2008. In this paper I 
use the same selection of inputs and outputs 
as Horie when calculating the productivity 
changes of the shinkin banks. I also follow 
his idea of weighted average when 
measuring some variables for the regional 
economic environments.  
Measuring the effects of M&A on the 
efficiency or change of productivities is not 
an easy task. Some analysts (Fried et al. 
1999，Rezitis, 2006, etc.) directly calculated 
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the efficiency changes of the banks involved 
in M&A activities before and after the 
occurrence of M&A. However, this approach 
is problematic. M&A activities will cause 
discontinuity of data for the acquired or 
closed banks. As for the acquiring or the 
merging banks (some with a new name), the 
operating environment also has greatly 
changed; hence simple comparison of these 
banks before and after the merging is 
misleading. In our case of Japanese shinkin 
banks, some banks even experienced more 
than two M&A during the sample period, 
which makes the problem even more 
complex. Noticing this problem, some 
researchers (Ralston et al. 2001, etc.) 
compared the efficiency scores of the bank 
formed after M&A with the weighted 
average of the efficiency scores of the 
merged and merging banks before M&A. 
Alternatively some researchers (Cooper, 
Seiford et al. 2006) advocate comparing a 
virtual bank which have aggregated inputs 
and outputs of the merged and merging 
banks to the bank formed after M&A. This is 
also questionable. For due to the nature of 
the measurement, the average radial 
efficiency score of two or more banks is not 
always equal to the efficiency score of the 
bank with aggregated inputs and outputs of 
these banks (Fried, Lovell et al. 2008).  
This paper does not simply compare the 
efficiencies of the banks which involved in 
M&A activities before and after the M&A 
incidences. Instead it compares the 
productivity changes between the banks 
involved in M&A activities before the 
sample period with those not involved. All 
those which involved in M&A activities 
during the sample period are deleted from 
the sample. The effects of M&A are inferred 
from the differences between these two 
groups.   
The paper also makes several other 
contributions to the literature. First of all， in 
order to get a more objective measuring of 
efficiency, it uses the hyperbolical-oriented 
distance instead of input or output-oriented 
Shephard distance as the measure of 
efficiency. This approach avoids the possible 
discrepancy between the input and output-
oriented measurements and is also more 
closely related to the traditional profit 
concept. Second， to deal with measurement 
error and endogenous problems inherent in 
the second stage regressions, this paper uses 
the algorithm suggested by Simar and 
Wilson (2007), but with a few alternations. 
To avoid the problem of bounding of the 
dependent variable, instead of using 
efficiency scores this paper uses a 
productivity change index called Malmquist 
index as the dependent variable. This avoids 
using the censored or truncation models and 
makes it possible only using OLS models, 
because Malmquist index is only low-
bounded by 0. Finally, following Horie 
(2010), this paper uses weighted regional 
economic data as the control variables. 
Compared to macroeconomic data, which are 
used in most of the other related papers, 
regional data are more suitable for the 
analysis of the regional financial institutions. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: 
Section 2 makes a brief review of the 
literature about the methodology used by the 
paper. Section 3 describes the data and the 
variables used in the paper. Section 4 gives 
the results of the estimation and makes some 
analysis about them. Section 5 draws 
conclusions from the analysis. 
The methodology 
We use a two-stage approach to analyze the 
effects of M&A on the productivity changes. 
It consists of two stages: in the first stage, a 
productivity change measure called 
Malmquist index and its decomposition are 
International Research Journal of Applied Finance         ISSN 2229 – 6891   
Vol. V  Issue – 1  January, 2014 
78 
 
calculated. In the second stage, the estimated 
Malmquist index and its decomposition are 
regressed on several environmental variables 
and a technique called semi-parametric 
bootstrapping is used to test the significance 
of the parameters of the model.  
A. Estimation of productivity changes 
In Malmquist index, the productivity change 
of a decision making unit (DMU) is 
measured as the ratio of efficiency of the 
DMU between two periods. Efficiency 
means the relative performance of a DMU 
compared to the potential performance. 
Generally Shephard distance is used as the 
measure of efficiency. In each year, we can 
derive a production frontier (consisted by 
those efficient combinations of input-
outputs) based on the performance of all 
DMUs in that year. In the output-input space, 
Shephard distance is the relative distance 
from the point of that DMU to the “frontier” 
along a certain direction.  
Shephard distance can be estimated either 
along the direction of inputs or outputs or 
any other arbitrary directions. In this paper 
we use the hyperbolic-oriented distance to 
measure the efficiency. For an arbitrary 
production point 0 0( , )x y , the hyperbolic- 
oriented distance is defined as the proportion 
needed to simultaneously reduce the inputs 
and increase the outputs to push a point to 
the frontier. 
Mathematically, we can define the production set tΨ at time t as: 
{ }( , ) |  can produce  at time                           (1)t N Mx y x y t+Ψ = ℜ  
where Nx ∈ℜ are N dimension vector of inputs and My ∈ℜ are M dimension vector of 
outputs. The Shephard hyperbolic distance ,0
t tD  is defined as:  
,
0  sup{ >0| ( / , ) }                                              (2)tt t x yD γ γ γ ∈ Ψ=  
Where γ is the scale that needed to decrease 0x and increase 0y simultaneously to push the 
point 0 0( , )x y to the efficient frontier ( , )tQ x y∂  (the set that constituted by efficient DMUs, 
which are those points with 1γ = ). 
Since hyperbolical-oriented distance 
considers both the output and input 
efficiency, it avoids the problem of possible 
discrepancy between input and output-
oriented distance (Fukuyama, 1996). Thus it 
is a more objective measure of efficiency. It 
is also more related to the concept of profit, 
which is the conventional measurement of 
efficiency.  
Beside calculating the distance of DMU i in 
year t according to the frontier of year t as 
,t t
iD , we can also estimate the distance of 
DMU i in year t+1 according to the frontier 
of year t as , 1t tiD
+
. Similarly we can calculate 
the distance of DMU i in year t and t+1 both 
according to the frontier of year t+1 as 1,t tiD
+
 
and 1, 1t tiD
+ + respectively; then we can get two 
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expressions of productivity changes as tiM
 
and 1tiM
+ :  
It is very likely that these two ratios are 
different; Malmqust index ( iM ) is the 
geometric average of the two18:  
1/2
, 1 1, 1
1 1/2
, 1,( )                                          (3)
t t t t
t t i i
i i i t t t t
i i
D DM M M
D D
+ + +
+
+
 
= × = × 
 
 
The explanation of Malmquist index depends 
on the method used for the calculation of the 
distance D. For the input-oriented or 
hyperbolic-oriented distance, a larger 
(smaller) value of M means deterioration 
(improvement) of productivity over time. On 
the other hand, for the output-oriented 
distance, a larger (smaller) value of M means 
an improvement (deterioration) of 
productivity over time.  
In order to detect the sources of productivity 
changes, we need to decompose the above 
Malmquist index into several components. 
One of the most widely used decomposition 
methods was first proposed by Färe, 
Grosskopf, Lindgren and Ross (1992): 
                                         (4)M E S T= × ×  
M is the Malmquist index. E  is the change 
of pure technical efficiencies. It measures the 
change of position of a DMU according to 
the current frontiers between year t and t+1 
under the assumption of variable returns to 
scale (VRS). S is the change of scale 
                                                 
18
 Since Malmquist index is a commonly 
used indicator for productivity changes we 
will not explain its technical details here. 
Those who are not familiar with it can see 
Fried et al (2008). 
 
economy. Scale economy is measured as the 
ratio of distance to the current frontier under 
the assumption of constant return of scale 
(CRS) to the distance to the current frontier 
under the assumption of VRS. T is the 
technological changes. Since it measures the 
effect of the moving of the CRS production 
frontier from period t to t+1 on the 
productivity changes of a DMU, it is also 
called “frontier shift effects”. As in the case 
of total score, for the input-oriented or 
hyperbolic-oriented distance, a larger 
(smaller) value of component means 
deterioration (improvement) of the 
component over time. 
I use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
approach to estimate the hyperbolic oriented 
distance. DEA identifies those efficient 
DMUs by solving a programming. The 
production frontier is the convex 
combination of these optimal points. For 
input or output-oriented distance, the 
programming is linear. For hyperbolic-
oriented distance the programming is non-
linear, but with the help of computer it can 
also be easily solved by recursive trying. For 
technical details of the programming, see 
Wheelock and Wilson (2009). 
B. Problems with the second stage models 
Suppose, for a DMU i, 1, 2, ,i n= L it can use
ix to produce iy , it has a efficiency measure 
of iγ , iγ is determined by a vector of 
environmental variables iz , then the basic 
two stage model is: 
               
'
,            1, 2,i i i iu i nγ = + =z β L   
（5） 
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iu is the error term. 
 
Among those papers which used the two-
stage models, in the first stage most 
researchers used the efficiency score as the 
dependent variables. In the second stage, 
some analysts just used OLS (Garden et al. 
1999, Devaney and Weber 2000, Ralson et 
al. 2001) to estimate the model.  
However, for the second stage regression 
models using efficiency score itself as the 
dependent variable, several problems have to 
be solved. First of all, the dependent variable 
(the efficiency measurement iγ ) is bounded. 
For the input or hyperbolic- oriented 
distance, it is low bounded by 1. For the 
output-oriented distance, it is low bounded 
by 0 and upper bounded by 1.  
To solve the bounding problem of the 
efficiency scores, in the second stage most 
researchers used censored or Tobit (e.g. 
Hahn 2007) models to estimate the 
coefficients of the model. Simar and Wilson 
(2007) argued that truncated model may be 
more suitable in this case. Some analysts 
(Fried et al. 1999) used logit models to 
analyze the problem. 
Another way to solve the problem is to use 
some ratio of the efficiency measure as the 
dependent variable. For ratios such as the 
Malmquist index are only low bounded by 0; 
therefore models using these ratios as 
dependent variable can be estimated by OLS. 
Second, the dependent variable γ  is not an 
observed variable. It itself is estimated from 
the sample in the first stage. By construction 
the dependent variable γ  is serially 
correlated. This is because iγ  is measured as 
the distance to the frontier and the entire 
sample x and y are involved in the 
construction of the frontier. Any DMU’s 
change of x and y may cause change of the 
frontier, thus the efficiency scores of all the 
DMUs.  The fact that iγ is correlated with 
any x and y also means iu  is correlated with 
iz , because the choice of x an y of the DMU 
i is conditional on iz , thus here we also face 
a endogenous problem. 
The third problem is that although γˆ  is a 
consistent estimator, it is a biased estimator 
of realγ , Thus we also face a measure error 
problem in this model. This bias is also 
correlated with x and y, thus the z, and 
disappears at a slower rate than that of the 
traditional econometric models.  
The two and third problems are more 
difficult to deal with. Traditional 
econometric techniques cannot be used to 
handle these problems.  
Simar and Wilson (2007) designed a more 
advanced semi-parametric approach for 
solving the problem. This paper uses a semi-
parametric approach similar to that suggested 
by Simar and Wilson to estimate the second 
stage model. But unlike the original model, I 
choose Malmquist index as the dependent 
variable. To further simplify the problem, I 
take log of the ratio. As mentioned above, 
ratios like the Malmquist index are only low 
bounded by 0. Their logarithms can even 
take negative values. Thus it avoids the 
bounding problem that efficiency 
measurement will face.  
The Simar and Wilson approach has two 
algorithms. In the first approach, we first run 
a regression model, then form new efficiency 
scores by randomly combining the fitted 
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value and residuals. The Simar and Wilson 
approach has two algorithms. This paper 
only uses the first one because the second 
algorithm involves using the estimated 
efficiency score (such as the Shephard 
distance) and its residuals to generate new 
input and output samples. Hence it is 
unsuitable in the case of Malmquist index. 
For details about the problems in the second 
stage model and bootstrapping approach 
used in the model, see Simar and Wilson 
(2007). 
C. model specification 
Except the Malmquist index, the paper also 
regress the components of the Malmquist 
index on the same environmental variables. 
Then we will get a system of regression 
equations: 
'
'
'
'
ln ,  
ln ,        
ln ,
ln ,
ln l. n ln ln
m
e
t
s
M
E
T
M E TSt S
S
= +
= +
= +
=
= + +
+
m
e
t
s
zβ u
zβ u
zβ u
zβ u
 
Utilizing the constraint, only three out of the 
four equations can be estimated. I omitted 
the equation for pure efficiency changes and 
estimate the remained three equation using 
OLS method. The coefficients of the omitted 
equation for pure efficiency and their 
significance levels can be deduced from the 
estimated models. The vector of coefficient 
of the equation for LnE is: e m t s= − −β β β β
and their corresponding variance is:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )e m t sVAR VAR VAR VAR+ +=β β β β . 
With the estimate and its variances, it is easy 
to obtain its significance level. However, 
because the variances of the estimates are 
larger than those obtained by traditional 
method, its significant level will be 
underestimated. In this case bootstrapping 
method is a more accurate estimate. Through 
bootstrapping, we can obtain B estimate of 
each coefficient: * * * *
e m t s= − −β β β β
. 
The 
bootstrapping significant level can be 
estimated by using the quantile approach 
described above. 
The paper is especially interested in the 
effects of M&A incidences on the 
productivity changes. I set dummies to 
capture the effects of M&A. It may take 
times for the participant banks to integrate 
their operations and cultures. Therefore, the 
effects of M&A on productivities of the 
involved banks may at first decrease, then 
gradually increase and finally will disappear. 
To capture this dynamics the paper set 4 time 
dummies (date01, date02, date03 and 
date04): 1,  01, 04,itDate t= = L  if shinkin 
bank i experienced M&A during the fiscal 
year of t.  
To control for other factors that may 
influence the productivity changes, the paper 
includes several control variables in the 
second stage model. These variables can be 
divided into two categories: Internal factors 
and external factors. Corresponding to the 
differentiation and logarithm of the 
dependent variables, all of these control 
variables are differentiated and taken log.  
Internal factors are bank specific variables 
that may influence the productivity of the 
banks. In our model, these factors include: 
(1) Total income (asset), as the indicator 
of bank scale. According to the firm 
theory， for each industry, there is an optimal 
scale of production. For firms smaller than 
this optimal level of scale, increasing the 
scale of production will increase their 
productivities. On the other hand, for firms 
larger than this optimal level of scale, the 
increasing the scale of production will have 
negative effects on their productivities. For 
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regional institutions like shinkin banks, their 
business is limited in a relative small area; 
thus we should expect their optimum scale to 
be much smaller than national financial 
institutions. Due to these considerations the 
sign of the variable is hard to be determined 
in advance.  
(2) Risk level indices. Since risk taking 
behaviors and the profits of banks are 
correlated, these indices certainly will have 
effects on the productivities of shinkin 
banks. The paper chooses three indices as the 
indicators of risk taking. 
(2.1) Risk adjusted capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR), the capital/risk weighted asset 
ratio defined by the Basle Accord. The sign 
of this coefficient is not easy to predict. 
Higher CAR ratio means a larger proportion 
of bank fund is not used in more profitable 
projects. This is detrimental to the 
productivity. On the other hand, a strong 
capital position makes it possible for banks 
to take riskier projects. This will improve 
their productivities. The results of empirical 
studies in this field are mixed. 
(2.2) Non-performing loans/ total 
loans ratio (npl); higher NPL ratio will 
reduce the productivities of the banks, thus 
this variable should have negative effects on 
the change of productivities 
(2.3) Loan loss provisions / total loan 
ratio (lp). The effects of this variable are 
similar to that of CAR.  
(4) Indices of administration 
efficiency, an efficient administration will 
reduce the cost of production and strengthen 
the control of risk. Thus it will certainly have 
effects on the productivities of shinkin 
banks. Following Horie (2010), this paper 
includes three indicators of administration 
efficiency in the model:  
(4.1) Labor efficiency of the 
headquarter (LH): the numbers of staffs in 
the headquarter divided by the numbers of 
offices in headquarter.  
(4.2) Organizational efficiency (NH): 
Number of department in the Headquarter / 
number of branches. 
The two variables reflect the 
efficiency of headquarters. The higher the 
ratios, the higher the operating expense of 
headquarter is. However，higher ratio also 
reflects higher ability of supervision and risk 
control. Therefore the sign of these two 
variables are not predetermined. 
(4.3)  efficiency of the Branch (LB): 
average number of employees per branch: 
This variable reflects labor efficiency of 
branches. Thus it should have negative 
effects on productivities.  
External factors are those variables out of the 
control of the banks that affects the 
productivity of the shinkin banks. All of 
these factors are indicators of operating 
areas. Operating areas is the economic and 
social environment in which a bank operates. 
As a kind of regional financial institution, 
shinkin bank’s activities are limited in a 
specific geographic area. Unlike large 
financial institutions which operate in a 
national scope, the economy of the region 
over which a shinkin bank operates plays a 
key role in the determination of its 
productivities (Horie 2010). In the model of 
this paper I use several economic and social 
variables as the indicators of operating area. 
These variables include:  
(1) iShare : the ratio of the number of 
branches of shinkin bank i to the total 
number of branches of all financial 
institutions operating in the same region -an 
indicator of market power of shinkin banks. 
The role of market power in the 
determination of productivity changes is not 
certain. On one hand, high market power 
may discourage a bank to improve its 
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efficiency and technology, thus its 
productivity growth rate may be low; on the 
other hand, high market power also gives 
bank high price fixing ability; therefore its 
productivity growth rate measured in value 
terms may be high. Due to these conflicting 
effects, the sign of market power indicators 
in the model is not easy to be pre-assumed. 
The model also includes three indicators for 
the level of regional economic activities: 
(2.1) iy : The taxable personal income of 
the region in which shinkin bank i operates.  
(2.2) iinsti : The number of enterprises of 
the region in which shinkin bank i operates. 
(2.3) imanu : The value of manufactures 
of the region in which shinkin bank i 
operates.  
It is reasonably predicted that banks operate 
in areas which have high economic activities 
should have high rate of productivity growth; 
Thus these three variables all should have 
positive effects on the productivity growth. 
Population problem now is a key factor that 
influencing the Japanese economy. Thus the 
model specially includes two indicators of 
the characters of population in the region:  
 (3.1) ipop : The population density of the 
region in which shinkin bank i operates. 
High density of population normally 
indicates more members and customers for 
the shinkin banks. Therefore it should have 
positive effects on productivity changes. 
(3.2) iold : The proportion of aged 
families to the total number of families in the 
region in which shinkin bank i operates. 
High proportion of aged families is 
disadvantageous for the regional economy. 
Thus this variable should have negative 
effects on productivity changes of the banks.  
I use “city, town or village” (shi, mura or 
machi) as the unit of region. Since many 
shinkin banks operate over more than one 
city, I use weighted average of city statistics 
of the above variables as the indicator of 
operating area. The weight is the ratio of the 
number of branches in city i of shinkin bank 
j to the total number of branches of bank j in 
year t.  
Since the scale of city is different, it is 
questionable to treat each city equally. To 
avoid this problem, the three quantity 
variables for economic activities are 
expressed in term of value per acreage.   
Because external variables are weighted 
average, thus the change of these variables 
for a shinkin bank can be originated either 
from the change of the variables themselves 
in each city or the change of weights of each 
city in which the shinkin bank operate.  
Data and variables 
A. The estimation of Malmquist index and 
choice of inputs and outputs 
Data of the inputs and outputs for the 
estimation for Malmquist index comes from 
the annual income statement of the shinkin 
banks from FY 2005 to FY 2008. The data is 
obtained from the database of Nikkei 
NEED19.  
In the estimation of productivity changes, 
one difficult problem is the choice of time 
length. To let the effects of M&A fully 
exposed, the paper chooses a 3 year time 
length.  
Another difficult problem encountered is the 
merging, acquisition (M&A) and closing 
down of the DMUs. As mentioned in the 
                                                 
19
 This database is offered by the Company “Japanese 
Economic News” (Nihon keizai Shimbon, Nikkei.) 
The database includes various kinds of financial and 
economic data. FY 2001 and FY 2008 are the 
beginning and end year of the database when the 
paper is written. 
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introduction, to avoid this problem, I delete 
all of those banks which have been involved 
in the M&A activities or have been closed 
down during the period of comparison. After 
doing so, the number of samples for the 
period of FY 2005 to FY 2008 is reduced 
from 303 to 261. 
One of the serious problems of the DEA 
analysis is that it is very sensitive to outliers. 
Here I use an approach suggested by Wilson 
(1993) to detect and delete the outliers from 
our samples.. This method is specially 
designed for non-parametric frontier 
models20. By using this technique, 5 outliers 
have been detected in the period of FY 2005 
to FY 2008 and the number of sample is 
further reduced from 261 to 256.    
For the choice of output and input, the 
method used in this research is similar to the 
production approach. As in Horie (2010), the 
paper uses value rather than the volume of 
output and input as the measure of scales. 
Since the scope of business of shinkin banks 
is not as wide as that of large financial 
institutions in Japan, I focus on the credit 
services provided by shinkin banks, which 
accounts for more than 70% of the current 
incomes of most shinkin banks. In the 
income statement of shinkin banks, the credit 
activities are reflected under the entry of 
“Income on funds managed”. I group items 
under this entry of income into two products: 
A single item in the entry called “Interests 
from loans”, which is the interest incomes 
from loans, forms the first product. It is the 
largest source of the interest income of 
shinkin banks. Meanwhile, other items in the 
entry, such as interest incomes from call 
loans, bonds and deposits in other financial 
institutions, are aggregated to form the 
                                                 
20
 The technique details of the method are not given in 
the paper due to the limitation of space, interested 
authors can refer to the paper by Wilson (1993). 
second product called “other interest 
income.”  
The paper uses net income rather than total 
(raw) income as output. That is, we deduct 
expenses on raising funds for a given credit 
from income gained from such credit. In this 
way, we not only reduce one input in the 
model but also avoid the difficult problem of 
treating deposits in the model, which is a 
major difference between different 
approaches. Interest earned from deposits is 
treated as income, whereas interest paid to 
depositors is treated as expenses incurred in 
the production of credit products  
Unfortunately, there are no separate entries 
of expenses for each of the two products. All 
expenses are aggregated under a single entry 
“Fund Raising Expenses”. To get the 
corresponding expense for each of the two 
products, following Horie (2010), I divide 
this single entry into two entries by the 
weight of each product on the total interest 
incomes; thus the equations for the two 
products are as follows
     
-                                          (7)
-                                     (8)
L
L L I
I
NL
NL NL I
I
YNY Y C
Y
YNY Y C
Y
=
=
 
where: 
LNY =net interest from loans; 
NLNY = net other interest income; 
LY = total interest income from loans; 
NLY = total other interest income; 
I L NLY Y Y= + = total interest income; and 
IC = total fund raising expenses. 
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In the input side, also two inputs are 
selected: One is the labor expenses. In the 
income statement of shinkin banks, these 
expenses are recorded under the entry “Labor 
expenses”; however, this entry only includes 
the expenses on the formal employees. In 
recent years, like in other Japanese 
corporations, informal workers have 
accounted for an increasingly large 
proportion of the employees in the shinkin 
banks. Expenses on these employees are 
included in the entry called “General 
expenses”. Due to the lack of information, it 
is impossible to segregate expenses on 
informal employees from general expenses 
and add them to labor expenses. Thus we 
should keep in mind that labor expenses do 
not include all of the cost of labor inputs for 
shinkin banks.  
Another input used in this research is fixed 
expenses, which roughly correspond to 
capital input for shinkin banks. This input is 
the combination of two expense entries in the 
income statement of the shinkin banks: 
“General expenses” and “expenses on 
service transactions”. General expenses 
include rents for stores, depreciation, 
expenses on advertisements, deposit 
insurance fees, outsourcing expenses, and 
expense on informal employees, among 
others. Expenses on service transactions 
include expenses on financial services by the 
shinkin banks for their financial activities. 
This entry is neither large enough to be 
considered as a separate input nor too small 
to be ignored. Since these expenses are 
similar to some of the general expenses (e.g., 
outsourcing expenses and expenses on 
informal employees), I added them to 
general expenses. 
The calculations involve data across time, 
making the inflation effect a necessary 
concern. To eliminate this effect, the paper 
uses the GDP deflator to deflate the data 
with the beginning year of the sample period 
as 100. 
 
Table 1 summarized the descriptive statistics 
of the inputs and outputs used in this paper: 
Table I, Descriptive statistics of inputs and 
outputs                                         
From table 1, it is easy to see that the scale 
of business of the sample banks significantly 
increased during the sample period, however, 
the variance of scale among the banks also 
enlarged. 
B. Explanatory variables in the second 
stage model 
All of the data about the internal variables 
come from the Nikki database and the 
yearbooks “The Japan financial directory” 
published also by Nikki. The descriptive 
statistics of internal variables are 
summarized in table 2: 
Table II Descriptive statistics of the growth 
rate of internal variables 
The data about the market share are obtained 
from the yearbooks “The Japan financial 
directory”. Other external data come from 
the “Regional Statistics Database” offered in 
the official website of the statistics of the 
Japan (www.e-stat.go.jp). Unfortunately not 
every year of the data for some external 
variables is available. Thus the end year for 
the variable insti is 2009. The end year for 
pdensity and old are 2010 respectively. Table 
3 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
external variables.  
Table III Descriptive statistics of the growth 
rate of the external variables                                                  
Because the external variables are weighted 
averages of the “shi”s which shinkin banks 
operate, their growth rates reveal both the 
changes of the variables and the geographical 
structure of the shinkin banks.  
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The results and their explanation 
A. The results for the Malmquist index 
estimation 
We use a package of the software R called 
FEAR to estimate the Malmquist index. It 
was designed by P. W. Wilson (2008) 
particularly for the purposes of DEA. The 
descriptive statistics of the estimation of 
Malmquist index and its three components 
for the period of FY 2005 - FY 2008 are 
outlined in table 4. 
Table III  Descriptive Statistics of the 
Malmquist results 
For the case of hyperbolic-oriented distance 
measurement, higher score of Malmquist 
index and its components means lower 
growth. It is easy to find that in the sample 
period productivity has significantly 
decreased. The means and medians of the 
Malmquist index and two of its three 
components are all above 1. However, the 
scale economy has significantly improved 
during the period. The results confirm the 
impression we got from the descriptive 
statistics of the internal environmental 
variables in table 2. 
B. The results of the second stage model 
and their explanation 
The results of the second stage model are 
summarized in table 5. 
Table V Estimation results of the second 
stage model 
All of the models have low adjusted 2R . The 
models of Fried et al.(1999) , Ralson et al. 
(2001) and Horie (2010) also have this 
problem. Nevertheless some interesting 
conclusions can still be drawn.  
We first check the four time dummies for 
M&A. From table 5 we see that they are all 
insignificant for the Malmquist index. 
However, when we look at the components, 
we see a different picture. For the technical 
efficiency，date04 is significant (at 5% 
level). date03 is weakly significant (at 10% 
level) only in the bootstrapping results. In 
the equation for scale efficiency, date04 is 
highly significant (at 1% level). In the cases 
that the coefficients are significant, for LnT, 
the signs are negative, indicating M&A 
incidences in the year of FY 2001-FY 2004 
have positive effects on the technical 
efficiency. This is in line with the market 
power hypothesis. However, for LnS, the 
signs are positive. This may indicate that 
many banks formed after M&A are 
oversized. The coefficient of date04 is also 
much more significant in all equations. In the 
deduced results for LnE, the four time 
dummies are all insignificant. This tells that 
the M&A incidences have no significant 
effect on the changes of pure efficiency. The 
controversial effects of M&A incidences on 
LnT and LnS plus its insignificant effects on 
LnE may be the major reason why time 
dummies are all insignificant in the equation 
for LnM. As for the dynamics of the effects, 
the latest M&A cases have the most 
significant effects on these components.  
The paper then checks other variables which 
may be related with the M&A activities. 
First of all, M&A activities will increase 
bank scale. For the Malmquist index, the 
variable “dlnasset” (change of bank income) 
is only weakly significant both in the original 
and bootstrapping results (all at 10% level). 
However, it is highly significant in the 
equations for technical and scale efficiency 
(all at 1% level). It is insignificant in the 
deduced results for pure efficiency. In case 
of the total score and scale economy, the 
signs of the coefficients are negative. This 
indicates that most shinkin banks are in the 
position of increasing returns of scale and the 
increasing of scale has positive effects on 
their productivity changes and scale 
economy. On the other hand, in the equation 
for the technical efficiency, the sign of the 
coefficient is positive, which means bank 
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scale has negative effects on technical 
efficiency changes, which support the 
hypothesis that large banks lack the motive 
for technical progress. Combined with 
insignificance of the LnE, it is not surprising 
the variable is less significant in the equation 
for Malmquist index than in the equations for 
the two components. The results are 
consistent with the findings of Al-Sharkas et 
al. (2008) and Hahn (2007). 
As mentioned in the introduction, M&A may 
also cause the reduction of overcapacity and 
redundant labors. Thus they may bring out 
administration structure changes. For the 
three indices of administration efficiency, 
only dlnNH (number of department in 
headquarter/ number of branches) is weakly 
significant (at 10% level) in the equation for 
lnM, both in the original estimation and the 
bootstrapping results. Some variables are so 
insignificant in some equations that they are 
omitted from the corresponding equations. 
M&A also may strengthen the market power 
of the acquiring or merging banks. The sign 
of the variable dLnshare (market power of 
the shinkin banks) is positive in the equation 
for the total score, scale economy and the 
reduced results for the pure efficiency. This 
supports the hypothesis that market 
concentration has negative effects on the 
change of total productivity, pure efficiency 
and scale economy. On the other hand, in the 
equation for technical efficiency changes, its 
sign is negative, which is against the 
hypothesis the banks with market power are 
reluctant in adopting new technologies. 
However, they are all insignificant, whether 
according to the original estimation or the 
bootstrapping results. This means the change 
of market share has no significant effects on 
the productivity changes and its components. 
Though it is not our purpose, it is also 
interesting to check the results for other 
variables. For internal factors, the variable 
“dlnlp” (Loan loss provisions ratio) is only 
weakly significant (at 10% level) in the 
equation for dlnM. Its sign is positive. This 
means loan loss provisions have negative 
effects on the productivity changes. The 
variable “dlnCAR” (change of capital 
adequacy ratio) are significant for the 
Malmquist index and pure efficiency. In the 
equations which it is significant, its sign is 
negative, indicating that change of CAR ratio 
has positive effects on the productivity 
changes and pure efficiency. This support the 
hypothesis that high capital position makes 
shinkin banks take riskier but also more 
profitable strategies. The variable “dlnnpl” 
(change of NPL ratio) is significant only for 
the scale economy. Its sign is positive, 
indicating that increase of NPL ratio has 
negative effects for the change of scale 
economy. This is easy to understand, since 
banks with high npl ratio are constraint in 
their ability to increase their assets and 
exploit the economy of scale.  
The paper next checks the effects of external 
variables on productivity changes. The 
variable dlny (the change of taxable income) 
is only significant for the Malmquist index. 
In all equations, its signs are negative. This 
supports the hypothesis that shinkin banks 
which located in an area with higher 
economic growth rate will have higher 
growth rate of productivity and technical 
efficiency.  
For the indicators of economic activities, the 
variable ln id insti (the change of the number 
of enterprises) is only significant for LnS 
(only for original results). ln id manu  
(change of value of manufactures) are 
significant in varied degrees for the 
equations of LnM, LnS and LnE. But in 
some equations the signs of the variables are 
not what we expected. 
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For the two indicators about the population, 
the variable dlnpop (change of the population 
density) is significant only for LnS. 
However, in that equation its sign is positive. 
This means the growth rate of population 
density has negative effects on the growth of 
the scale economy. This is not what we 
assumed. The variable dlnold (the change of 
proportion of aged families) is insignificant 
for all the equations. In all equations its sign 
is negative. This means shinkin banks in the 
area with high growth rate of aging 
population have high rate of productivity 
growth. Again this is not what we assumed. 
However, some other researchers (Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas, 2008) also got the same 
contradictory results for efficiency analysis. 
Conclusions 
This paper at first estimates the productivity 
changes of shinkin banks in Japan during the 
period of FY 2005-FY 2008 and then 
investigates the effects of M&A activities on 
these changes. The paper finds that on 
average the productivities of shinkin banks 
have significantly decreased. Their pure and 
technical efficiencies also decreased. 
However, their economies of scale have 
significantly increased. It finds that merger 
incidents have significant effects only on the 
growth of the two components (technical and 
scale efficiency). It also discovers that the 
merger incidents occurred in FY 2004 have 
stronger effects on these two components. 
This may be because it is closest to the 
examined period.  
Some other factors which are closely related 
to the M&A also have significant effects on 
the productivity change and its components. 
The indicator of change of bank scale is 
significant for all the three equations. The 
indicator of change of market share is 
significant for two of the three equations.  
All these results prove that the M&A 
activities occurred during the early years of 
2000s have significant effects on the 
productivity changes and its components in 
shinkin banks. Thus they may offer some 
support for the policies of encouraging M&A 
activities. 
                                
Figure 1: number of M&A cases among shinkin banks in 2000s 
 
Sources of data： Annual reports of shinkin banks by Central shinkin banks 
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Table I  Descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs  
                                          Unit： million yen 
 y11 y12 x11 x12 y21 y22 x21 x22 
Min. 397 63 354 202 287 136 303 212 
1st Qu. 1531 422.5 966.5 698.2 1372 519.5 1014 710.2 
Median 2902 998.5 1807 1314 2528 1079 1827 1297 
Mean 4808 1475 2873 2161 4318 1666 2835 2178 
3rd Qu. 5660 1898 3434 2676 5088 2217 3359 2618 
Max. 31510 11880 18280 14030 26390 11050 17980 14220 
sd 5478  1589  3001  2401  4936  1723  2948  2457  
Note:   
y11=Net interest from loans in FY 2005       y21=Net interest from loans in FY 2008 
y12= Net other interest income in FY 2005    y22= Net other interest income in FY 2008 
x11= Labor expenses in FY 2005            x21= General expenses in FY 2008 
x12= Labor expenses in FY 2005            x22= General expenses in FY 2008 
Min, Median, Mean, Max and SD are the minimum, median, mean, max, and standard deviation of the 
sample, respectively. 
 
Table II  Descriptive statistics of the growth rate of internal variables  
                                                              Unit: %  
  LH LB NH Asset lp CAR npl 
Min. -35.110 -40.260 -100.000 -9.457 -78.800 -59.750 -70.670 
1st Qu. -7.360 -7.536 -1.161 1.202 -30.800 -3.762 -36.970 
Median 1.391 -1.925 4.555 3.832 -8.363 6.567 -24.310 
Mean 5.899 -1.015 8.622 4.441 4.951 5.355 -19.360 
3rd Qu. 13.110 4.235 17.040 7.801 21.050 16.730 -11.060 
Max. 253.300 127.800 160.000 23.180 617.500 58.070 116.500 
sd 25.783 12.719 29.218 5.408 67.440 18.043 27.219 
Note: variables are defined as in section II C. Min, Median, Mean, Max and sd are defined as in table I. 
 
Table III  Descriptive statistics of the growth rate of the external variables 
                                                           Unit: % 
  share income institute manu pop old 
Min. -70.00  -56.09  -57.24  -28.70  -87.21  -38.16  
1st Qu. -4.58  1.83  -1.39  0.59  -3.68  9.53  
Median 0.00  5.04  1.08  10.18  -0.83  12.89  
Mean 0.15  7.27  12.70  13.36  0.49  14.19  
3rd Qu. 3.20  8.91  4.10  19.52  2.04  15.52  
Max. 125.30  388.30  2177.00  387.30  309.60  199.00  
var 14.69  27.58  138.36  30.30  23.55  17.23  
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Table IV  Descriptive Statistics of the Malmquist results 
 
 malm pure tech scale 
Min. 0.9509 0.9066 0.9867 0.8937 
1st Qu. 1.001 0.9783 1.021 0.9758 
Median 1.034 1.001 1.038 0.9939 
Mean 1.035 1.01 1.037 0.9896 
3rd Qu. 1.06 1.04 1.051 1.001 
Max. 1.217 1.206 1.09 1.068 
sd 0.046 0.048 0.02 0.046 
Note: 
   malm = malmquist index;                   pure= pure efficiency score;   
tech= technical efficiency score              scale = scale economy score 
Table V Estimation results of the second stage model 
  LnM LnT LnS 
  Original Boot Original boot Original boot 
(Intercept) 0.03116 0.00377 0.03359 0.03361 0.00141 0.0013 
 (0.00615) ***  (0.00569)***  (0.00204)*** (0.00197)***  (0.00373) (0.00366) 
dlnasset -0.09079 -0.19115 0.06126 0.06126 -0.14101 -0.1383 
 (0.05320 )* (0.05139)*  (0.02315)***  (0.02217)***  (0.03077)***  (0.03030)***  
dlnlp -0.0074 -0.01514 0.00564 0.00561 -0.00458 -0.00463 
 (0.00786) (0.00763) (0.00336)*  (0.00331)*  (0.00454) (0.00415) 
dlnCAR -0.03787 -0.0379   0.01432 0.01378 
 (0.01550)**  (0.01520)***    (0.00895) (0.00848) 
dlnnpl -0.00821 -0.00724 -0.00556 
-0.00567 0.02416 0.02418 
 (0.01208) (0.01162) (0.00533) (0.00515) (0.00699)***  (0.00661)***  
dlnLH 0.00975 0.00983 -0.00759 
-0.00778 0.01161 0.01144 
 (0.01431) -0.01374 (0.00632) (0.00609) (0.00822) (0.00806) 
dlnLB   -0.00947 
-0.00948 -0.01342 -0.01312 
   (0.01063) (0.01007) (0.01384) (0.01353) 
dlnNH -0.01411 -0.01735 -0.00388 
-0.00397  
 
 (0.00848)*  (0.00791)*  (0.00376) (0.00367)  
 
date01 -0.01543 -0.01438 -0.00912 
-0.00912 0.01039 0.01043 
 (0.01332) (0.01310) (0.00589) (0.00572) (0.00770) (0.00725) 
date02 0.01067 0.01917 0.00192 0.00192 -0.00086 -0.00078 
 (0.00897) (0.00849) (0.00394) (0.00387) (0.00518) (0.00489) 
date03 -0.00014 0.01379 -0.00811 
-0.00784 -0.00089 -0.00077 
 (0.01140) (0.01097) (0.00502) (0.00472)*  (0.00659) (0.00640) 
date04 -0.01109 -0.0149 -0.01639 
-0.01609 0.03002 0.02988 
 (0.01684) (0.01645) (0.00739)**  (0.00730)**  (0.00974)***  (0.00949)***  
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dlnshare 0.03428 0.03697 -0.00939 
-0.009 0.01941 0.01936 
 (0.02327) (0.02293) (0.01019) (0.00987) (0.01353) (0.01303) 
dlny -0.00966 -0.01931 -0.00415 
-0.00415 -0.00776 -0.0077 
 (0.01122)**  (0.01090) (0.00486) (0.00462) (0.00657) (0.00602) 
dlninsti   0.00684 0.00697 -0.01264 -0.00631 
   (0.00493) (0.00466) (0.00769)*  (0.00911) 
dlnmanu 0.03326 0.03825   -0.0061 
-0.0125 
 (0.01586) (0.01560)**    (0.00922) (0.00754)*  
Dlnpop -0.00354 0.0229 -0.00979 
-0.00982 0.01826 0.01846 
 (0.01744) (0.01663) (0.00693) (0.00677) (0.01008 )* (0.00950)**  
Dlnold 0.01484 -0.00826  
 
-0.0078 
-0.00793 
 (0.02964) (0.02703)   (0.02023) (0.01933) 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.04283   0.05011   0.1326   
LnE  Original boot 
(Intercept) 
-0.00384 -0.00379 
 (0.00748) (0.00740) 
dlnasset 
-0.01103 -0.01389 
 (0.06567) (0.06661) 
dlnlp 
-0.00846 -0.00857 
 (0.00968) (0.00933) 
dlnCAR 
-0.05219 -0.05209 
 (0.01789) *** (0.01783) ***  
dlnnpl 
-0.02682 -0.02647 
 (0.01494) *  （ ）0.01462 *  
dlnLH 0.00572 0.00708 
 (0.01767) (0.01796) 
dlnLB 0.02289 0.0226 
 (0.01745) (0.01749) 
dlnNH 
-0.01023 -0.0108 
 (0.00927) (0.00896) 
date01 
-0.01669 -0.01652 
 (0.01648) (0.01614) 
date02 0.00961 0.00943 
 (0.01108) (0.01067) 
date03 0.00886 0.00894 
 (0.01409) (0.01381) 
date04 
-0.02472 -0.02389 
 (0.02081) (0.02034) 
dlnshare 0.02426 0.02309 
 (0.02878) (0.02823) 
dlny 0.00225 0.00211 
 (0.01388) (0.01336) 
International Research Journal of Applied Finance         ISSN 2229 – 6891   
Vol. V  Issue – 1  January, 2014 
92 
 
dlninsti 0.0058 -0.00066 
 (0.00913) (0.00989) 
dlnmanu 0.03936 0.04581 
 (0.01835) ***  （ ）0.01692 ***  
dlnpdensity 
-0.01201 -0.01209 
 (0.02130) (0.02079) 
dlnold 0.02264 0.02354 
 (0.03589) (0.03481) 
Adjusted R-squared 
  
Note:  a．***: significant at 1% level., **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 10 % level 
b. figure in bracket is the standard error of the estimated coefficient. 
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